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Abstract 
This study will observe the British state’s capture, release and recapture of occupational health 
and safety (OHS).  The state incrementally ‘captured’ OHS via the passing of the nineteenth-
century factories acts.   The state developed new forms of intervention that grew in scope and 
ambition.  However, such growth was problematic; the state gradually became overloaded by the 
accumulation of factories acts.  Correspondingly, the state observed a surge of voluntary 
initiatives to prevent workplace accidents.  Motivated by these developments, the state ‘released’ 
some of its responsibilities to non-departmental public bodies and non-state actors through the 
enactment of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.  The ‘release’ facilitated a network of 
non-departmental public bodies and non-state actors to expand and develop into a formidable 
OHS network.  However, within just a few years of its existence, the OHS network was 
confronted by successive governments that sought to limit its autonomy and ‘recapture’ OHS. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.0 General introduction                                                                                                             
Occupational health and safety (OHS) developed in tandem with the development of state 
intervention.  It is problematic to explain the development of state intervention without reference 
to OHS.  In this vein, Peter Bartrip believed that his examination of government intervention 
could not afford to overlook the regulation of factories ‘for this exerted a powerful 
demonstration effect when other possibilities of regulation arose’.1  Debates around the 
regulation of the workplace were attached to the definition of government; it was the ‘most 
controversial state interventionist issue in early Victorian Britain’.2   
Crucial to understanding government is to understand the state’s capacity to capture, release and 
recapture core functions.  This study will observe the state’s capture, release and recapture of 
OHS.  Never has the state captured, released or recaptured OHS in its totality.  The notions of 
capture, release and recapture are not complete dichotomies.  Instead, we should view them on a 
spectrum.  The state incrementally ‘captured’ OHS via the passing of the nineteenth-century 
factories acts.  The state gradually regulated aspects of working conditions for the textile, 
bleaching and dyeing, lace work, percussion cap-making, cartridge-making, paper staining, 
fustian cutting, earthenware manufacture and lucifer match-making industries.  The state had 
legitimated ‘new forms of intervention’, which grew in scope as the century progressed.3  
However, manufacturing interests maintained some degree of influence over the state.4   
Correspondingly, the state ‘released’ OHS through its establishment of the Health and Safety 
Commission and the Health and Safety Executive (HSC/E) in the 1970s.5  However, these bodies 
                                                     
1 P.W.J. Bartrip, ‘British Government Inspection, 1832 – 1875: Some Observations’ (1982) 25 HJ 3 p605, p611 
2 W.C. Lubenow, The Politics of Government Growth, Early Victorian Attitudes towards State Intervention 1833 - 
48 (Newton Abbot 1971) p137 
3 Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the First Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Ac, 1802' in Norman 
Landau (ed), Law, Crime and English Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002) p255 
4 P.W.J. Bartrip and P.T Fenn, ‘The Evolution of Regulatory Style in the Nineteenth Century British Factory 
Inspectorate’ (1983) 10 JLS 2 p201 
5 Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford University 
Press 2003) p148 
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operated under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.6  As R.A.W. Rhodes states, ‘They are dependent on 
central agencies for legal authority and financial resources’.7   The period of ‘release’ was short-
lived; the state gradually began to ‘recapture’ OHS through the erosion of the independence of 
its non – departmental public bodies.  This spectrum of capture, release and recapture has shaped 
the history of OHS.   
 
1.1 Overview of the thesis                                                                                                                                            
In the late eighteenth century, a collective of non-state actors employed practical methods to 
protect communities from the harms of the work environment.8  One group, in particular, has 
received significant attention; the collective of Manchester physicians.9   Led by Dr Thomas 
Percival, this collective employed a number of practical methods to ameliorate outbreaks of 
putrid fevers in the Lancashire area.   The content of which was incorporated into the Health and 
Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802.  It from this point that the state gradually ‘captured’ OHS 
through assuming primary responsibility for protecting some of its citizens from the harms of the 
work environment.10  The 1802 Act ushered in the first era of factory legislation.  Acts followed 
it in 1819 and 1825 that exhibited a similar sentiment.  This was profoundly significant; by 
                                                     
6 R.A.W. Rhodes, Network Governance and the Differentiated Polity: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press 
2017) 
7 R.A.W. Rhodes, Network Governance and the Differentiated Polity: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press 
2017) p75 
8 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press 2001) 
James A. Swaney and Martin A. Evers, ‘The Social Cost Concepts of K. William Kapp and Karl Polanyi’ (1989) 23 
JEI p7 
9 B.L. Hutchins and A. Harrison, A History of Factory Legislation (Frank Cass & Co 1966); T.K. Djang, Factory 
Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942); M.W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation (Thames 
Bank 1948); James Smiley, ‘Some Aspects of the Early Evolution of the Appointed Factory Doctor Service’ (1971) 
28 BJIM 4 p315; W.G. Carson, ‘The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime’ (1979) 7 IJSL p38; Alexander 
Meiklejohn, ‘Industrial Health: Meeting the Challenge’ (1959) 16 BJIM 1 p1; Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the First 
Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Ac, 1802' in Norman Landau (ed), Law, Crime and English 
Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002); Edward Royle, Robert Owen and the Commencement of 
the Millennium: The Harmony Community (Manchester University Press 1998) p11; Robert B. Williams, 
Accounting for Steam and Cotton: Two Eighteenth Century Case Studies (Garland Publishing 1997) p72; Pamela 
Horn, Children's Work and Welfare 1780-1890 (Cambridge University Press) p23; C. Wilkinson, Fundamentals of 
Health at Work: The Social Dimensions (Taylor & Francis 2001) p27; W.R. Lee, ‘Emergence of Occupational 
Medicine in Victorian Times’ (1973) 30 BJIM 2 p119, p118; Kevin White, ‘Introduction’ in Kevin White (ed), The 
Early Sociology of Health and Illness, Volume 1 (Routledge 2001) pxx 
10 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942); Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the 
First Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Ac, 1802' in Norman Landau (ed), Law, Crime and 
English Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002) 
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passing these acts, the fundamental principle of state interference with free labour was 
cemented.11  It is mistaken to view the regulation of workplaces as merely an adjunct function 
taken on by the state; instead, the decision to regulate the workplace was how it became a state; 
an ‘active force, doing or choosing not to do particular things’.12   
Bound by precedent, the state was expected to be an ‘active force’ to intervene when ‘evils’ were 
uncovered.13  Beginning with the regulation of the textile industry, it then turned its attention to 
bleaching and dyeing, lace work, percussion cap-making, cartridge-making, paper staining, 
fustian cutting, earthenware manufacture and lucifer match-making.  To accommodate these 
growing responsibilities, there was an incremental increase in personnel and budget, albeit not at 
the rate that was fitting for such a broad remit, but enough to demonstrate that the state was 
capturing OHS.  In the late nineteenth century, the state’s accumulation of factory legislation 
was moderated with a concern to regulate the workplace more effectively.14  Regarding this 
development, Oliver Macdonagh stated: 
They began to undertake more systematic and truly statistical and experimental investigations. They strove 
to get and to keep in touch with the inventions, new techniques and foreign practices relevant to their field.   
They even called directly upon medicine and engineering, and the infant professions of research chemistry 
and biology, to find answers to intractable difficulties.15 
From the late nineteenth century, several initiatives were undertaken to review, improve and 
consolidate factory regulation.  These initiatives were critical for the maturation of factory 
regulation; acceptance that non – state actors could play a larger role and the acknowledgement 
                                                     
11 M.W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation (Thames Bank 1948) p26; Hylton Dale, ‘Child Labor under 
Capitalism’ in Sally Alexander, Women's Fabian Tracts Volume VII (Routledge 1988) p56; B.L. Hutchins and A. 
Harrison, A History of Factory Legislation (Frank Cass & Co 1966) 
12 Joanna Innes, ‘Forms of ‘government growth’, 1780–1830’ in David Feldman and Jon Lawrence (eds) Structures 
and Transformations in Modern British History (Cambridge University Press 2011) p79 
13 Oliver MacDonagh, 'The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal' (1958) 1 HJ 1 p52 
14 Oliver MacDonagh, 'The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal' (1958) 1 HJ 1 p52 
P.W.J Bartrip, ‘British Government Inspection, 1832 – 1875: Some Observations’ (1982) 25 HJ 3 p605 
15 Oliver MacDonagh, 'The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal' (1958) 1 HJ 1 p52, p60 - 
61 
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that state-centric legislation had its limits.16  However, these considerations would remain in the 
background until the Factory Department’s transfer to the Ministry of Labour and National 
Service in 1940.  Though advances had been made in the early twentieth century, they were 
amplified when the Factory Department relocated to the Ministry.  The Ministry was a relatively 
young department unfettered by precedent and tradition like the Great Offices of State.17  It was 
accustomed to adopting new roles and responsibilities placed on it by other departments.18  
Moreover, when Ernest Bevin accepted the ministerial post in Winston Churchill's Coalition 
government, he did so on the condition that he be allowed to take measures to improve the 
conditions of workers.19  On his first day, Bevin filled up four sheets of paper with a programme 
of action that ‘transformed the attitude and the role of the Ministry of Labour’.20  Prime among 
his programme of action was to give OHS a new footing.21 
This new footing gave OHS corporatist backing and led to a surge in government action to 
improve the working conditions of the British public.22  These currents of the post-war period 
contributed to two critical developments.  First, the atmosphere of collaboration and input 
prompted significant non-state interest and activity in the arena of OHS.23  Non – state actors 
working for the betterment of working conditions independently demonstrated to the Ministry 
that industry had the potential to mobilise and address the rising accident rates.  Second, it 
                                                     
16 John B. Andrews, British Factory Inspection; A Century of Progress No. 11 (United States Department of Labor 
1937); T.K Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942); H.A. Mess, Factory 
Legislation and its Administration 1891 – 1924 (P.S King 1924); George Moses Price, Administration of Labor 
Laws and Factory Inspection in Certain European Countries (Washington Government Printing Office 1914) 
17 Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain 1890 - 
2000 (Princeton University Press 2007) p75 – 82; Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, ‘The 
Ministry of Labour of Great Britain’ (1923) 5 JCLIL 1 p99 
18 Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain 1890 - 
2000 (Princeton University Press 2007) p75 – 82; Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, ‘The 
Ministry of Labour of Great Britain’ (1923) 5 JCLIL 1 p99 
19 Robert Mackay, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain During the Second World War (Manchester 
University Press 2002) p205 - 206 
20 Alan Bullock, The Life & Times of Ernest Bevin - Minister of Labour 1940 – 1945 (Heinemann 1967) p12 
21 Norman George Price, ‘The Relationship of the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour with the Treasury 
Establishment Division 1919 – 1946: An Evaluation of Contrasting Needs’ (PhD Thesis, London School of 
Economics 1991) p253 - 254 
22 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) 
23 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) 
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helped create a sense of inconsequential reform.24  The surge of the Ministry of Labour’s 
corporatist, welfarist and legislative activity in the post-war period did not have a discernible 
impact on working conditions.  The rigidity of government had been stretched by the Ministry of 
Labour’s programme of action with no discernable benefit.  Both of these developments were 
critical to the appointment of the Robens committee.25  The Robens committee was significant 
because it pointed the way towards the ‘release’ of certain responsibilities to individuals and 
groups outside of central government.26  The proposals of the committee made its way through 
the Houses with the passing of the Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAWA) in 1974.  The 
HASAWA was a bold and emancipating act.27  The Health and Safety Commission and the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSC/E) were established with the enactment of HASAWA.28  The 
initial nurturing of these bodies created a quasi-autonomous, well – rounded and formidable 
governance network.  However, the network was not given the opportunity to fully develop.  
From the winter of 1979, successive governments eroded and restricted its regulatory mandate, 
autonomy and effectiveness,29 in doing so, the government began to recapture OHS. 
 
 
1.2 The significance of the thesis                                                                                                          
The significance of this study lies in four matters.  First, a period in the history of OHS has been 
left under-researched and under-theorised.  There are a number of foundational and influential 
texts that help us understand two important periods of OHS.  The period of the nineteenth 
century30 and the latter part of the twentieth century.31  However, the decades in-between these 
                                                     
24 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) 
25 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) 
26 Sandra Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988) 
27 R.C. Browne, ‘Safety and Health at Work: The Robens Report’ (1973) 30 BJIM 1 p87 
28 R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Open 
University Press 1997); R.A.W Rhodes, Network Governance and the Differentiated Polity: Selected Essays 
(Oxford University Press 2017) 
29 Theo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury (Mansell 1997); Steve Tombs and David Whyte, ‘Deadly 
Consensus Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation under New Labour’ (2010) 50 BJC 1 p46, p48 – 50; Sandra 
Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988); Paul 
Almond, ‘Revolution Blues: ‘The Reconstruction of Health and Safety Law as ‘Common-sense’ Regulation’ (2015) 
42 JLS 2 p202 
30 For example, M.W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation (Thames Bank 1948); B.L. Hutchins and A. Harrison, 
A History of Factory Legislation (Frank Cass & Co 1966); John Fielden, The Curse of the Factory System (Frank 
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periods, there is not much literature.  The few studies focusing on this period were written in that 
period.32  Therefore, we do not benefit from the long view.  To address such issues, this study 
offers two chapters that cover this period.  Second, the vast majority of studies are fixated on the 
government, HSE, HSC and the Inspectorates.  Few studies look at non-governmental activity.  
It is imperative that we go beyond our state-centric fixation and include the efforts of the 
countless men and women that also contributed to OHS policy and practice.  As Hugh Heclo, 
one of the first scholars to document the activities of ‘issue networks’, explained, ‘Looking for 
the few who are powerful, we tend to overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and 
guide the exercise of power’.33  It is problematic to discuss capture, release and recapture 
without reference to critical developments amongst non – state actors.  Third, to shed light on 
either unexplored areas or to bring fresh perspectives, this study utilises unpublished interviews 
with prominent figures in OHS and archival materials from the National Archives, the TUC 
Library and the Modern Records Centre.  Fourth, there is also significant engagement with 
theory to frame and explain key occurrences in OHS history.  To make the best use of the 
sources above, this study has drawn from the theoretical work around networks and the 
hollowing out of the state.  Descriptive accounts dominate the landscape of OHS, there are very 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Cass & Co 1969); P.W.J. Bartrip, ‘British Government Inspection, 1832 – 1875: Some Observations’ (1982) 25 HJ 
3 p605; Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the First Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Ac, 1802' in 
Norman Landau (ed), Law, Crime and English Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002) p230; Peter 
Bartrip, The Way from Dusty Death: Turner and Newall and the Regulation of the British Asbestos Industry 1890s-
1970 (Bloomsbury 2001); Peter Bartrip, ‘Success or Failure? The Prosecution of the Early Factory Acts’ (1985) 38 
EHR 3 p423; Robert Gray, The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830-1860 (Cambridge University Press 
1996); Robert Gray, ‘Medical Men, Industrial Labour and the State in Britain' (1991) 16 SH 1 p19; Peter Kirby, 
Child Workers and Industrial Health in Britain, 1780-1850 (Boydell & Brewer 2013); B.L. Hutchinson and A. 
Harrison, A History of Factory Legislation (2nd edn, P.S King 1911) 
31 For example, Theo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury (Mansell 1997); Sandra Dawson and others, Safety 
at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988); Bridget M. Hutter, Regulation and Risk: 
Occupational Health and Safety on the Railways (Oxford University Press 2001); Keith Hawkins, Law as Last 
Resort: Prosecution Decision-making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford University Press 2002); Vicky Long, The 
Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory: The Politics of Industrial Health in Britain 1914 - 60 (Palgrave Macmillan 
2011) 
32 John B. Andrews, British Factory Inspection; A Century of Progress No. 11 (United States Department of Labor 
1937); T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942); H.A. Mess, Factory 
Legislation and its Administration 1891 – 1924 (P.S King 1924); George Moses Price, Administration of Labor 
Laws and Factory Inspection in Certain European Countries (Washington Government Printing Office 1914) 
33 Hugh Heclo 'Issue networks and the Executive Establishment' in Anthony King (ed), The New American Political 
System (American Enterprise Institute 1978) p102 
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few accounts that generate their own theory or benefit from decades of theoretical work that 
broadly correlates with the development of OHS.  
 
1.3 The scope of the thesis                                                                                                                        
The scope of this study is from the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802 until the demise 
of the Coalition government in 2015.  In order to observe incremental change, it is vital to 
observe such a vast period.  Faced with this task, this study will focus on elements related to 
capture, release and recapture.  This provides the study with a basic framework to include or 
omit events.  For instance, this study did not spend much time highlighting the closure of the 
HSC.  By the time it was abolished, it was not able to insulate the HSE from the recapture of 
government.34  This study is neither a history of OHS legislation nor an administrative history of 
regulatory agencies.  Instead, it is conceptually anchored towards the notions of capture, release 
and recapture.  Another consideration regarding the large period of investigation is that it shares 
some connection with existing literature.  It is difficult to find a study in this field that does not 
begin with the nineteenth-century factories acts or at the very least refers to past occurrences.  
This is because of the incremental nature of OHS that does not permit researchers to begin their 
study at any arbitrary period without referencing the past.  It is inconceivable to discuss the 
Löfstedt Review without discussing the Robens Report or to discuss the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 without discussing the previous factories acts.   
 
1.4 The capture, release and recapture of OHS  
There is not one particular theory that explains the capture, release and recapture of OHS.  The 
developments within OHS were far too varied to accommodate any overarching theory.  As 
famed commentator Sidney Webb stated, reformers were not guided by any ‘abstract theory…  
but instead responded pragmatically to particular problems as they emerged.  We seem always to 
                                                     
34 Alan Dalton, Safety, Health and Environmental Hazards at the Workplace (Cassell 1998); Alan Dalton, 
‘Consensus Kills Health and Safety Tripartism: A Hazard to Workers’ Health?’ (The Carbon Monoxide Gas Safety 
Society, n.d.) < http://www.co-gassafety.co.uk/consensus-kills-by-alan-dalton/ > accessed 30 October 2016 
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have been inescapable of taking a general view of the subject we were legislating upon’.35  
However, there were crucial themes that informed particular periods of OHS which this study 
has drawn from.  What follows is an overview of what informed the notions of capture, release 
and recapture. 
 
1.4.1 Capture                                                                                                                                
Capture involves the state assuming prime responsibility for the policy and practice of OHS, 
exerting a significant influence over the administration of factory regulation, influence over the 
day-to-day decision–making processes and restrictive roles for non-state actors.  The mood for 
the government’s capture of OHS was prompted by the detrimental consequences of the 
productive process, depicted by Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation.  Polanyi’s work enhances 
this thesis through the provision of a broad framework for the identification and understanding of 
the adverse consequences of industrialisation in the late eighteenth century.36  Moreover, 
Transformation’s distinctive merit is theorising the reaction to the consequences of 
industrialisation.  It helps to frame the spontaneous reactions or countermovements.37  Merits 
aside, there are a number of issues with Polanyi’s thesis; generalities, contradictions and 
interpretation of events are problematic.38  However, his broad ideas are of interest.39  The early 
history of OHS draws many parallels with these ideas.40  Also, there is a sufficient body of work 
on the factory question that permits us to leave his more problematic assertions to one side.  
Polanyi's concept of the countermovement is powerful in explaining change, but it fails to 
explain the normalisation of the expansion of factory regulation or the continued capture.  
                                                     
35 Cited in Vivien Hart, Bound by Our Constitution: Women, Workers, and the Minimum Wage (Princeton 
University Press 1994) p176 - 177 
36 James A. Swaney and Martin A. Evers, ‘The Social Cost Concepts of K. William Kapp and Karl Polanyi’ (1989) 
23 JEI p7 
37 See for example Anne Mayhew, ‘Polanyi's Double Movement and Veblen on the Army of the Commonweal’ 
(1989) 23 JEI 2 p555 
38 Jan Drahokoupil, ‘Re-Inventing Karl Polanyi: On the Contradictory Interpretations of Social Protectionism’ 
(2004) 40 CSR p835 
39 Margaret Lewis, 'The Age Demanded: The Rhetoric of Karl Polanyi' (1991) 25 JEI 2 p475 
40 P.W.J. Bartrip and P.T. Fenn, ‘The Evolution of Regulatory Style in the Nineteenth Century British Factory 
Inspectorate’ (1983) 10 JLS 2 p201 
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Despite the reduction of the miseries of industrialisation, government regulation of the 
workplace continued to grow.   
Due to this consideration, we turn to Oliver Macdonagh’s model to help shed light on the 
government’s capture of the workplace.  Just a decade after Polanyi’s Transformation, 
Macdonagh observed the expanding role of government in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.  This observation led him to develop a model of the ‘self-generating, administrative 
momentum’ of government.  This model provides framing so that ‘particular factors can be 
grouped and the particular developments evaluated’.41  Macdonagh’s observation allows us to 
see that the regulation of the workplace brought more regulation of the workplace; assuming 
responsibilities brought more responsibilities.  This in no way disregards external drivers of 
regulatory growth; all can be accommodated within the model.  Thus, Macdonagh’s model is 
among the ‘safest’ vantage points to observe the government’s extension of workplace regulation 
because it is broad enough to accommodate other considerations, such as humanitarian pursuits, 
Benthamism, influence of manufacturers or party spirit.  On this basis, succeeding writers on 
nineteenth-century government have not strayed too far from MacDonagh’s model.42  Similarly, 
Denis Paz noted that ‘MacDonagh and the ‘pragmatic’ school have...  the better part of the 
debate’.43   
 
1.4.2 Release                                                                                                                                     
The release of OHS involved the dissemination of certain responsibilities to the HSC/E, the 
ability of the HSC/E to introduce legislation without scrutiny, autonomy in the day-to-day 
decision–making processes, the HSC/E’s inclusion of non–state actors into the policy-making 
process and the widening of the HSC/E’s regulatory mandate.  This notion is informed from two 
strands of literature.  First, the ‘hollow state’ thesis, which is a metaphor used to describe the 
                                                     
41 Oliver MacDonagh, 'The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal' (1958) 1 HJ 1 p52, p63 
42 Marlene A. Arieno, Victorian Lunatics: A Social Epidemiology of Mental Illness in Mid Nineteenth Century 
England (Susquehanna University Press, 1989) p103; D. Roberts, ‘Jeremy Bentham and the Victorian 
Administrative State’ (1959) 2 VS 3 p193 – 210; G. Kitson Clark, The Making of Victorian England (Routledge 
1962); R. J. Lambert, ‘A Victorian National Health Service - State Vaccination, 1855-71’ (1962) 5 HJ p1 - I8 
43 Denis G. Paz, The Politics of Working-class Education in Britain, 1830-50 (Manchester University Press 1980) p8 
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practice of governments contracting out service provision.44  In the latter decades of the 
twentieth century, the ‘hollow state’, ‘state of agents’, the ‘substitute state’, ‘disarticulated state’, 
‘third party state’, ‘networked state’, ‘enterprise state’ ‘neo-managerialist state’ and ‘marketized 
public administration’ were all attempts to explain how conventional government had ceded 
away some of its core functions.45  In this light, the enactment of the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974 established the HSC/E to oversee OHS policy and implementation.  Through the 
creation of these bodies, the core executive conceded its capacity ‘outwards’, which resulted in 
the hollowing out of the state.46    
The second strand of literature utilises the network thesis.  The notion of a ‘network’ came out of 
a range of ‘decentred’ accounts that sought to document the shift from ‘hierarchically organized, 
unitary systems of government that govern by means of law, rule and order, to more horizontally 
organized and relatively fragmented systems of governance that govern through the regulation of 
self-regulating networks’.47  The network form existed when many ‘nodes’ (experts, 
governmental and non–governmental organisations) are linked to many other ‘nodes’, which are 
all ‘tied’ together by a common area of interest.48  Numerous metaphors have been used to 
describe this configuration (‘lattice’, ‘web’, ‘matrix’, as well as network’), and all sought to 
evoke the logic of decentralised and integrated connectivity which defined the essence of the 
                                                     
44 Chris Skelcher, ‘Changing Images of the State: Overloaded, Hollowed-Out, Congested’ 15 PP 3 p3; Michael 
Saward, ‘In Search of the Hollow Crown’ in Patrick Weller, Herman Bakvis and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds), 
Countervailing Trends in Core Executives (Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding 
Governance Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Open University Press 1997) 
Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, Interpreting British Governance (Routledge 2003); Mark Bevir and R.A.W 
Rhodes, ‘Public Administration without Foundations: The Case of Britain’ (1998) 20 ATP 1 p3 
45 R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Open 
University Press 1997) 
46 Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Public Administration without Foundations: The Case of Britain’ (1998) 20 
ATP 1 p3 
47 Eva Sørensen, ‘Democratic Theory and Network Governance’ (2002) 24 ATP 4 p693; Manuel Castells, The Rise 
of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy Volume 1 (2nd edn, Wiley Blackwell 2011); Jan van Dijk, 
The Network Society (Sage Publications 2012); Jan Kooiman (ed), Modern Governance: New Government-Society 
Interactions (Sage Publications 1993); Walter J M Kickert Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop F.M. Koppenjan (eds), 
Managing Complex Networks Strategies for the Public Sector (Sage 1997); Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, 
‘Network Governance and Post-Liberal Democracy’ (2005) 27 ATP 2 p197; Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (eds), 
Theories of Democratic Network Governance (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 
48 Darin Barney, The Network Society (Polity Press 2004)  
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OHS Network.49  The literature on networks is not without its critics.  A standard charge centres 
on the metaphorical nature of the network literature.50  Undoubtedly, the notion of the network is 
an ideal type, a streamlined schematic of reality.51  This is not necessarily a weakness; Patrick 
Kenis and Volker Schneider saw that describing the network as a metaphor enables us to capture 
the ‘architecture of complexity’.52  As was demonstrated through past attempts, the metaphor of 
the network helped us make sense of complex and tumultuous modern realities.53  Interestingly, 
the metaphor of the network was likened to Harry Beck’s London Underground map; Beck 
designed his circuit diagram with the intent of making complex routes and confusing 
interchanges fathomable to the observer.54  Related to the allegation of metaphor is the notion 
that the literature on networks offers little explanatory insights.55  The literature on networks 
inclines towards generality and has had a very irregular record on producing empirical work.56  
In response to this criticism, this study has confined itself to a particular area in an effort to 
garner ‘thick description’; no grand theory is proposed, just an illumination of critical events that 
took place in one area of government.  A network focus is just one aspect of viewing OHS 
practice and policy.   
 
1.4.3 Recapture                                                                                                                       
Recapture involves the loss of the HSE’s autonomy and independence, marginalisation, 
restriction of regulatory mandate, interference in the decision–making process and alignment 
                                                     
49 Darin Barney, The Network Society (Polity Press 2004)  
50 Barrie Houlihan, Sport, Policy and Politics: A Comparative Analysis (Routledge 1997) 
51 Wayne Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 1995) 
52 Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical 
Toolbox’ in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (eds), Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Considerations (Boulder 1992) 
53 Hugh Heclo, ‘Issue networks and the executive establishment’ in Anthony King (ed), The New American Political 
System (AEI Press 1978); Kenneth Hanf and Fritz W. Scharpf Interorganizational Policy-Making: Limits to Co-
ordination and Central Control (Sage 1978); Peter J. Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty, Foreign Economic 
Policies of Advanced Industrial States (University of Wisconsin Press 1978) 
54 Karen Heard - Laureote, 'Transnational Networks: Informal Governance in the European Political Space' in 
Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie (eds), Transnational European Union: Towards a Common Political Space 
(Routledge 2015) 
55 Keith Dowding, ‘There Must Be End to Confusion: Policy Networks, Intellectual Fatigue, and the Need for 
Political Science Methods Courses in British Universities’ (2001) 49 PS 1 p89 
56 R.A.W. Rhodes, Network Governance and the Differentiated Polity: Selected Essays, Volume 1 (Oxford 
University Press 2017); Barrie Houlihan, Sport, Policy and Politics: A Comparative Analysis (Routledge 1997) 
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with the government.  To depict the recapturing of OHS, this study draws from the notion of the 
‘surround’.  The surround was one of the organising principles utilised by Keith Hawkins to 
direct our attention to the broader context in which regulatory decision–making took place.57  
Hawkins suggests that changes in the surround impact actors ‘on the ground’ either through 
central policy shifts or through the modification of their behaviour.58  Though Hawkins did not 
point to the origin of this organising principle, it appears that it was extracted from the recurrent 
themes in his interviews with HSE staff.  Also, it bears a similarity to an earlier study conducted 
by Michael Lipsky59 which suggested that broad cultural values informed ground-level 
bureaucratic decision–making.60   
In addition, the ‘steering’ literature proves useful in explaining how the HSC/E was ‘steered’ 
into moderation and eventual recapture.  Within the British context, it was articulated by Andrew 
Dunsire, and then developed by Rod Rhodes; steering was a ‘synonym for a mode of control 
which involves setting a norm and correcting deviations from it’.61  Steering describes how 
governments ‘manage’ and moderate their sprawling networks of public, private and voluntary 
actors.   
 
1.5 The layout of the thesis                                                                                                                      
Chapter Two: The Capture of OHS (1802 – 1870s)                                                                     
Chapter Two explores how occupational health and safety (OHS) began as a reactionary 
movement to the adverse consequences of industrialisation of the late eighteenth century.  
Leading the movement was a collective of Manchester physicians who sought to mitigate the 
harmful working conditions of the urban poor.  Their practical methods were appreciated by 
                                                     
57 Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort Prosecution Decision – Making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford University 
Press 2002) p115 - 135 
58 Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort Prosecution Decision – Making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford University 
Press 2002) p115 - 135 
59 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: The Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service (Russell Sage 
Foundation 1980) 
60 Hawkins references Michael Lipsky in Law as Last Resort Prosecution Decision – Making in a Regulatory 
Agency. 
61 R.A.W. Rhodes, Network Governance and the Differentiated Polity: Selected Essays, Volume 1 (Oxford 
University Press 2017) p161 
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local government and prompted the development of the first factories acts.  In passing these acts, 
Parliament accepted the principle that the issue of working conditions required its consideration 
and intervention.  This chapter serves to highlight how factory regulation was threaded into the 
fabric of government.                                                                                                                            
Chapter Three: The Extension of the Capture of OHS (1870s – 1930s)                                            
This chapter charts the development of OHS from the late nineteenth century in which there was 
a concerted effort to improve the quality of OHS regulation.  Moving from its narrow legislative 
origins, the government implemented a number of initiatives to broaden OHS regulation.  
However, the lack of discernible impact pointed to the problematic nature of developing OHS 
within the confines of Westminster.  This chapter seeks to understand the expansion of factory 
regulation, not merely regarding the proliferation of statute, but also regarding the refinement of 
processes to bring about greater compliance.  In some ways, the process of refining government 
embedded government further into the factory regulation, but it also prompted government 
officials to conceive of alternative ways to fill the ‘gaps’ of factory regulation.                                
Chapter Four: The Loosening Grip of Government (1930s – 1960s)                                            
Chapter four examines the decades leading up to the appointment of the Robens Committee.  
These decades were typified by the expansion of corporatist and non - governmental efforts to 
improve working conditions.  Such activity contributed to two significant developments.  First, it 
contributed to a surge in non – governmental efforts to reduce the toll of death and disease 
independent of government.  Second, the inability of the government’s post-war drive to tackle 
the accident problem affirmed the notion that its regulation of the workplace had reached its 
limit.  Both developments pushed the government to take OHS in a radically new direction.  This 
chapter explores an under-researched and under-theorised period of OHS to explore plausible 
reasons that prompted the government’s decision to release OHS. 
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Chapter Five: The Release of OHS (1970 – 1974)                                                                          
Chapter five provides an overview of the Robens committee which was significant because it 
pointed the way towards the release of responsibilities to individuals and groups outside of 
central government.  The terms of reference was unprecedented in its scope and it strongly 
reflected the corporatist sentiment of the period.  What came out of this committee was a 
blueprint to give the prime responsibility of OHS to those who created the risks and those who 
worked with them.  The chapter seeks to uncover the details behind the release of OHS from 
several government departments.  
Chapter Six: The OHS Network (1974 – 1979)                                                                                   
The blueprint produced by the Committee led to the introduction of Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974 (HASAWA).  There were two significant consequences of the enactment of the 
HASAWA.  The first of which was the ‘hollowing out of the state’.  The second was that the 
‘hollowness’ of the state was filled by the OHS Network.  Individuals and organisations from the 
public, private and voluntary sectors that worked for the betterment of OHS came together to 
form the OHS Network.  This chapter seeks to conceptualise the release of OHS through the 
vehicle of the OHS Network.  To illustrate the conceptualisation, the OHS Network is observed 
in isolation of the ‘surround’. 
Chapter Seven: The Recapture of OHS (1974 – 2010s)                                                                      
The Labour government’s nurturing of the OHS Network created a quasi-autonomous, well – 
rounded and formidable governance network.  Arguably, if it was allowed to continue on the 
same trajectory established by the 1974 – 1979 Labour government, it had the propensity to 
govern the workplace more effectively.  However, it was not given the opportunity to develop.  
From the winter of 1979, successive governments eroded and restricted its regulatory mandate.  
Ultimately, losing much of its autonomy and effectiveness.  OHS is in the process of recapture.  
This chapter seeks to understand how and why this occurred.  
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Chapter Two: The Capture of OHS (1802 – 1870s) 
1.0 Introduction 
In the late eighteenth century, occupational health and safety (OHS) developed as a reactionary 
movement to the adverse consequences of industrialisation.  Leading the movement was a 
collective of Manchester physicians who sought to mitigate the harmful working conditions of 
the urban poor.  Their practical methods were appreciated by the local authorities and prompted 
the development of the first factories acts.  In passing these acts, Parliament accepted the 
principle that the issue of working conditions required its consideration and intervention.   
 
 
1.1 The layout of the chapter                                                                                                                                      
This chapter will commence with a description of the adverse conditions of industrialisation.62  
Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation is utilised to frame these conditions and the reactions to 
them.63  Polanyi’s work asserts that the miseries caused by industrialisation stemmed from the 
‘dis-embedding’ of economic activity from social and political restraints.  This, in turn, spurred a 
reaction or a countermovement, initiated by a collective of Manchester physicians.  These 
physicians conducted studies and employed crude but practical methods to ameliorate the 
excesses of the factory system.  The result of which contributed to the first notions of OHS and 
led to the passing of the first factories act, the 1802 Health and Morals of Apprentices Act.64   
                                                     
62 B.L. Hutchins and A. Harrison, A History of Factory Legislation (Frank Cass & Co London 1966); T.K. Djang, 
Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942); M.W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation 
(Thames Bank 1948); Barbara Harrison, Not Only the Dangerous Trades: Women's Work and Health in Britain 
1880-1914 (Taylor & Francis 1996) ;Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins 
of Our Time (Beacon Press 2001); Joseph Bizup, Manufacturing Culture: Vindications of Early Victorian Industry 
(University of Virginia Press 2003); James Smiley, ‘Some Aspects of the Early Evolution of the Appointed Factory 
Doctor Service’ (1971) 28 BJIM 4 p315; W.G. Carson, ‘The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime’ (1979) 7 
IJSL p38; Alexander Meiklejohn, ‘Industrial Health: Meeting the Challenge’ (1959) 16 BJIM 1 p1 
63 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press 2001); 
Gregory Baum, Karl Polanyi on Ethics and Economics (McGill-Queen's University Press 1996) 
64 Edward Royle, Robert Owen and the Commencement of the Millennium: The Harmony Community (Manchester 
University Press 1998) p11; Robert B. Williams, Accounting for Steam and Cotton: Two Eighteenth Century Case 
Studies (Garland Publishing 1997) p72; Pamela Horn, Children's Work and Welfare 1780-1890 (Cambridge 
University Press 1995) p23; C. Wilkinson, Fundamentals of Health at Work: The Social Dimensions (Taylor & 
Francis 2001) p27; Kevin White, ‘Introduction’ in Kevin White (ed) The Early Sociology of Health and Illness, 
Volume 1 (Routledge 2001) pxx; W.R Lee, ‘Emergence of Occupational Medicine in Victorian Times’ (1973) 30 
BJIM 2 p118, p119; B.L. Hutchins and A. Harrison, A History of Factory Legislation (Frank Cass & Co London 
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Though the role of the physicians in the formation of OHS was acknowledged in numerous 
studies, Polanyi’s conception of countermovements helps contextualise their responses.   
 
The following section explores the significance of the acts that followed. The 1802 Act prompted 
the institutionalisation of important precedents and new responsibilities.65  It was a period in 
which MPs ‘were framing their thoughts in ways that their forefathers would not have done’.66   
To understand the implications and significance of the early factory legislation, this chapter 
utilises Joanna Innes’ work,67 which elucidates that through the passing of the first factories acts, 
Parliament had conceded the principle that factory conditions required its attention.   In effect, 
the torch of the countermovement was passed to the government.68  This was particularly evident 
in the ‘transition legislation’; a series of acts after 1819 that reflected the government 
transitioning from being ‘escorted’ to the statute book by external actors to legislating of its own 
accord.  The government was now fully engaged in countermoving, expected to tackle ‘new’ 
problems identified, created, or exacerbated by industrialisation.69   
 
The third section of this chapter observes the extension of factory regulation.  Since the 
precedents were established with the first factories acts ‘all that remained to be settled was how 
far regulation should be extended, and how best to give it effect’.70  Thus, what follows is an 
explanation of how factory regulation was extended.  Drawing on Oliver Macdonagh’s model of 
regulatory growth, there will be an explanation of the ‘self-generating, administrative 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1966); Eddie Crooks, The Factory Inspectors: A Legacy of the Industrial Revolution (Tempus Publishing 2005); 
M.W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation (Thames Bank 1948) 
65 Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the First Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802' in Norman 
Landau (ed) Law, Crime and English Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002) 
66 Joanna Innes, ‘Forms of ‘Government Growth’, 1780–1830’ in David Feldman and Jon Lawrence (eds) Structures 
and Transformations in Modern British History (Cambridge University Press 2011) p79 
67 Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the First Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802' in Norman 
Landau (ed) Law, Crime and English Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002); Joanna Innes, 
‘Forms of ‘Government Growth’, 1780–1830’ in David Feldman and Jon Lawrence (eds) Structures and 
Transformations in Modern British History (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
68 Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the First Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802’ in Norman 
Landau (ed) Law, Crime and English Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002) 
69 P.W.J. Bartrip, ‘British Government Inspection, 1832 – 1875: Some Observations’ (1982) 25 HJ 3 p605  
70 Joanna Innes, ‘Origins of the First Factory Acts; The Health and Morals of Apprentices Ac, 1802’ in Norman 
Landau (ed) Law, Crime and English Society, 1660 - 1830 (Cambridge University Press 2002) p230; Oliver 
Macdonagh, Early Victorian Government, 1830-1870 (Holmes & Meier Publishers 1977); Oliver MacDonagh, ‘The 
Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal’ (1958) 1 HJ 1 p52 
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momentum’ that pushed the government to legislate.71  It was through this momentum that 
factory regulation grew in scope.   
 
The last section of the chapter comments on the nature of the growth of factory regulation.72  The 
growth of regulation was typified by government intervention.  OHS was centrally coordinated; 
factory regulation was largely the prerogative of state institutions that offered a limited role to 
non-state actors.73 
 
 
 
2.0 The miseries of industrialisation 
The miseries wrought by industrialisation in the late eighteenth century were typified by human 
degradation.74  As W.G. Carson noted, the worst excesses ‘had occurred… following the 
invention of the water – frame, patented in 1769’.75  Rural communities that migrated to the 
industrial centres often faced overcrowded and unsanitary workplaces and settlements.  Health 
hazards were provoked by the lack of infrastructure to accommodate such an unprecedented 
level of migration.  The suffering of the newly arrived migrants intensified by way of the 
rationing of poor quality food, wretched clothing and poor ventilation.76  Their former rural 
habits only added to their miseries, ‘It was one thing in a semi-rural area to fetch water from the 
river and to fling refuse to the winds but quite another for dwellers in the congested streets and 
crowded courts and alleys’.77   In such conditions, whole families succumbed to death and 
                                                     
71 Oliver Macdonagh, Early Victorian Government, 1830-1870 (Holmes & Meier Publishers 1977); Oliver 
MacDonagh, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal’ (1958) 1 HJ 1 p52; Richard 
Brown, Church and State in Modern Britain 1700-1850 (Routledge 1991);W.H. Greenleaf, Rise Collectivism 
(Routledge 2012) 
72 Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation (Oxford University Press 
2007); Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms 
for the Age (Edward Elgar 2004); David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society: New Demands and Old Politics 
(Jonathan Cape 1988) p178 
73 Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation (Oxford University Press 
2007) 
74 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press 2001) 
p41 
75 W.G. Carson, ‘The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime’ (1979) 7 IJSL p37, p38 
76 Alexander Meiklejohn, ‘Industrial Health: Meeting the Challenge’ (1959) 16 BJIM 1 p1 
77 Marjorie Cruickshank, Children and Industry: Child Health and Welfare in North-west Textile Towns during the 
Nineteenth Century (Manchester University Press 1981) p21 
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disease.  Death rates were so high in some of the growing towns and cities that the urban 
populations were only able to grow through a net influx of migration from the countryside.78 
 
Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation provides the framing of the miseries of industrialisation.   
More specifically, Polanyi contextualised the miseries by situating them within the notion of 
‘social costs’.79  Although Polanyi did not explicitly mention the term ‘social cost’, his work 
pointed to the detrimental ‘costs’ which communities suffered as a result of the productive 
process, and for which factory owners were not automatically held accountable.80  It proves 
difficult to comprehend why the state took on the responsibility to protect its citizens from the 
adverse effects of industrialisation without referring to the ‘social cost’ that prompted such 
action.  Thus, the use of Polanyi’s work enhances this chapter through the provision of a broad 
framework for the identification and understanding of social costs.81     
 
Polanyi explained that society reacted to the adverse conditions brought about by the 
establishment of a self - regulating market, which divorced economic activity from social 
relations.    To this point, James Smiley noted that ‘most millowners with a few honourable 
exceptions’ developed a ‘hard and selfish’ attitude that exploited workers and rejected any 
responsibility for the well-being of their workpeople.82   Industrialisation or what Polanyi 
referred to as ‘mechanisation’ brought about a radically different work environment that 
engendered a revision of the relationship between mill owners and their workforce.83   Planning 
and organising for reliable and large-scale production, coordinating and controlling activities of 
larger numbers of people and functions, containing costs and maintaining a trained and 
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motivated workforce engendered a homo economicus mindset that rationalised, monetised and 
mechanised everything in the factory including the workers.84  Joseph Bizup added that machines 
and their ‘living attendants’ were envisioned as mere 'organs' subordinated to the factory's 
central source of power.  Alongside capital and machinery, labour was an asset to be used.85    
 
2.1 The reaction to the miseries of industrialisation  
The Great Transformation is noted for contextualising the social costs of industrialisation.  
However, it is also crucial in contextualising the reaction to the social costs.  Drawing from his 
anthropological research, Polanyi posited that certain members of society mobilised to protect 
wider society from the social costs of industrialisation; he refers to this mobilisation as a 
‘countermovement’.86   Polanyi appealed to what he calls the ‘changelessness of man as a social 
being’;87 throughout known human history, economic activity was embedded in social relations.  
This contrasted with the self - regulating market advocated by the prevailing laissez-faire liberal 
creed, a unique and unparalleled institution that separated the economy from society and 
endangered the latter as a result.88   He notes that historical experience suggests that society 
would generate a countermovement to protect itself against disintegration.  However, Polanyi 
makes it clear that the ‘countermovement’ of protection was not the result of society acting 
according to its own inner logic; instead, it was the work of specific groups in society who were 
concerned about the devastation caused by unfettered production.89   These groups chose to 
protect themselves and the society to which they belonged.  Their efforts were not necessary, not 
always successful, not written into the nature of things, but freely chosen and fallible.90  
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2.2 The countermovements that led to the formation of OHS 
Polanyi’s thesis provides an appropriate setting to observe the countermovements that formed 
OHS.  It helps to frame their actions as spontaneous reactions to the adverse consequences of 
industrialisation.   Such reactions were particularly prevalent among a collective of Manchester 
physicians.  In the closing decades of the eighteenth century, their attempts to counteract the 
adverse consequences of industrialisation formed the basis of OHS.   
 
Led by Dr Thomas Percival, a collective of Manchester physicians sought to ameliorate 
outbreaks of putrid fevers in the Lancashire area in the closing decades of the eighteenth century.  
To this point, Edward Royle noted, ‘This ad hoc committee was a precursor… of Sir Robert 
Peel's determination to secure legislation’.91  The panel of physicians condemned some mills as 
stuffy, malodorous and filthy. 92  They also criticised the excessively long hours that children 
were made to work.93  More importantly, their report on the ‘health of Manchester’ contained 
recommendations for remedial action.94  B.L. Hutchins and A. Harrison commented that, ‘The 
magistrates of the county were so much impressed by the recommendations of the physicians 
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that they directed their clerk to return them public thanks and to have the letter printed and 
distributed’.95  Innes observed that ‘They printed both report and resolution in the Manchester 
Mercury, and sent copies to the magistrates of seven neighbouring counties.  In practice, they 
clearly received wider circulation (emphasis added)’.96  Such reactions support Polanyi’s notion 
of the countermovement ‘checking the expansion’ of the factory system ‘in definite directions’.97 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
2.3 The humanitarianism of the countermovements 
 
The countermovements of the Manchester physicians did not only gain the favour of government 
because of the practical methods employed but also because of its ‘concomitant 
humanitarianism’.98  For Harold Silver, the Manchester physicians ‘were an obvious point at 
which… humanitarianism became transmuted into social action in Britain’.99  Percival and his 
contemporaries espoused a ‘brand’ of humanitarianism that was particularly appealing to figures 
in local and central government.  Contrary to present-day conceptions of humanitarianism, its 
earlier manifestations were conservative.  For the most part, they did not attempt to identify with 
the industrial poor or improve social mobility.100  The economic and social gulf between the poor 
and the reformers was just too wide.101  Rather, the brand of humanitarianism that characterised 
the countermovements expressed itself in self-preservation, amelioration and a child-
centeredness.  The first of which was articulated by one of the leading members of the collective 
of Manchester physicians, Dr John Ferriar.102  He explained that the wealthier members of 
society needed to concern themselves with the plight of the impoverished because their ‘own 
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health and safety’ depended on it103; ‘Closer attention to the comfort of the poor, than is 
commonly practised, is a desirable object of attainment: and it may excite the benevolence of 
some men… that acts of charity will not only serve them in another life, but promise them a 
longer enjoyment of the present (emphasis added)’.104 
 
The second aspect of their humanitarian project was that it represented ‘ameliorative action’ as 
opposed to disruptive and radical action.105  The Manchester physicians were not ‘outsiders’ that 
wanted to tear down existing institutions, rather they were representative of these institutions, in 
the sense that they had a ‘high’ standing in Lancashire of which they were considered the 
‘aristocracy of the town’.106  Percival and his colleagues used conventional practices and means 
to push through a program of amelioration.  Mark Sanders’ work on the ‘humanitarian narrative’ 
places the countermovements within the context of a cluster of ideologies that affirmed the 
universality of the interests of the various capitalist class factions and that professed that the 
majority of merchants, manufacturers, and professionals were ‘agents of progress’, their interests 
and actions contributed to the greater happiness of all.107  Thus, the solutions to the problems of 
the factory system did not venture too far from what was ‘practical’ and advantageous for all 
parties concerned.108 
 
The third feature of the humanitarian project was that it primarily focused on the child.  This can 
be observed in the physicians’ anxieties over the physical well-being of factory children.109  To 
this point, S.E. Maltby found significant material from the 1770s that demonstrated a 'long-
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standing' interest in the welfare of children.  Moreover, as their influence grew, ‘the cry of the 
children’ in factories became a centrepiece of the reform movement.110  Their concern can be set 
in the wider context; throughout the eighteenth century, children's bodies were increasingly seen 
as crucial to the health of the nation.111  Thus, the destruction of children was, in fact, the 
destruction of society.112  Emphasising the physical and rational deficiencies of children, this 
movement propagated that children were in need of regular intervention, special attention, care 
and protection.  The child's deficiencies were not despised but cherished as tokens of a more 
natural form of existence that adults should protect.113  It was the mixture of these three aspects 
that made the humanitarian demands of the Manchester physicians irresistible.  As MacDonagh 
noted, ‘No wall of either doctrine or interest could permanently withstand that single trumpet 
cry’.114  
 
2.4 The institutionalisation of the countermovements                                                                                         
After capturing the attention of local government, key figures in central government witnessed 
and took note of Percival and his colleague’s methods to ameliorate the miseries of the 
countermovements.115  In 1796, Sir Robert Peel the Elder, industrialist and parliamentarian, was 
asked to attend the meetings of the newly inaugurated Manchester Board of Health, in which he 
and borough reeves, constables, church warders, overseers of the poor, Strangers' Friendly 
Society members, magistrates, physicians, surgeons and apothecaries, would hear the problems 
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of an unregulated factory system and more importantly the solutions to these problems.116  S.E. 
Maltby noted that such gatherings were of the ‘utmost significance’ because they brought 
individuals ‘into touch with the cruelties so bound up with business’.117  These gatherings were 
also opportunities to promulgate the need for ‘parliamentary aid’ to ‘establish a general system 
of laws for the wise, humane and equal government of all such works’.118  It became clear that 
the voluntary advice of non-state actors could only go so far, as ‘Nothing less than an Act of 
Parliament can put this most essential affair universally upon a proper footing… Unless these 
things are attended to, such manufactures will prove the destruction of the people’.119 
 
The voices of the ‘countermovers’ were listened to by Peel and his fellow parliamentarians.  The 
passing of the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act in 1802 is evidence of this.  The influence 
that Percival and others had on this process was identified by Innes, who observed that ‘Though 
the idea of seeking legislation seems to have started with Bayley and the doctors, Peel at some 
point seized the initiative’.120  Also, Robert Williams noted that ‘Percival was the main instigator 
of the move to demand legislative intervention which led to the Health and Morals of 
Apprentices Act of 1802’.121  Pamela Horn found that ‘(Sir Robert Peel) was also influenced by 
the writings of Dr Thomas Percival and consulted Percival when he was drafting the Bill’,122 and 
Wilkinson noted that Percival’s ‘report found favour with Peel.  It contributed to the first Factory 
Bill’.123  Kevin White draws the link explicitly: ‘Based on this work (Thomas Percival's 1773 
publication Observations on the State of the Population of Manchester), Sir Robert Peel 
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proposed the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act of 1802, the first of the factories acts’.124  
Peel was not only influenced by Percival but also by the publications of other physicians that sat 
on the Manchester Board of Health.125  W.R. Lee pointed out that some the Board of Health’s 
recommendations of hygiene control ‘continued down through the factories acts and still appears 
in Factories Act 1961’.126  The most convincing correlation comes from Peel himself: ‘having 
the assistance of Dr Percival and other eminent medical gentlemen of Manchester together with 
some distinguished characters both in and out of Parliament, I brought in the Bill of 1802’.127   
We can also postulate that the countermovement entered Parliament by means of the institutional 
links between local and central government.128  Primarily in the form of High Court judges who 
presided over trials from all over the kingdom and travelled to the provinces for assizes, thus 
acquiring opportunities for contact with local magistrates and officials; enabling a cross-
pollination of ideas or what Frédéric Moret referred to as the beginnings of a ‘shared political 
culture’.129  At the very least, ‘activist magistrates’ shared their views with their representative 
county members of Parliament.130  Innes added that:  
Both county magistrates and philanthropists were plugged into wider networks.   Parliament, the most 
powerful resource available to local activists, was moreover a national body.  Concerns brought there were 
canvassed before, subject to modification by, and dependent on the support of representatives of all parts of 
the nation.131 
 
The Manchester physicians had achieved the ‘special task of showing the double danger of an 
industrialism that incubated-disease and lessened the vitality of future citizens by the inhuman 
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exactions of child labor’.132  Their efforts resulted in the passing of the 1802 Act, the first epoch 
of OHS legislation. 133 
 
3.0 A new beginning 
The 1802 Act was an indication that the legislature had been caught up in the countermovement 
to protect the urban poor from the excesses of the self – regulating market.134    The 1802 Act 
ushered in the first era of factory legislation.  Acts followed it in 1819 and 1825 which exhibited 
a similar sentiment.  As products of the countermovements, their shared ethos was ‘emotional, 
religious, charitable’.135  The first factories acts were practical solutions as much as they were 
moral instruments.  They were representative of the period’s ‘direct causal link between the 
moral health of a workman and his physical health’.136 
 
 
3.1 The 1802 Act                                                                                                                                     
The passing of the 1802 Act was fundamental ‘by way of idea… Subsequent attempts to secure 
factory legislation took it as a starting point’.137  By passing this Act, Parliament had resigned 
itself to the principle that factory conditions required its attention.138  For the first time, the 
factory was now on the radar of government, with the Act stipulating the establishment of a 
register of factories, and owners were required to enter particulars in a book kept by the Clerk of 
Peace.   
 
The 1802 Act regulated the conditions in textile factories in which three or more apprentices or 
twenty or more other persons were employed.  As its title – ‘Health and Morals’ – suggests, the 
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Act had two concerns.  The ‘Health’ orientated provisions were practical, stipulating that the 
mills be whitewashed and ventilated.  Visitors appointed under the Act were authorised to call in 
physicians if an infectious disease broke out.  Other health-oriented provisions related more to 
the attire, sleeping arrangements and working hours of apprentices.  The ‘Moral’ related 
provisions in the Act focused entirely upon apprentices, providing that male and female 
apprentices be segregated, attend church services and be instructed in reading, writing and 
arithmetic.  The enforcement provisions stipulated that county benches were to appoint at least 
two visitors, one a justice, the other a clergyman, to oversee conditions in local factories. 
 
3.2 The 1802 Act: A new act?                                                                                                          
In some corners, the 1802 Act was not considered a sign of a new period of factory regulation.  
This assertion is largely based on Hutchinson and Harrison’s History of Factory Legislation,139 
where it was argued, ‘It was in reality not a Factory Act properly speaking but merely an 
extension Elizabethan Poor Law relating to parish apprentices (emphasis added)’.140  In 
agreement with Hutchins and Harrison, the poor laws ‘set the scene’ for the 1802 Act, and the 
abuse of apprentices was not unique to the industrialised urban centres.  However, Hutchins and 
Harrison’s study overlooked the progressive elements relating to health, hygiene and education 
standards that the 1802 Act sought to establish.  Perhaps it was the fact that the Act’s focus on 
apprentices, in the title and much of the provisions, obscured the stipulation of health, hygiene 
and education standards to all cotton and woollen factories in which 'twenty or more persons 
were employed’.  If apprentices were the only targets of the state, as Hutchinson and Harrison 
imply, perhaps it would have been politically expedient to target the parents of apprentices, as it 
was supposed that children ‘were set to work as soon as they could crawl, and their parents were 
the hardest of task- masters’.141  However, the state chose the more difficult task of regulating a 
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well-resourced, connected and influential industrial block.142  From the resolutions of the 
Manchester physicians to the statements of Peel, we find a consistent intent to tackle 
manufacturing interests.143   
 
Also, manufacturers recognised the novelty of the 1802 Act’s to the extent that Peel and his 
supporters were compelled to use stealth to get the Act passed.144  What remains to be 
investigated is whether such tactics would have been used if the Bill was just an extension of 
Elizabethan poor laws.  Nonetheless, observing the antagonism of some manufacturers allows us 
to appreciate what the 1802 Act represented; several manufacturers opposed the detail of its 
provisions believing it was ‘excessively demanding’.145   Similarly, it was believed that the Act 
instituted regulation in the heart of an industry whose strength had been its freedom: ‘creating an 
unquestionable power of inspection over and interference with the manufacture of the country 
which hitherto has flourished free’.146    
 
All the above considerations indicate that the 1802 Act was a significant development from the 
Elizabethan poor laws.  The self-preserving, ameliorating and child-centred brand of 
humanitarianism espoused by the Manchester physicians had made it onto the statute books. 
Though not in the exact form that the more radical voices wanted it, the Act was far-reaching 
enough to lay down the foundation of a new period of government.147 
 
3.3 The 1802 Act: a humanitarian act?                                                                                        
It is challenging to attribute any major contributory factor to the passing of the 1802 Act outside 
of the culmination of the humanitarian countermovements.  However, it was argued by Peel’s 
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contemporaries that the 1802 Act was passed for more earthly concerns; it was Peel’s tool to 
disadvantage the interests of spinners for the benefit of weavers and help large manufacturers to 
the disadvantage of smaller manufacturers.148  Innes dismissed such claims, as ‘It seems 
improbable that Peel, with major interests in both spinning and weaving, was indifferent to the 
impact of his measures on the industry’.149  Moreover, Peel’s effort to push through the 1802 Act 
should be seen in the context of a changing mood.  A month before Peel brought the Bill to 
Parliament, Wilbraham Bootle and Viscount Belgrave, both members of Parliament for the 
north-west, brought into Parliament a Bill requiring magistrates to keep a register detailing to 
whom and on what terms parish apprentices were apprenticed.150  Perhaps the most conclusive 
indication of the mood of the period was the fact that the Bill passed with ‘no difficulty’, ‘the 
House being quite convinced of its necessity, and it does not appear the Act was received in at 
all a controversial spirit’.151   
 
Another doubt over the humanitarian ethos of the 1802 Act stems from the Act’s 
shortcomings.152  Undoubtedly, the 1802 Act was ineffective.   The declining use of apprentices, 
the expansion of industry and the increased use of steam power nullified many of its provisions.  
Such shortcomings were used as a pretext to dismiss the humanitarian ethos of the Act; if the Act 
was a culmination of the countermovements, it should have been more successful in ameliorating 
or at the very least minimising the negative aspects of the factory system.153   
 
Such an argument ignores two fundamental matters.  First, the Act’s shortcomings point to its 
‘emotional, religious, charitable’ construction, which naively presupposed the universality of the 
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interests of the various capitalist class factions.154  Second, the legislature possessed limited 
expertise.155  To this point, Bartrip and Fenn stated:  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what alternative enforcement procedures could have been devised and 
implemented in 1802.  Given prevailing methods of social administration and the absence of precedent for 
a centralized, paid inspectorate, there was little alternative but to give magistrates a dominant role in the 
process.156 
 
The supporters and drafters of the Bill were on the cusp of the countermovement, with no 
precedent or an actual example of how to ameliorate the miseries caused by the factory system.  
It is thus unsurprising that the first factories acts were ineffective; the practicalities of regulating 
such unprecedented and rapidly expanding industries were simply beyond the scope of the early 
nineteenth-century state.157   
 
Third, pragmatism also explains the inadequacies of the Act.  Peel and his supporters had to draft 
the Act in a way that would not garner too much opposition and also avoid the pitfalls of 
venturing into the unknown.158  It sought to cement existing practices that had emerged from the 
countermovements rather than experiment with untried and impractical restrictions.   To this 
point, Peel noted, ‘If the provisions of the bill were more extended, that would be going forward 
entirely in the dark’.159   
 
 
4.0 The 1819 Act                                                                                                                               
There was no coordinated central governmental action following the introduction of the 1802 
Act, even though Peel and his fellow Parliamentarians observed significant developments that 
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greatly impeded the effectiveness of the Act.160  There are two possible reasons for this, the first 
of which was a confession made by Peel about the 1819 Act; he said that he was ‘diffident’ of 
‘his abilities to originate legislative measures’.161  Arguably, if Peel with all of his manufacturing 
credentials and experience of bringing through previous legislation made this omission, then 
what can be said about the other members of government?  Second, perhaps out of naivety, 
members of government believed that intervening in the workplace was not something that 
required continuous action.  This sentiment was expressed throughout the Parliamentary debates 
of the 1819 Act.162  
 
4.1 The 1819 Act: Owen’s bill 
The apathy remained until members of government received ‘prodding’ from a member of the 
Manchester Board of Health, Robert Owen.  Owen’s protests were crucial to the government’s 
decision to continue to regulate the workplace, ‘Socially and industrially the first two or three 
decades of the nineteenth century form a gloomy period...  Almost the only episode pleasant to 
dwell upon or giving much hope of future progress is the work of Robert Owen’.163  Similarly, 
Thomas noted, ‘Robert Owen, the first of the humanitarian philosophers whose untiring zeal 
supplied the impetus that was the essential if not sole ingredient of legislative regulation’.164  In 
this regard, ‘Robert Owen was the prophet of the new era’.165  Also, Sally Alexander remarked, 
‘[T]hrough Robert Owen’s influence and ceaseless endeavour, Sir Robert Peel the elder got 
passed the Act known as the Cotton Mills Act of 1819’.166  Turning to the historical accounts, 
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Owen recollected that Peel introduced ‘the Bill into the House of Commons with all the clauses 
as I had prepared them (emphasis added)’.167   Moreover, Peel confirmed that; ‘A worthy man 
produced a plan to me, which I am not ashamed to own, and I conceived that the intention of that 
gentleman was so good, and his wishes so earnest, that I did not lend an unwilling ear to him 
(emphasis added)’.168  Needless to say that Robert Owen was the ‘worthy man’.169   
 
Like Percival, Owen did not begin with a campaign to bring about legislation, rather he sought to 
create practical solutions to remedy the problems of industrial life.  He and his partners 
purchased the great mill at New Lanark from the enlightened master Robert Dale.  He utilised 
this mill to build upon Dale’s progressive experiments in factory management.170  Owen settled 
on the policy of only employing children over the age of ten and limiting their working day to 
twelve hours.171  He argued that the emulation of such policies would be of incalculable benefit, 
not only to the young people but to society as a whole.172  Owen’s New Lanark mill was 
documented not only in the United Kingdom but also on the Continent, and he used this fame to 
press fellow manufacturers to implement similar visions.173 However, he did not receive the 
response he had expected, so he turned his attention to Parliament.  In doing so, ‘Owen did more 
than march from meeting to meeting with pictures of his dream world under his arm’, rather he 
undertook a number of actions to bring about government intervention.174  He advertised and 
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drafted Observations on the Effects of the Manufacturing System, published it with a dedication 
to the British legislature and distributed it to MPs.175  Moreover, he drafted a Bill of reform and 
held meetings to discuss the contents with both Houses.   
 
The purpose of this Bill was to amend and extend the 1802 Act, Thomas noted that it ‘anticipated 
the trend of future legislation’.176  It was to apply to all cotton, woollen, flax and other mills 
employing twenty or more persons under eighteen years of age.  No child was to be employed 
under the age of ten and no persons under eighteen were to work more than ten and a half hours 
a day.  There was to be instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic for factory children during 
the first four years of their admission.  Perhaps the most progressive aspect of the Bill was the 
appointment of a Clerk of Peace endowed with the same powers and responsibilities as their 
predecessors under the 1802 Act.177  Owen had held on to the concept of a paid and qualified 
inspectorate propagated by the Manchester Board of Health almost two decades prior.178  
However, Owen faced considerable apathy very early in his legislative campaign.179  To 
overcome this, he had little choice but to seek Peel’s assistance, given that Peel had passed the 
only legislation in this area and he was ‘one who stood well with the government’.180  Peel 
agreed, on the 6th June 1815 he introduced the Bill under the title A Bill to Amend and Extend an 
Act made in the forty - second year of his present Majesty (George III.) for the Preservation of 
the Health and Morals of Apprentices and others employed in Cotton and other Mills and Cotton 
and other Factories. 
 
4.2 The 1819 Act: a longer journey 
Peel’s ability to pass Owen’s Bill through both Houses was not as smooth as the passage of 
Percival’s Bill.  Owen complained that Peel was ‘too much under the influence of his brother 
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manufacturers, and that to indulge them he allowed unnecessary delays’.181  However, it was 
noted that Owen’s perception of the ‘unnecessary delays’ stemmed from his naivety of the 
Parliamentary process rather than Peel’s susceptibility to his ‘brother manufacturers’.182  William 
Lucas Sargant also added that politicians like Peel did not seek to reduce or to shorten the stages 
of legislation 'because they would fear the passing by surprise of many immature measures’.183  
Another explanation for this delay was that Owen’s Bill had entered a different environment; 
Harrison and Hutchinson noted that the first factory owners were men of little education, they 
were chiefly operatives that had risen – ‘narrow-minded’.  However, by the time Owen’s Bill 
had entered the fray, factory owners were better educated, ‘if not by schools, at least by wider 
life’.184  They were able to argue their case in a more or less literary form, or at the very least pay 
someone else to do it for them.185  
 
4.3 The 1819 Act: enlightened government 
Due to the more hostile environment, the Bill could not pass through both Houses without 
compromise.  The ‘storm of protest’ from manufacturers caused such a commotion that a 
Commons and Lord’s Committee was announced to consider the question of factory children.186  
The proceedings of these Committees were important steps to the awakening of the state.  The 
Commons Committee, under the chairmanship of Peel, sat for two sessions, during which time it 
listened to the testimonies of 47 witnesses.  Of these, eight were medical men and twenty-nine 
were manufacturers.  Macdonagh believes that it is difficult not to ‘overestimate the importance’ 
of these Committees: 
Even where (as was commonly the case) the official inquiry was in the hands of unscrupulous partisans, a 
sort of informal adversary system usually led to the enlargement of true knowledge in the end.  A session 
or two late the counter - partisans would secure a counter-exposition of their own.  All this enabled the 
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administration to act with a confidence, a perspective and a breadth of vision which had never hitherto 
existed...  For the exposure of the actual state things in particular fields was in the long run probably the 
most fruitful source of reform in nineteenth-century England.187 
 
 
The members of government present at these meetings were exposed to testimonies of medical 
men who unanimously argued that close confinement and long hours led to stunted growth and 
physical deformity.188  Moreover, they were exposed to ‘heightened’ accounts of the suffering of 
factory children; the evidence for factory regulation was prone to amplification.189  It is not 
implausible to assume that some members of the government may not have been aware of the 
horrors of the factory system; Peel’s initial ignorance of the abuses in his own mills bears 
testimony to this.190  Also, Jerome Blum mentions that decades later many were still shocked by 
witness statements.  When such statements were reported in the press, they ‘made a deep 
impression upon many of the upper classes who till then had been unaware of the evils of child 
factory labor’.191  Economic arguments against factory regulation were broad, dry and lacked the 
intimacy of the ‘heart wrenching’ medical accounts of the medical witnesses.192   
 
4.4 The 1819 Act: the role of the state 
Scholars have tended to concentrate on the dilution of Owen’s Bill as it made its way through the 
Houses, but a more extraordinary occurrence took place as the Bill went through its readings, 
namely, discussions about the role of the state.  A fundamental benefit of Owen’s Bill was that it 
required the government to talk and listen to itself about how far it was willing to go to protect 
the well-being of factory children.193  Those that opposed the Bill argued that, ‘In the law of this 
country, there was no precedent for such interference.  Where was any instance of it to be 
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found?’194  There was a strong laissez-faire basis for their dissent; Asa Briggs contextualises this 
recourse to laissez-faire ideologies as concealing an admission that government was ill-equipped 
to face the problems of modern industry.195  It was simply beyond statesmen to solve such 
problems; their involvement could exacerbate the situation or create a whole host of new 
problems.   
 
From this point of view, the laissez-faire defences were not the result of an optimistic belief in 
the advancement of society through private enterprise.  Rather, it was an acknowledgement that 
their expertise in the service of society was limited and that in the management of their common 
affairs, statesmen would not be able to find the elasticity and adaptiveness which individuals 
showed in devising schemes for their own self-interest.196  On this basis, we are better placed to 
appreciate Lord Stanley’s warnings over Owen’s Bill.197   
 
Furthermore, the fierce defence against Owen’s Bill spoke to the fear that government would 
change its nature.  The interference that was advocated would bring forth an ill-conceived and 
foreign notion of government.  This fear was particularly emphasised by Lord Lascelles, who 
believed that once the Bill was passed into law, it will determine future government behaviour, 
‘Be cautious what you are about, as, if you interfere now in this instance with the regulation of 
labour, you will find it difficult to find out when to stop’.198  He also argued that this new 
definition of government was crafted by external forces.  To turn the House against the Bill, he 
explained that Peel was merely the ‘front man’, the 'origin of the Bill was from a gentleman 
(Robert Owen) who had, for the last twelve months, made much noise in the public prints’.199  
This was an attempt to inform the audience that Owen’s Bill engendered something external to 
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what government has traditionally represented.  It was also an attempt to connect the Bill with an 
individual that been maligned; in some circles, Owen was seen as 'dangerous man, possessed 
with infidel and revolutionary notions, which his high position as a great manufacturer enabled 
him to propagate’.200 
 
In response, several counterarguments were put forward.  First, the precedent had been set with 
the 1802 Act.  Peel reminded the House of Commons that they had formerly approved of the 
1802 Act.201  The government had already taken the first step into the unknown, which did not 
result in any discernible negative consequences.  If Parliament moved to protect apprentice 
children, then it should move to protect factory children who were much more vulnerable than 
apprentice children, and not entitled to rely on the protection of either employers or their 
parents.202  The second counterargument was that the state of affairs was so dire and exceptional 
that intervention was needed; to buttress this argument, Peel stated that the principle of 
intervention was constantly acted on in commercial regulations where peculiar exceptions from 
the general rule of trading practices called for a particular mode of relief.203  Through such an 
analogy, he attempted to get the House to see that the plight of factory children was peculiar 
enough to warrant intervention.  The third counterargument centred on the absurdity of 
considering factory children as free labour.204  Such an absurdity should allow Owen’s Bill to 
pass undeterred.  Kenneth Walker argued that it was difficult to argue that child labour was 
‘free’ or that the regulation of child labour infringed upon the ‘freedom of contract’.205  
Moreover, he argued that the propaganda against the regulation of child labour was largely non – 
existent; the political economist was not greatly interested in the regulation of child labour in 
England during the first forty years of the nineteenth century.   He based this opinion on the lack 
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of critical pamphlets or tracts written by leading economists on factory regulation.  He believed 
that the negligible number of tracts and pamphlets holds particular significance given that such 
materials were usually attached to the hotly debated matters of the day.206 
 
In addition to these counterarguments, Peel had the support of the ‘respectable classes of 
society’, who demanded that the government do the unprecedented; numerous petitions were 
presented to Parliament: 
We can refer to petitions presented to Parliament, signed by more than twenty thousand individuals, from 
various parts of Lancashire, Cheshire, Yorkshire, Derbyshire, and Scotland, attesting the existence of the 
facts, and the kind and degree of the sufferings resulting from them…  All these, in common with the other 
highly respectable residents, bear testimony to the existence and extent of ‘the sufferings which they 
feelingly deplore.’…  such evils cannot be removed without the aid of legislative authority.207 
Peel also argued that the number of master manufacturers who supported the Bill was greater 
than those who opposed it, he questioned the House of Commons, ‘Would not the House feel it a 
duty to yield to the pressing remonstrance of the medical, clerical, and all other respectable 
classes of society, who had no interested object and who had stated the dreadful effects to these 
little children …?’208   It was difficult to rebut such a question, with 91 votes to just 26, Owen’s 
Bill was sent to the Lords, where it was confronted by the first Lords’ Committee on factory 
regulation, chaired by Lord Kenyon.  However, this Committee accomplished little but to impose 
a further delay on the Bill.  In the summer of 1819, the Bill was finally passed into law.    
 
 
4.5 The significance of the 1819 Act 
The 1819 Act was no longer Owen’s Bill; the multiple readings, committees, debates and private 
negotiations diluted the provisions.209  Nonetheless, there was still enough content that ‘opened 
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the way to further and more far-reaching reforms’.210  From this point of view, there are three 
general observations about the 1819 Act’s role in the state’s intervention of the workplace.  The 
first of which is that it cemented the ‘fundamental principle of state interference with free 
labour’.211  Thomas noted, ‘It broke barriers.  The state had intervened between employer and 
employed, and on the narrow foundation of this fundamental principle the dreaming of the 
reformers and innovators was to rear a mighty fabric’.212  Similarly, Hylton Dale stated, ‘The Act 
of 1819 marks the first and the most important step in the long procession of Factory Acts.  
Under it, for the first time the State assumed the rights of parent and guardian to the children of 
the free, and took it upon itself to prescribe the hours of work and general condition of their 
labor’.213  Even Harrison and Hutchinson’s critical appraisal of the 1819 Act had to concede, 
‘This, niggardly as it was, was the affirmation of a principle which was perhaps more needed at 
that time than any other’.214 
 
The second observation was that the 1819 Act enlarged the state’s sphere of influence.  This was 
because there was ten times the number of children affected by this Act than the prior 1802 
Act.215  Moreover, the Quarterly Review argued that covertly the 1819 Act limited the hours of 
labour from all persons employed in cotton factories, whatever their age may be: 
Every person acquainted with cotton spinning knows, that so soon as the younger persons employed cease 
working, the more advanced must cease likewise; their labour is so connected, that they must cease or go 
on together…  Thus the bill gains covertly what it does not aim at openly.216 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
day, exclusive of meal-times.  Owen's Bill provided for the appointment of paid and qualified inspectors, while the 
1819 Act left the matter in the hands of the justices as it did in the 1802 Act.  The 1819 Act was restricted to cotton 
mills, whereas Owen's Bill included all cotton, woollen, flax and other mills.   
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The third observation has not been widely discussed in the literature; the 1819 Act established 
the idea that intervention was an ongoing activity.  There is little evidence that this would have 
come about without the countermovements.  Despite the ineffectiveness of the 1802 Act and the 
arrival of steam power, we saw little government action in this area.  Thus, the effect of passing 
the 1819 Act was to instil the idea of reactive regulation; when ‘evils’ were uncovered or finally 
acknowledged, it was the state’s duty to intervene.  It would be ‘unchristian’ to do otherwise.  
This was best exemplified by the increased speed of passing legislation; within just six months, 
and following a fire at one of Owen's mills, Peel legislated to amend the 1819 Act so that 
operatives who were affected by such unforeseen circumstances could operate night shifts 'till 
the accident was made good'.217  This was the first of an extensive line of amendments to 
factories acts; the 1802 Act had been left in isolation for sixteen years with no amendments.   
 
 
 
Arguably, the amendment of the 1819 Act was a sign that the government was willing to react to 
changing circumstances.  Moreover, the amendment was followed by factories acts in shorter 
periods; for example, the 1825, 1829 and 1831 Acts.  A similar observation was made by Gavin 
Drewry who saw the increased occurrence of legislation as part of ‘a changing view of 
government and the proper scope of its activities’:218 
The fact remains...  that the main instrument of Victorian social reform was the public general Act of 
Parliament and that increasingly such legislation came to be recognised as an essential part of the 
collectively agreed programmes of government...  The growth of such legislation - measured not just in 
terms of numbers of Bills and Acts but also by their size, scope and complexity - is an important indicator 
of the rate at which the responsibilities of government grew during this period (emphasis added).219 
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5.0 The transition acts  
The 1825, 1829 and 1831 Acts were important ‘transition’ Acts.  In the sense that they were 
early attempts to uphold and extend upon the responsibilities of the 1802 and 1819 Acts, without 
‘prodding’ from external parties.220  Before the 1825 Act was passed, the impetus for factory 
legislation was discernible, almost certainly originating from outside of central government.  
However, from the 1825 Act, we are unable to attribute the content of the 1825 Act to external 
parties with any degree of certainty.  All indicators point to an internal government effort.  
Whereas, much of the content 1802 Act can be confidently linked to the Resolutions of the 
Manchester Board of Health and the 1819 Act and its amendment can be linked to Robert Owen, 
the 1825 Act bears no apparent external connection, instead much of its content was associated 
with Sir John Cam Hobhouse and his Parliamentary allies.  Hobhouse was the Whig member for 
Westminster, who assumed Parliamentary leadership of the Bill.  On the 6th May 1825, he 
moved for leave to introduce a Bill to reduce the working hours of children between nine and 
sixteen from twelve hours per day to eleven and strengthen enforcement provisions of the 1819 
Act.221  Appropriating the language of the countermovement, Hobhouse appealed to the humanity 
of Parliament: 
The children in these mills… were now worked twelve hours and a half in the day; and for three or four 
days in the weeks were not allowed to leave the mills to take their meals, which they were obliged to take 
off the floor…  They scarcely bore any resemblance to their fellow creatures after so long subjected to this 
torture.  Their skins were literally the colour of parchment.222   
 
 
 
By the 1820s, many members of government were actively involved in discussions of state 
intervention, of which many were converts to Hobhouse’s Bill.  Hobhouse’s fellow member, Sir 
Francis Burdett, condemned industrial slavery; 'he knew not a more crying evil, or one that 
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called more loudly for the interference of Parliament'.223  Likewise, Mr W. Smith condemned 
'shameless, barefaced and inhuman' evasions of the 1819 Act, telling the House that negro slaves 
worked less than Manchester children.224  Mr J. Smith argued that legislation was ‘necessary to 
prevent malpractices among those who were not restrained by the same feelings of humanity’.225  
Mr Evans observed that ‘the bill was loudly called for’.226  Thus, in June 1825, Hobhouse’s Bill 
passed into law.  Hobhouse would go on to spearhead two more Bills that became law in 1829 
and 1831.  All of which helped to extend the state’s jurisdiction over the workplace.  However, 
the support that Hobhouse enjoyed was not enough to protect the legislation from dilution.  As 
with all previous efforts, Hobhouse’s legislation was moderated by fierce opposition.227  Even if 
Hobhouse and his allies were not faced with such opposition, their efforts were amateurish and 
unlikely to bring about real change.  As Macdonagh noted, these individuals knew little to 
nothing of the real conditions which they were attempting to regulate and paid little attention to 
long-term solutions.228   
 
6.0 The extension of factory legislation 
The significance of the first factory acts lies in the precedents they set.  Once these precedents 
were set, the business of extending the coverage of factories acts came to be the prerogative of 
the government.  The humanitarian countermovements ‘injected’ the concern of the workplace 
into the government.  This in turn set in motion the ‘self-generating, administrative momentum’ 
that extended factory regulation.229   
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6.1 From Polanyi to Macdonagh 
Polanyi's concept of the countermovement is influential in explaining change, but it fails to 
explain the normalisation of the expansion of factory regulation.   Despite the reduction of the 
miseries of industrialisation, government regulation of the workplace continued to grow.  Due to 
this consideration, we turn to Macdonagh’s model to help shed light on the government’s 
regulation of the workplace.  Just a decade after Polanyi’s Transformation, Macdonagh observed 
the expanding role of government in the first half of the nineteenth century.230  This observation 
led him to develop a model of the ‘self-generating, administrative momentum’ of government.  
This model provides framing so that ‘particular factors can be grouped and the particular 
developments evaluated’.231     
 
Macdonagh hoped that his ‘model’ of governmental expansion would point to a ‘much wider and 
more complex group of happenings’ than the mere passing of acts.  It is among the ‘safest’ 
vantage points to observe the government’s extension of workplace regulation because it is 
broad enough to accommodate other considerations, such as humanitarian pursuits, Benthamism 
and the influence of manufacturers or party spirit.  On this basis, succeeding writers on 
nineteenth-century government have not strayed too far from MacDonagh’s model.232  Similarly, 
Paz noted that ‘MacDonagh and the 'pragmatic' school have...  the better part of the debate’.233  
To go any further would be problematic, the propagation of Benthamism234 and party spirit235 are 
cases in point.  His model helps us move beyond the limitations of Polanyi’s countermovements 
to understand why the government extended its regulation of the workplace.  His model depicts 
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government as the cause for government.  Though Macdonagh concurs that humanitarianism was 
a vital precondition for government intervention, he also looks at the consequences of governing 
to explain growth.  
 
The themes of Macdonagh’s model relevant to this study will be highlighted; his generic five-
stage model does not completely represent the trajectory of workplace regulation.  Macdonagh 
himself was mindful of the limited applicability of his model to real-world situations, ‘The 
development outlined… is but a 'model'…  In an exact form, in an unbroken adherence to the 
pattern, it was perhaps rarely present.  Nor are the stages into which the process has been 
divided to be regarded as sacrosanct (emphasis added)’.236  In light of this, only the relevant 
themes were discussed.  
 
6.2 The exposure of a social evil 
The opening stage of Macdonagh’s model depicts that the ‘exposure of a social evil’ had to be 
remedied.  It was too intolerable for Victorian society to bear even if it brought economic 
benefit.  Throughout this period, 'intolerability' was the ‘master card’ for mobilisation.237  In a 
broad sense, this stage is compatible with Polanyi’s social cost of industrialisation spurring the 
need for countermovements or as Macdonagh put it ‘an irresistible engine of change in 
motion’.238  
 
 
6.3 The acknowledgement of the deficiencies of factory regulation 
As Macdonagh’s model moves on, it departs from Polanyi.  It was widely acknowledged by 
those inside and outside of government that the initial factory legislation ‘had left the original 
evils largely or perhaps even altogether untouched’.239  This acknowledgement was a significant 
driver of the government regulation of the workplace.  Building on this observation, three 
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notions of acknowledgement significantly extended the government regulation of the workplace; 
(1) trial and error (2) redemptive legislation (3) addressing absurdities. 
 
6.3.1 The trial and error process 
The process of trial and error was fundamental to the improvement and extension of the factories 
acts; ‘one might imagine that Parliament was fully committed to reform from early in the 
century but had to go through a trial and error process before it finally lit into effective 
measures’.240  A pertinent example of this was the trial and error of age restriction.  It began 
idealistically with the 1802 Act’s restrictions to the hours of apprentices.241  Then the 1819 Act 
introduced the first statutory provision for the verification of the age of young workers.  Once 
the precedent of restricting age was achieved, the subsequent Acts sought to improve and extend 
coverage; the 1825 Act required the employer to provide a statement that children were over the 
minimum age.  Additionally, the parents of factory children were required to countersign and 
hence become co-responsible.   
 
However, widespread fraud nullified the Act’s intent, thus prompting the passing of the 1831 Act 
that placed the parents under even more scrutiny by making them wholly responsible and they 
were liable for the penalty of £5 if they produced fraudulent certificates.  Yet, according to the 
Report of the Factory Commission in 1833, the previous Acts did not go far enough to limit the 
fraud and overcome inept baptismal registrations.242  To counteract such problems, a system was 
devised with the passing of the 1833 Act in which it was unlawful to employ any child without a 
certificate from a surgeon who was a resident in the township where the mill or factory was 
situated.  However, within just a few years, it was believed that placing such faith in the medical 
profession had not produced the expected consequences.  Difficulties arose from unqualified 
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practice, fraudulent activities and varying levels of medical knowledge.243   Correspondingly, the 
passing of the 1844 Act was the first effort to standardise the practices of surgeons by bringing 
surgeons under the purview of factory inspectors. 
 
Another cumulative example of trial and error was the move from generalist to specialist 
legislation.  The dominant mode of factory legislation until the 1880s was a generalist public 
health-oriented model emphasising sanitary and environmental aspects of working conditions.244  
It was simply beyond the Factory Department to specify or even realise that a more specialist 
approach was needed due to its scant knowledge of the causes of ill-health or disease.245  
However, through the cumulative experience of inspectors and medical experts, it became 
apparent that specific classes of workers were afflicted with diseases that went beyond the ‘usual 
and oft-recounted evils attending long hours and bad air’.246  The Factory (Extension) Act 1864 
was intended to address much of these peculiar problems that were found outside of the general 
ambit of industrial complaints.247  Barbara Harrison saw the 1864 Act as a crucial step towards 
specialisation; the provisions that came out of the Act were consolidated in the 1870s, leading to 
more guidance in the annual reports of the Inspectorate and specific legislation in the decades 
that followed.248   
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6.3.2 Redemption regulation 
The second process of acknowledgement was through ‘redemptive’ legislation and policies.  
Such a process differed from trial and error in the sense that the solution was known but did not 
have enough political support.  The contentious nature of factory legislation often meant that 
Bills could only pass through the Houses in a compromised form.  However, the ineffectiveness 
of such compromises created a cause for ‘redemptive’ legislation to be put forward.249  Among 
the most notable examples of this were the enforcement provisions of the factories acts.  From 
the Resolutions of the Manchester Board of Health, the proposal of paid government officials 
enforcing standards was put forward to the government.   
Unsurprisingly, it was one of the few Resolutions that did not make it to the 1802 Act.  Instead, it 
was politically expedient to use magistrates to oversee the conditions of local factories.   
 
The proposal for paid officials entered the discussion again in 1815.  The continued requests for 
a new regime show that even at this early date it was recognised that the appointment of unpaid 
visitors was wholly ineffective.250  Owen’s Bill proposed that the former system should be 
abandoned and that in the future the magistrates should appoint the Clerk of Peace or his deputy, 
or other qualified persons as visitors.  Moreover, they were to receive ‘a full and adequate 
compensation for their trouble and expenses’ from the country rates.251  Once again, these 
proposals fell victim to compromise; the government had little appetite to frustrate 
manufacturing interests, rather through the 1819, 1825 and 1831 Acts, it chose to merely ‘tweak’ 
the existing system.252  Three decades of the government submitting to the manufacturing 
interest had produced ineffective enforcement.  Andrew Ure summed up the situation: 
[I]neffectual towards protecting children from being worked over – hours under greedy operatives and 
needy parents….  Had the preceding bills been simply inoperative they would have deserved no blame; but 
                                                     
249 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) 
250 M.W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation (Thames Bank 1948) 
251 M.W. Thomas, The Early Factory Legislation (Thames Bank 1948) p19 
252 The 1819 Act merely raised the penalty for each offence to a minimum of £10 and a maximum of £20, the 1825 
Act attempted to eliminate bias by stipulating that justices who were owners of mills, or the fathers or sons of 
proprietors were prohibited from hearing complaints under the Act and the 1831 Act empowered that magistrates to 
inspect Time Books, convict if the machinery was kept in operation at certain times, and fine parents for producing 
false certificates.   
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 58 
they were instrumental in demoralizing both the parents and the children, by leading the former to commit 
perjury, and the latter to become habitual liars.253 
 
Such failure persuaded members of the government and even some manufacturers that inspection 
was necessary.  With this change of sentiment came the enactment of the 1833 Factory Act; 
Section 17 stipulated that ‘It shall be lawful for His Majesty by warrant under His Sign Manual 
to appoint during His Majesty’s pleasure four persons to be Inspectors of Factories’.  Towards 
the end of 1833, the first four inspectors were appointed; Leonard Horner, Thomas Jones 
Howell, Robert Rickards and Robert Jones Saunders.  Successive factories acts increased their 
powers, responsibilities and numbers.  
 
6.3.3 Uncovering absurdities 
The third process of acknowledgement was to address the absurdities created by a prior Factory 
Act.  A prime example of this was the 1867 Factory Act which extended regulation to 
workshops.  The prior factories acts created an arbitrary distinction between factory and 
workshop based upon the number of workers in the establishment.  Additionally, it was observed 
that if the factories were under legislative control and the workshops remained without 
supervision, the result would be unfair competition and an inevitable increase of the smaller 
workshops at the expense of the larger factories.  Therefore, in the 1867 Act, workshops were 
included in the legislative provisions for control.254 
 
6.4 The appointment of executive officers 
Crucial to Macdonagh’s ‘legislative-cum-administrative process’ was the appointment of 
executive officers.  Workplace regulation was greatly extended through the appointment of 
factory inspectors.  This was arguably the most significant because it fed into other processes; as 
MacDonagh noted it was a ‘step of immense… consequence’ and that it ‘brought the process 
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into life’.255  Inspectors ‘played a leading role in legislation, including the development of their 
own powers’,256 and the period was subsequently characterised as ‘the age of the inspector’.257  
The fact that there was now a group of individuals, however few, professionally charged with 
carrying the statute into effect facilitated the improvement and extension of the factories acts.258  
Before the appointment of factory inspectors, there was no place for OHS to develop and 
solidify; it was ill-formed in the hands of politicians, enforcers, humanitarians, magistrates and 
clergy.  However, within the hands of the inspectors, OHS formed into a ‘much fuller and more 
concrete revelation’.259  Inspectors were envisioned to be travelling stipendiary magistrates, with 
powers of deciding cases and inflicting fines for breaches of the factories acts.260  Thus, unlike 
their predecessors, they were able to propose new and more effective legislation through their 
direct experiences.261 
 
Unknowingly, the state had created a reform movement from within its walls; it was the single, 
consistent lobby for the extension and improvement of the factories acts.262  As a result, there is 
not a single facet of OHS that does not owe its development to the Factory Inspectorate.  Since 
the Inspectorate was required to report regularly to the Home Secretary and Parliament of its 
findings, it regularly used this opportunity to push forward their agenda for a wider and more 
penetrative oversight of Britain’s workplaces.263  Jill Pellew noted that Inspectors ‘used every 
means open to him to press his opinion on the public, on Parliament and in particular on the 
Home Office that this or that change or extension of the Act was necessary if the law was to be 
made enforceable’.264  One of which was the Inspectorate’s unparalleled collection of data, a 
widely cited example of this was the Factory Inspectorate’s 1840 report on the condition of 
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children working in the mines, which led to the total ban of women and children working in the 
collieries.265    
 
A much more substantial example is the move towards the ‘safety’ of the workplace as opposed 
to legislation that focused on just health concerns.  It was one of the initial signs of a move away 
from the ‘emotional, religious and charitable’ basis of the factories acts towards its ‘quasi-
scientific’ content.266  Owing to the influence of the medical practitioners, the factories acts had 
an incessant focus on health, hygiene and sanitation.  Additionally, the workplaces that the first 
factories acts encountered were not significantly mechanised; it was the ‘day of the low, wooden 
machines, operated by the hand of the worker’.267  However, subsequent factories acts were 
increasingly faced with ‘giant structures’ that ‘enabled the machinery to be driven at greater 
speed, as the thinner driving shafts and smaller drums or pulleys revolved at an ever-increasing 
rate’.268  The prevalence of such workplaces created ‘a great number of maimed ones… this one 
has lost an arm or a part of, that one a foot, the third half a leg; it is like living in the midst of an 
army just returned from a campaign’.269  Upon its first encounters with the factory system, the 
newly established Factory Inspectorate witnessed these devastating effects.  The Inspectorate’s 
concerns were first raised in the mid-1830s; it drew attention to the consequences of unguarded 
machinery.  More specifically, Cotterell v. Stocks tried at the Liverpool summer assizes in 1840 
brought the question of factory accidents to the forefront.  This case of a seventeen-year-old girl, 
who had been caught by a revolving shaft and hurled to the ground, attracted considerable 
sympathy.  The momentum of which led to Section 20 of the 1844 Act that provided that no 
child or young person was to clean any part of the mill gearing while it was in motion.270  This 
was a particularly courageous step by the Inspectorate, given that these ‘new machines’ were 
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viewed with ‘superstitious awe and reverence’.271  Despite the ‘mystery’ of these innovative 
technologies, the Inspectorate progressively instructed how they should be used, who should use 
them and at what times they should be used.   
 
7.0 Observing the growth of factory regulation 
Several points can be raised about the tremendous growth of factory legislation.  The first of 
which is that it is important to note that the growth of legislation had no discernible ‘plan’.  
Though we have ‘clothed’ the expansion of regulation in Macdonagh's model, this model could 
only be constructed after the fact.  The continued regulation of the workplace was ‘largely ad 
hoc, practical and unplanned and pragmatic…  It was the pressure of the real world’.272   Second, 
the ‘growth of the statute’ did not indicate that the state’s regulation of the workplace was 
effective.  As Peter Bartrip noted, ‘It is hard to establish a good case for a strong degree of state 
control of industry’.273  The effectiveness of the nineteenth-century factory regulation has been a 
source of debate274, although both sides of the argument rest uneasily on unstable foundations, 
there is a strong case to be made that there was a distinction between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in 
action’.275  The former typified the nineteenth century, and the latter came to fruition much later.  
Third, factory regulation continued to grow in scope even though the excesses of the factory 
system began to subside.276  This speaks to the overwhelming momentum of the administrative 
machine. 
 
Another set of observations can be made about the growth of statute; it was thoroughly 
governmental.  The state was woven into the fabric of OHS.  This was exemplified by three 
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matters.  First, the Factory Inspectorate was placed in the heart of the regulatory state, the Home 
Office.277  We should see its place in the Home Office as part of a ‘new trend’ of the Home 
Secretary acquiring diverse responsibilities through acts of Parliament.278  The Home Office’s 
‘out – department’, or within the context of this study, the Factory Department was staffed by a 
‘new kind of expert official’ who worked in the field enforcing regulations and reported back to 
the Secretary of State on a regular basis.279  Though they were referred to as ‘out – departments’, 
this should not detract from the fact that all significant decisions were taken by the Home 
Secretary and his advisers, ‘these men alone among department officials worked alongside the 
secretary of state, going over all incoming correspondence, working alongside the secretary of 
state, going over all incoming correspondence, working on legislation and advising on policy 
matters (emphasis added)’.280    
 
It was noted that inspectors ‘did not interest themselves in certain things simply because they 
were servants of the State; rather, they were servants of the State because they were interested in 
those things, because they had formed opinions which an official position allowed them to 
translate into action’.281   Inspectors were creatures of the state that could be used for whatever 
the state wanted.  This is best exemplified by the Factory Inspectorate ‘deployment’ in many 
areas outside of the scope of OHS.  The antecedents of which were highlighted by Thomas’ 
study on the early factory legislation.  He noted that the whole conception of inspectorial control 
was new.  There was no corpus of minutes and decisions upon which inspectors could rely.  
Thus, ‘they allowed themselves to be employed in affairs that were clearly outside of the range 
of duties contemplated by the Act that had called them into being’.282  Among the most 
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controversial were espionage activities; the Home Office was concerned about the state of unrest 
in the 1830s.  It had no means of assessing accurately public discontent in the areas that were 
remote from the metropolis.  In such anxious times, the Home Office, whose duty it was to 
preserve public order, turned to inspectors.  The latter’s intimate knowledge of the 
manufacturing districts gave them a unique opportunity to report ‘political information’ to the 
government.283  Sir Robert Peel, the younger, reminded the House that in ‘times of great 
excitement and great distress… it became a matter of expediency that the government should 
resort to means of obtaining information, without which the public service could not be carried 
on’.284  
Moreover, as servants of the state, inspectors were subject to the political direction of the Home 
Office.  For instance, the Inspectorate followed the direction of Sir George Grey who favoured a 
cautious line, yet they were influenced by Lord Palmerston who pushed for the prosecution of 
inattentive factory owners and the granting of greater powers of intervention by the Inspectorate.  
The Home Office’s dominance of the Inspectorate was particularly apparent in the moderating of 
the Inspectorate’s wide-ranging powers, in 1850, the central government set out to exercise 
greater supervision of the Inspectorate’s quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers and settling 
of disputes.285  Consecutive Home Secretaries assumed closer supervision of policy formation 
and factory regulation.  Additionally, the administrative action by the inspectors became subject 
to scrutiny by government lawyers.  The independence of the Factory Inspectorate was 
significantly curtailed, their discretion shaped by the external controls of legal rules and 
ministerial discretion.286  The Inspectorate was wholeheartedly a government institution.287    
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Second, via the factories act, non-governmental actors were ‘written out of the script’.  OHS was 
legislated out of private hands and placed within the sphere of government.  From the very first 
factories act, the state marginalised the role of non-state actors; the 1802 Act empowered local 
government to oversee conditions at local factories, ascribing only a peripheral record-keeping 
role to physicians, in which he had to seek remuneration from the mill owner.  Building on this, 
the state secured its monopoly on OHS by establishing the Factory Inspectorate via the 1833 
Factory Act.   
This is not to suggest that there was a conscious effort of ministers to keep the regulation of 
workplace in government hands, rather it was a pragmatic reality.288  Any opportunity to 
promote voluntary action was taken, but when it failed, the state had little option but to 
intervene.289  After all, when the first factories acts were being passed, the capabilities and 
resources of non-state actors were severely limited.  Employers were not able to talk with one 
voice.  They were not a homogenous block; they were deeply fractured; a national survey in 
1851 recorded that 71.5% of employers in England and Wales employed between one and four 
workers and that 87% of employers engaged fewer than ten workers.290  Even among larger 
employers, the history of the National Federation of Associated Employers of Labour clearly 
demonstrates that unity often succumbed to industrial sectionalism and individualism.291  
Moreover, many employers had no desire to engage in the regulatory process, or were excluded 
from it due to their size or status, and were in any case unlikely to be prosecuted. 
As a whole, non – state actors who were interested in factory conditions were not developed 
enough to have substantial powers delegated to them.292  For instance, the medical profession 
‘was not yet clearly de-limited, and upon the fringes there practised many men whose technical 
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knowledge and skill were of the slenderest’. 293  Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
Inspectorate expressed its frustration with illicit practices among certifying surgeons.294  For 
much of its existence, the Factory Inspectorate maintained its remoteness from professional 
groups.295  It rarely deviated from the course that was set by the Home Office.  As a creature of 
government, the Inspectorate was ‘ordained’ with an exceptionalism to be shared by no other 
non-state actor; they were the sole authoritative body in OHS.  Andrew Hale notes that this was a 
‘preoccupation’ from 1833: 
The reason for setting up an Inspectorate was the feeling that no group in existence would have an interest 
in casing the laws obeyed because all groups were biased…  The ideal of a lack of bias, both in the 
Inspectorate as a whole and in individuals is one which the inspectorate has been pursuing for the whole of 
its existence.296 
 
Third, the closeted nature of the government’s capture of OHS was critically connected to the 
timing of its development.  It was created in a world where formal democracy existed only as a 
frightening spectre.297  David Marquand noted that ‘The atmosphere of the British government 
was that of a club, whose members trusted each other to observe the spirit of the club rules; the 
notion that the principles underlying the rules should be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed 
was profoundly alien’.298  The ‘club like’ environment of government was built on discretion, 
non-transparency, unaccountability and decision - making behind closed doors.299  
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
Little by Little, and year by year, the fabric of state expenditure and state responsibility is built up like a coral island 
cell on cell.300 
 
The story of OHS begins with the countermovements of external actors.  These 
countermovements were institutionalised by the state in the form of factories acts.  This was 
profoundly significant; through passing these acts, the fundamental principle of state interference 
with free labour was cemented.   The state had intervened between employer and employed.  
Moreover, it was the first time the State assumed the rights of parent and guardian to the children 
of the free.  Thus, we should not view the regulation of workplaces as merely an adjunct function 
taken on by the state; rather the decision to regulate the workplace was how it became a state; an 
‘active force, doing or choosing not to do particular things’.301   
 
Bound by precedent, the state was expected to be an ‘active force’ to intervene when ‘evils’ were 
uncovered.  Beginning with the regulation of the textile industry, it then turned its attention to 
bleaching and dyeing in 1860, to lace work in 1861 and in 1864 to percussion cap-making, 
cartridge-making, paper staining and fustian cutting, earthenware manufacture and lucifer match-
making.   To accommodate these growing responsibilities, there was an incremental increase in 
personnel and budgets, albeit not at the rate that was fitting for such a broad remit. 
 
Utilising Macdonagh’s model, we saw how the state ‘grew into its new role’ and enveloped the 
workplace with legislation.  Though there is a significant difference between law in statue and 
law in action, it is a ‘reasonable assumption’ to make that compliance improved with the growth 
of the regulation.302  Macdonagh’s observation allows us to see that regulation of the workplace 
brought more regulation of the workplace; assuming responsibilities brought more 
responsibilities.   Macdonagh’s model does not totally disregard the external drivers of 
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regulatory growth; all can be accommodated within the model.  For instance, the legislation that 
came out of addressing the absurdities of unregulated workshops could point to many drivers.  
Such a process may have been instigated by larger manufacturers who saw competition from the 
smaller and unregulated workshops.  Equally, the process of addressing absurdities could have 
been instigated by humanitarian concerns which saw that unregulated workshops as havens of 
illicit behaviour.  What is important is that the government stood in the middle of these drivers 
and addressed the imbalance through acts of Parliament. 
 
Regulatory growth output was significantly state-centric.  The Factory Department’s physical 
location in Whitehall reveals much about its place in government.  Inspectors were creatures of 
the state that could be used for whatever the state wanted.  Although some degree of discretion 
came with the Factory Department’s growth of expertise, the politically significant issues 
remained the preserve of the Home Office.  
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Chapter Three: The Extension of the Capture of OHS (1870s – 1930s) 
1.0 Introduction                                                                                                                             
From the late nineteenth century, there was a concerted effort to improve the quality of OHS 
regulation.  Moving from a narrow legislative focus, the government implemented a number of 
initiatives to broaden the scope of OHS regulation.  However, the lack of discernible impact 
pointed to the problematic nature of developing OHS within the confines of Westminster. 
 
1.1 The layout of the chapter                                                                                                                                            
This chapter begins with a brief exploration of the latter stages of Macdonagh’s model.  
Macdonagh posits that ‘a change of attitude on the part of the administrators’ emerged out of 
experience and experiment. 303  The decades spent regulating the workplace had enlightened the 
government to the fact that a deluge of legislation was not enough to bring about a satisfactory 
solution.304   Macdonagh also observed that experience had shown officials that their concept of 
regulation was much too narrow.  A broader effort was needed to bring about greater 
compliance.  Several studies undertaken in the early twentieth century recognised this 
transitionary period.305  To fully appreciate the context of the transition, it is vital that we go 
beyond Macdonagh’s notion of experiment and experience.   There were wider and profound 
developments in the latter part of the nineteenth century that compelled the government to 
rationalise its output and mature its processes; the increasing accident rate, the consolidation of 
organised labour, critical changes to the staffing of Home Office and the Factory Department, 
changing disposition of employers and the influence of international systems of OHS.  Such 
developments helped foster an atmosphere of reform.306 
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This atmosphere of reform helped produce a number of initiatives to reduce the toll of workplace 
death and disease.  This section will outline these initiatives that emerged from the late 
nineteenth century; consolidating legislation, extending departmental committees, promotion of 
self – inspection, welfare supervision and engagement with non – state actors.   
The final section seeks to answer why the above-mentioned initiatives did not fill the ‘gaps’ in 
regulation and bring about a reversal of the dire accident rates.307  The central reason was that the 
initiatives were placated by the limits of the government.  Ironically, the nature of these 
initiatives demonstrated innovation and maturity, but they also revealed the limits of the state.308  
OHS was ‘trapped’ in the Westminster model.  As a result, several fundamental issues hindered 
the effectiveness of reform; the sluggishness of government machinery, rigid and circumscribed 
engagement with non-state actors, inadequate statistical development, undue influence of the 
Home Office, insufficient staffing and government-centricity.  All of which indicated that 
government was the problem with the government of the workplace.309 
 
2.0 The rationalisation of the regulatory system                                                                     
The abundance of legislation ‘churned out’ by the administrative momentum had created a 
labyrinthine of ill-conceived, complex and overlapping regulations.   Moreover, such an 
abundance of legislation had not necessarily brought the desired results.  Thus, from the 1860s, 
government officials not only assessed all the statutes in front of them but also looked to produce 
sounder legislation for existing problems.   This was a crucial turning point in Macdonagh’s 
model that represented ‘a change of attitude on the part of the administrators’.310  The decades 
spent regulating the workplace had enlightened the government to the fact that a deluge of 
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legislation was not enough to bring about a satisfactory solution.311   Macdonagh also observed 
that experience had shown officials that their concept of regulation was much too narrow.  A 
broader and more concerted effort was needed to bring about greater compliance. 
Macdonagh’s model posits that this ‘volte-face’ emerged out of experience and experiment.  
This is indeed a contributory factor, but there were wider and profound developments in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century that compelled the government to rationalise its output and 
mature its processes.    First, the yearly increase of accidents, deaths and ill – health exposed the 
frailties of the government’s regulation of the workplace.312  Eddie Crooks noted that there were 
around 3,000 cotton mills and other factories in the country under government regulation in 
1833.  However, by 1883, every establishment in which mechanical power, steam, water or gas 
was used for manufacturing was deemed to be a factory and places where the preparation of any 
article or adaptation for sale was carried out was deemed to be a workshop.  This led to 
significant increases in the number of accidents reported to the Factory Inspectorate.313  There 
was also a growing perception that the factory legislation was ill-equipped to deal with the 
breadth of disease and death in industry.314  
Second, key changes in personnel ‘shook up’ up both the Home Office and the Factory 
Department.315  Within the Home Office, new competitive entry arrangements allowed for the 
entry of civil servants with ‘huge intellectual talents, drive and enthusiasm’.316  Particularly 
significant were Edward Troup, Malcolm Delevigne and the appointment of the dynamic and 
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visionary Herbert Asquith as Home Secretary.317  All of whom were deeply committed to the 
improvement of OHS.318   Upon entering the Home Office, Asquith wrote,                                        
When I assumed office one of the first questions to engage my attention was the organisation of the Factory 
Department, and from that time to this it has been the subject of my careful and almost continuous 
consideration.  Mr Herbert Gladstone also has devoted much time and thought to the matter.319 
Furthermore, these individuals and many others were committed to protecting and extending 
Home Office responsibilities rather than seeking to ‘slough them - off which had been the 
attitude of an older generation of officials’.320   
The Factory Department experienced a similar influx of talent, intelligence, and enthusiasm.321   
The retirement of Alexander Redgrave in 1891 was important to the ending a period of 
conservatism.322  The aged Redgrave had done little to make the Inspectorate responsive to a 
more technical age; the format of annual reports remained unchanged.323  Information was 
presented in impregnable prose and statistical data was unaccommodating.324  Moreover, the 
Redgrave ‘model’ was not particularly open to women inspectors, specialisation and responding 
to the demands of the workforce.325   Thus, with the departure of Redgrave, the Factory 
Inspectorate was reorganised – ‘so much so that it is fair to talk about the start of a new era in the 
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1890s’.326   Better educated and reform-minded Chief Inspectors took the Factory Inspectorate 
into the twentieth century.327   
Also, Vicky Long observed that the appointment of women inspectors in the 1890s prompted the 
Factory Department to turn ‘its attention to a wider range of issues’.328  She notes that women 
inspectors turned the Factory Department’s attention to the welfare of workers more so than their 
male colleagues.329  They focused their attention on lighting, ventilation, temperature, hygiene 
and the provision of cloakrooms.330 
Third, greater demands were being placed on the Factory Department from employers.  As 
employers became legally responsible for more activities, they looked to the Inspectorate for 
consistent and helpful information.331  This, in turn, caused inspectors to try to make sense of the 
mass of regulation and seek some degree of systematisation and simplification.332  Sir Gerald 
Bellhouse, who joined the inspectorate in the 1890s, recollected that previously inspectors had to 
enforce unpopular acts and contend with all kinds of opposition, however, a gradual shift 
occurred that required inspectors to spend more of their time advising and consulting 
employers.333   Similarly, Pellew observed that employers made greater demands on the factory 
inspector.  She presented a case of an inspector that complained that he had spent much of his 
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day as a ‘general counsellor’ answering queries from appliance makers and occupiers.334   
Barbara Harrison saw this as a ‘new development' that began in the 1880s and 1890s in which 
the state was called upon to take a more proactive role.335    The state’s designation of 
‘dangerous trades’ meant that employers needed to keep abreast of the Factory Department’s 
regulations and the Orders of the Home Secretary.   The latter aspect was a ‘distant regulatory 
framework’ that obligated employers to adhere to standards of cleanliness, ventilation, protective 
clothing and inspection.336   Thus, a higher level of systematisation and standardisation of advice 
and guidance was demanded from the Government.337     
Fourth, with the consolidation of organised labour in the late nineteenth century, the government 
faced stauncher and more vocal critics. 338   The government was subject to unprecedented 
scrutiny of its actions inside and outside of Parliament.339  For instance, the Trades Union 
Congress Parliamentary Committee and workers associations would send deputations to question 
the Home Office about the deficiencies of factory inspection.340  Moreover, in the House of 
Commons, the Home Secretary was ‘annually under pressure’ during supply debates from MPs 
sympathetic to labour who pushed for better factory inspection.341 
Fifth, it was significantly easier to push through legislation.  Thus, much more time was spent 
improving proposals than combating manufacturing interests.  From the late nineteenth century, 
employers were far more accustomed to ‘interference’ and the laissez-faire dogma had 
softened.342   Observing the thirty-year period of 1890 – 1924, H.A. Mess wrote: 
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Industrial legislation is therefore 'accepted with less unwillingness than in the past… The theory of non-
interference is not held by most people any longer.   Where there is objection to some new regulation it is 
usually on the grounds that this particular change is undesirable, not on the ground of general principle.   
The modern theory is that the community should insist on minimum standards of conditions for all 
workers.343 
Sixth, from the late nineteenth century, the British government was gifted with numerous 
examples of how to maintain a safe and healthy workplace.344  The decision to regulate factories 
set Britain apart from its other fellow nations.  Thus, Britain ‘walked alone’ on unprecedented 
ground with little to no inspiration from other countries.  Rather it was other countries that drew 
inspiration from Britain’s Factories Acts.345  Until the 1870s, the government could boast, 
‘England is, without doubt, far in advance of every country in this matter, whether we consider 
the law itself or the strictness of its execution’.346   However, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, various states began to develop very sophisticated OHS systems that not only rivalled 
Britain’s but on occasion surpassed it.347   To this point, George Moses Price outlines the 
evolution of European OHS systems, all of which had achieved varying levels of sophistication 
by the end of the nineteenth century.348 
With such a variety of evolved OHS systems, the British government no longer held an 
exceptional place.  Campaigners were able to draw on England’s ‘decline’ to prompt reform, the 
Fabian Society protested, ‘England has, on this point, lost her lead in labour legislation. 
Germany and Hungary absolutely forbid it under twelve; Switzerland forbids it (in factories) 
under fifteen (Act of 1877), and France under fifteen, unless the child has received sufficient 
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primary education’.349  In the spring of 1898, Professor T. Oliver, attended the International 
Congress of Hygiene at Madrid, representing the Home Office in the report of the Congress, he 
described his visit to the white lead factories of Paris ‘in which he found this industry carried on 
under more salubrious conditions than in our own country’.350  In 1912, Henry Harris observed 
that the statistics of the Factory Department’s industrial accidents were particularly poor 
compared to countries like Germany and Austria which had central offices for the collection of 
data.351  Thus, from the end of the nineteenth century, the Home Office’s departmental 
committees were able to formulate recommendations drawn from European witnesses.352  
Moreover, the Home Office was able to send its officials across the continent to experience 
examples of good practice.353 
Additionally, several International Conferences were held from the late nineteenth century.354 
For the most part, the conferences provided an opportunity for the British government to 
compare, contrast and exchange ideas with other industrialised nations.  B.L. Hutchins and A. 
Harrison observed that, ‘The meeting of experts for the study and comparison of what is being 
done in different countries is both stimulating and salutary’.355  Also, Mess observed that 
international conferences formed the basis of several Acts of Parliament.356  The first conference 
of note was held in Berlin in 1890 in which it was recommended that the participating states 
should make every Sunday a holiday for workers, time off for childbirth and a ban on children 
under 14 working in the mines.357    In 1897, the Home Office also sent representatives to the 
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International Congress on Accidents to Operatives in Brussels.358  In 1900, the International 
Association for Labour Legislation was formed in Paris.  It held conferences every two years and 
published a monthly bulletin in several European languages.359  In 1906, the Berne Conference 
was set up to reach agreement on the prohibition of night work for women and the use of white 
phosphorus.360  During the Great War, such gatherings ceased.  After the War, the forging of 
international norms resumed, particularly with the founding of the International Labour Office 
(ILO).361   
The proliferation of such gatherings was also important because it significantly reduced the 
‘bugbear of foreign competition’, therein giving the government less opposition to regulate its 
domestic industries.362  For much of the nineteenth century, there was difficulty introducing 
regulations which were beyond the standard of foreign competition.363  It proved to be a 
‘hindrance to the statesman, who may find himself confronted with the dilemma, whether to 
stand by and see the physique and morale of our workers deteriorated by bad conditions and long 
hours, or to run the risk of temporarily raising the cost of production, and so perhaps injuring the 
industry and therewith the workers’.364  Thus, the international agreements reached at these 
gatherings and improvement of European OHS systems significantly reduced the opposition of 
proposing new regulations. 
All these developments encouraged reform.  What came out of this process will be discussed 
following section. 
 
3.0 Government initiatives to improve the regulation of workplaces                                                                
The developments in the late nineteenth stationary culminated with the government undertaking 
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a number of initiatives to improve its regulation of the workplace.  To this point, Macdonagh 
observed: 
They began to undertake more systematic and truly statistical and experimental investigations. They strove 
to get and to keep in touch with the inventions, new techniques and foreign practices relevant to their field.   
They even called directly upon medicine and engineering, and the infant professions of research chemistry 
and biology, to find answers to intractable difficulties.365 
Several initiatives were undertaken to review, improve and consolidate factory regulation.  
Moreover, there were also attempts to fill in the gaps left by factory regulation.  These initiatives 
demonstrated the maturation of factory regulation.  Not only with regard to the rationalisation of 
the government’s output but also through the acknowledgement that the government could 
prompt industry to act without the passing of statutes.  What follows is an overview of these 
initiatives.   
 
3.1 Consolidated legislation                                                                                                          
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the government sought to ‘tidy up’ the ad hoc 
addition of sundry legal requirements into a consolidated form.  Consolidation is defined as 
‘bringing together different enactments on the same subject matter to form a rational structure 
and making more intelligible the cumulative effect of different layers of amendments’.366    The 
momentum of regulation described in the previous chapter created a labyrinthine of ill-
conceived, complex and overlapping regulation. 367   Thus, consolidation signified that the 
government sought to change direction.  This was the essence of all the consolidating acts, 
especially, the very first consolidated factories act, the 1878 Factories Act, which came out of an 
appointed commission in 1876 to inquire into the multifaceted system of factory and workshop 
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acts.368   As a history of OHS has demonstrated, reviewing past legislation became a constant 
feature of government.  The very first consolidation of factory legislation was passed in 1878.  
Every few decades (1878, 1901, 1937, 1961), factory legislation was reviewed then consolidated 
into a more manageable form.    
In addition to the rationalisation of the law, consolidation held practical implications, it allowed 
for the simplification of the growing body of OHS law.  To this point, commentators noted that 
in spite of the increase of the Inspectorate’s duties, the consolidated acts greatly simplified their 
work; the detection of evasions was attended with less difficulty than was formerly the case.369  
Also, consolidation was also necessary to extend the state’s regulatory powers to new areas.370  
With each consolidating factories act came new areas of governance. Thus, there was a need to 
place the ‘new and the old’ in one consolidated piece of legislation.  For example, the 1901 
Factories Act synergised previous acts and amendments with new areas of governance into one 
act.  Therein, placing an unprecedented five and a half million workers under its protection, this 
was followed by the 1937 Factories Act which increased the protections to seven million 
workers.  Subsequently, the 1961 Factories Act increased cover to around 11 million workers.  
For the most part, consolidating these acts allowed for the equality of treatment for individuals 
working in different industries. 371 
Due to these considerations, consolidated factories acts were generally the most progressive type 
of factories act.   The exercise of consolidating is the ‘consequence of reform, or at least 
change’.372  Thus, the passing of consolidated factories acts was often preceded by many years 
of campaigning.373  The consolidated Factories Act of 1937 is a case in point.  It was a result of 
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15 years of campaigning.374  Upon its enactment, Duncan Wilson, the then Chief Inspector of 
Factories described the Act as a ‘striking innovation… to raise the general standard of health, 
safety and welfare to a level higher than may be at present realized’.375  Also, the Act continued 
the tradition of the widening of safety measures.  The extension of safety measures found their 
home in the twentieth century’s consolidating acts.376 
 
3.2 Departmental committees                                                                                                     
From the closing years of the nineteenth century, the Home Office set up a variety of committees 
to address the deficiencies of OHS.  The departmental committees were marked by their ‘in-
house’ character, usually headed by the Home Secretary and supported by Factory Department 
officials.377  OHS had long been shaped by committees and commissions of various types. 
However, the Home Office’s departmental committees were unique in the sense that they were 
largely set up to review existing legislation and policy.  From the late nineteenth century, there 
was an expansion of specialised departmental committees investigating different aspects of OHS 
to the extent that OHS issues dominated the subjects reported to Parliament.378    
These committees set the tone for the twentieth century.379  Among the most influential was the 
Home Secretary’s380 departmental committee to consider the question of the increase in reported 
accidents in 1908.    Over 41 days, the committee took evidence, examined 58 witnesses and 
visited several factories.  The committee produced its report in 1911.381  The report was 
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‘instrumental in laying the foundations for a modern Factory Inspectorate’.382  Another 
committee of influence came a few years later; the 1919 Committee of the Re-organisation of 
Factory Staff, formed and chaired by Delevinge.383  The recommendation of this committee 
brought about the inclusion of women inspectors into the general body of inspectors, an increase 
in the number of divisions and districts of inspections and the strengthening of technical staff.  
The recommendations of the committee were acceded to by the Home Office and brought into 
action in 1921.384   
Committees were often the prelude to factory legislation.385   For instance, the recommendations 
of the Home Secretary Matthew White Ridley’s, Cotton Cloth Factories Committee resulted in 
the Cotton Cloth Factories Act 1897386; the recommendations of the Home Secretary Herbert 
Gladstone’s 1907 Committee resulted in the 1911 Factory and Workshop Act387; the 
recommendations of 1918 Committee on Anthrax led to the Anthrax Prevention Act 1919388; the 
recommendations of the Home Secretary Arthur Henderson’s Committee on Medical 
Examinations of Young Person for Factory Employment made ‘their way to the Statute Book’.389   
 
3.3 Welfare supervision                                                                                                               
From the First World War, the government sought to promote welfare supervision.  Although, 
the concept of ‘welfare’ developed in the late nineteenth century, it was actively promoted with 
the breakout of war.  According to B. Seebohm Rowntree, the Director of the Welfare 
Department in the Ministry of Munitions, ‘Welfare supervision is simply the creation in a factory 
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of those conditions which enable each individual worker to be and do his or her best’.390  More 
specifically, ‘Voluntary efforts on the part of employers to improve, within the existing 
industrial system, the conditions of employment in their own factories’.391 
The government was drawn into promoting welfare at work due to the outbreak of war in 1914 
when a significant number of women took up employment in industries previously dominated by 
men.392  These new workers were compelled to undergo the same ‘wearying physical strain’ as 
their male counterparts.    Their new work was often marked by ‘long hours, improper or 
inadequate sanitary conditions, and the extreme fatigue produced by industrial processes to 
which they are wholly unaccustomed to’.393  It was required of the government to maintain the 
health of the nation; women could not be worked to the extent that their health, morals and 
childbearing capacities diminished.394    Moreover, the War brought issues of productivity to the 
surface.  Through attending to the welfare of workers, greater productivity could be achieved.395   
Promoting welfare at work was exemplified by the 1916 Police Factories etc. (Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act.  This Act enabled the Home Office to issue orders for welfare provisions.  Such 
orders included an order requiring drinking water in every factory or workshop employing 25 
people or more; an order for the provision of seats for female workers in munitions factories; a 
first aid and ambulance order which required an ambulance room in factories that employed 500 
persons or more.396  There was also a bottom-up element to promoting welfare at work; the 
government sought to set up of welfare committees.397  The business of resolving and analysing 
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the issues related to the welfare of workers was left in the hands of these committees.398  The 
most prominent being the Health of Munitions Workers′ Committee (HMWC) set up 1915 ‘to 
consider and advise on questions of industrial fatigue, hours of labour, and other matters 
affecting the personal health and physical efficiency of workers in munitions factories and 
workshops’.399   In its lifetime, the Committee produced 21 memoranda and two reports of which 
over 210,000 were sold and distributed.400  A Factory Inspector noted that many of the 
Committee's publications circulated not just among employers but reached ‘a wide, general, 
reading and thinking public’.401  The HMWC was followed by the Home Office and the Board of 
Trade’s setting up of the Women’s Employment Committee to consider issues arising out of the 
mass entrance of women to the workplace, such as housing, transit, canteen provision and 
recreational arrangements.402  In addition to such committees, the government also issued a 
series of pamphlets offering advice on welfare arrangements for women workers.403   
The most radical action taken by the government in the realm of welfare was the push for the 
appointment of ‘welfare supervisors’.  B. Seebohn Rowntree, the Director of the Welfare 
Department in the Ministry of Munitions, defined the ‘welfare supervisor’ as a 'human engineer 
who goes into the factory to see that all the human machines are working at their highest 
potential’.404  The government hoped that the appointment of supervisors would help promote 
the well-being, health and efficiency of the workforce.  It was posited that this increase in 
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efficiency was essential to employer and employee because a progressive improvement in wages 
could only be achieved by the progressive improvement in methods of production.405  In 1916, 
the Home Office ordered all munitions factories to appoint a welfare supervisor.  Private 
employers managed to evade the prescription, but there were no such loopholes for the 
nationalised industries.406  By the winter of 1917, the Ministry of Munitions had dispatched 28 
supervisors to their new posts in national shell and fuse plants across the country.407   
Throughout the war years, the Home Office organised conferences to promote the appointment 
of welfare supervisors.  One of which was a conference in 1917 in which representatives of 
universities and other educational authorities discussed the criteria for the training and selection 
of welfare workers.408  Much of the voluntary welfare – enhancing initiatives became 
compulsory with the enactment of the 1937 Factories Act.409  
 
3.4 Self – inspection                                                                                                                     
The twentieth century was the century of ‘self – inspection’.   T.K. Djang regarded it as ‘a new 
development in British industry’.410  Cognisant of their limits, the government directed its 
attention to inducing employers to provide a measure of daily ‘self-inspection’ within their own 
firms.411  As early as 1911, a departmental committee recommended that there was a need to 
ensure that those occupying factory premises should be persuaded to take ‘constant daily care’ to 
fulfil their legal responsibilities.412   
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Self – inspection was brought about through regulation and the stimulation of voluntary 
provisions.  Regarding legal regulations, the extremely hazardous pottery and earthenware 
industry were selected as a venue for self – inspection.  John B. Andrews noted that the 
Regulations for the Manufacture and Decoration of Pottery 1913 was an ‘unexampled 
elaboration’ of self – inspection.413  Similarly, Djang noted that the ‘far-reaching importance of 
these regulations is self – evident’.414  These regulations required that persons fully conversant 
with the relevant law should be appointed by firms to monitor the observance of OHS and 
undertake systematic inspection.   The appointee was required to keep a record of breaches, 
apparatus failure and a description of steps taken to remedy defects and prevent accidents.  
Additionally, a special section was drafted into Section 28 (3) of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act 1923 which empowered the Secretary of State to give special orders to compel employers in 
hazardous industries to make ‘arrangements for special supervision in regard to safety, 
investigation of the circumstances and causes of accidents’.  Andrews notes that this section was 
expressly enacted by Parliament for the purpose of ‘promoting the establishment of special 
safety organisations in factories’.415  Utilising this provision, a draft order was put forward in 
1927 by the Home Office providing for the establishment of a safety organisation at each works 
in the iron and steel industries, heavy engineering and shipbuilding industries, in which more 
than fifty persons were employed.416  Though this draft order was not mandatory, it was not 
abrogated, it ‘held like the sword of Damocles’ over industry inducing employers to institute 
their own regimes of self – inspection.417 
The stimulation of voluntary self – inspection was also a cause for the establishment of the 
Home Office’s Industrial Museum.  In 1925, the government established an Industrial Museum 
                                                     
413 John B. Andrews, British Factory Inspection; A Century of Progress No. 11 (United States Department of Labor 
1937) p46 
414 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) p106 
415 John B. Andrews, British Factory Inspection; A Century of Progress No. 11 (United States Department of Labor 
1937) p46 
416 T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) p110  
417 Sandra Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988) p9; 
John B. Andrews, British Factory Inspection; A Century of Progress No. 11 (United States Department of Labor 
1937) p46; T.K. Djang, Factory Inspection in Great Britain (George Allen & Unwin 1942) p110  
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 85 
in which up-to-date methods, arrangements, and equipment for promoting OHS were exhibited 
to the public.  Located on Horseferry Road in Westminster, this was among the first significant 
signs of a transition.  Realising the limited nature of factory legislation, the Factory Department 
saw the museum as a means to address some of the regulatory gaps.418  Inspectors described how 
employers arrived with contravention notices to find out how they could best comply with the 
instructions and whole firms utilised the museum to improve safety systems.419  Long stated that 
the museum was a move away from the narrow ‘government heavy’ punitive approach towards a 
‘government - lite’ encouragement of industry to improve its own standards.420  Similarly, a 
Factory Department internal report in 1920 stated that ‘what may be called the police duties of 
the inspectors are becoming less and less important’.421  Furthermore, the government sent 
representatives to Europe to study their safety museums, yet another indicator that the 
government was seeking a new way to regulate industry.422   
The provision of information was also crucial to stimulate self – inspection.  From the opening 
decades of the twentieth century, there were several noteworthy safety publications that dealt 
with accident prevention.423  Of particular importance were pamphlets related to transmission 
machinery, hoists, cotton spinning and weaving machinery, abrasive wheels, and fire protection 
in factories.424  The Home Office endeavoured to provide employers with the latest information 
on special hazards and best practice.  Booklets were also printed to warn employees of special 
risks arising in their work. 425 
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In tandem with the Home Office’s efforts, the Factory Department sought to stimulate self – 
inspection schemes in numerous industries.  The Superintending Inspector noted in 1919 that, 
‘Periodical visits by members of the Factory Department can never have the same effect as the 
daily and hourly supervision of a works official whose activities are entirely concentrated on the 
prevention of casualties’.426   The Inspectorate was influenced by the ‘Safety First’ movement, 
which developed as a result of concern for the appalling industrial conditions during the First 
World War and advocated better management techniques and forms of self – regulation.427   At 
the request of the employers, Inspectors attended the meetings of voluntary safety 
organisations428 to give them additional advice and assistance.429  On occasion, companies which 
did not have such organisations often established them because of the encouragement and 
assistance of the Factory Inspectorate.430   
 
3.5 Engagement with non – state actors                                                                                      
From the early twentieth century, there was a move to engage with non-governmental 
organisations.431  There were three aspects to this engagement.  First, the government had ad hoc 
arrangements with individuals and groups.  Much of these arrangements took the form of 
funding an area of study.    For instance, in 1910, J.M. Beattie of Sheffield University conducted 
experiments on animals for the Factory Department to assess whether the inhalation of asbestos 
dust will cause a mild degree of fibrosis.432  In 1913, the Home Office funded Dr A.F. Stanley 
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Kent’s Professor of Physiology at Bristol University, studies on industrial fatigue.433   There was 
also funding available through the setting up of the Health of Munitions Workers Committee in 
1915.434  Funding from the government supported field investigations into working conditions, 
hours of work, fatigue, ventilation, lighting and labour turnover.435  In addition to these studies, 
the expertise of individuals and groups also played a role in the formulation of legislation; 
departmental committees welcomed persons known to have special knowledge of the subjects, 
not only to collect information but also to suggest regulations.436   Second, the government set up 
formal gatherings with non – governmental organisations.  Such gatherings were inaugurated in 
1927 with the Home Office’s joint conference with the National Safety First Association.  This 
was the first British 'Safety Congress’.437  Regarding the union, the Annual Report of the Chief 
Inspector of Factories stated that:  
A few years ago a conference of this kind would hardly have been possible but this conference was 
attended by some 450 delegates, sent by firms and associations from all parts of the country and from the 
remarks that were made afterwards it was quite evident that the discussion had served to bring home what 
is not yet realized by industry as a whole, how much can be accomplished by organised safety work 
(emphasis added).438 
Third, the government played a central role in setting up organisations.   After the Great War, the 
government encouraged the creation of three new organisations: the Industrial Welfare Society 
(1919) subsequently the Industrial Society and the Work Foundation, the National Institute of 
Industrial Psychology (1921) and the Industrial Fatigue Research Board (1918) renamed the 
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Industrial Health research board.439  Psychologists, doctors and physiologists formed the bulk of 
these organisations.  Under the direction of the government, these organisations developed new 
procedures and vocational guidance for a whole range of working practices.440 
 
3.6 Important steps                                                                                                                          
The initiatives were indicative of a developing regulatory regime.  Particularly the initiatives that 
sought to instigate activity amongst non – state actors.  This was a novel approach and a tacit 
acknowledgement that the passing of factories acts, devoid of a deeper inquiry, could only go so 
far.  What was needed was a holistic approach to OHS, the nineteenth-century concept of the 
field of regulation was much too narrow.441  These were important steps to the government’s 
appointment of the Robens Committee. 
 
4.0 The unsatisfactory impact of the government’s initiatives                                                               
Though the government’s initiatives were important symbolically, their material benefit is more 
difficult to ascertain.442   There appears to be little thought into the establishment of procedures 
to measure their effectiveness to the extent that it is difficult to determine what improvements to 
the safety and health of workers ‘was due to legislation and what was due to the spread of 
enlightenment and to scientific progress’.443  It appears that the government’s initiatives in the 
twentieth century were unable to adequately address the accident problem and the gaps in the 
regulatory system.  The Manchester Guardian stated in the 1930s: 
Every Home Secretary professes his burning enthusiasm to reduce them to order, to cure anomalies, and to 
bring the regulations abreast of modern standards and ideas.  One Government after another makes pledges 
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and forgets them...  society demands increasingly high standards of vigilance, and this branch of State 
service can never rest.444 
Mess concluded his treatise in the late 1920s, ‘Industry is probably almost as dangerous today as 
it was in 1907…  It was distinctly more dangerous in 1907 than it had been in 1891. The 
reduction in the number of accidents is a task needing the most serious attention’.445   He said 
elsewhere that, ‘The increase in the number of accidents, both fatal and non-fatal, is greater than 
can be accounted for plausibly either by the expansion of industry or by better reporting’.446  
Observing the trends of the twentieth century, John Williams looked at the ‘size of the problem’ 
that the government’s twentieth-century initiatives were unable to subdue.447   He lamented the 
erratic and ‘appalling’ accident rate.448  The accident rate rose, fell and stalled seemingly 
indifferent to the government’s initiatives.449  Moreover, the government was aware that its 
figures did not capture the full toll of death and incapacitation.450   The system of monitoring the 
accident rate was dependent on whether the injured workman filed a claim, or the employer went 
through the correct process.451  Equally, statistics were even more sparse for workers whose ill - 
health was caused or aggravated by their working conditions.  Williams notes that ‘there were no 
statistics for them’.452  According to some experts, such cases may have outnumbered accident 
cases.453   Beyond the figures, recorded and unrecorded, was the real suffering and loss caused 
by workplace accidents.454 
In addition to the accident problem was the ‘gaps’ in the regulatory system.  Regardless of the 
initiatives employed by the governments, gaps in regulatory oversight continued to be an issue.  
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The term ‘gaps’ is derived from an article written by Hutchins in 1908, in which she derided the 
government for its lack of protections for all workers.455  Many workers fell through the cracks 
of the regulatory system, left to toil in unregulated industries and susceptible to loopholes in 
regulated industries.456  Being on the front line, the Factory Inspectorate often felt the brunt of 
criticism from workers who were confounded that they did not receive the same protections as 
other workers.457 
In the 1920s, Mess listed the gaps that needed rectification, it ran into several pages.458  He 
implored the government to conduct a survey of ‘industrial labour in order to see what protection 
it needs’.459   Similarly, an American scholar in the 1930s was astonished at the gaps in 
legislation, he wrote: 
There is no authority over building construction where mechanical power is not used…  There is no 
authority whatever over the demolition of buildings…  At the beginning of 1936 there was no legal 
regulation whatever of the working hours of men, except in a single process in the potteries, and in coal 
mining, which does not come under the factory acts…  There is no regulation for work under compressed 
air… There is no official inspection whatever of elevators or lifts in England, except those in factories 
which come under the jurisdiction of the factory inspector.460 
 
4.1 Trapped in the Westminster Model                                                                                                            
A crucial question to ask is why didn’t the government’s innovative initiatives bring about a 
discernable impact on the accident rates and fill in the regulatory gaps?  This study posits that 
significant change did not come about because OHS was ‘trapped in Westminster’.   The Factory 
Department was a ‘possession’ of the Home Office, which it guarded jealously, as was 
exemplified by Delevingne’s proclamation ‘to die on the steps of the Home Office rather than 
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yield one iota of its prerogatives to any upstart department’.461  Briefly, in the previous chapter, 
we discussed that OHS regulation was typified by state capture.  Matters were conceived of and 
drafted in-house then disseminated out to industry.  Regulating the workplace in such a manner 
can be broadly described as the Westminster model.  We use this term with caution; it came 
under significant criticism due to the way it was presented as an accurate depiction, dichotomy 
and an ideal.  Thus, we use this model in the context of a ‘top-down, hierarchical approach’ to 
OHS regulation where much of the significant decisions were made in Westminster.462  In 
principle, the Westminster model ensured that decisions made at the centre of government were 
delivered ‘on the ground’ through the process of subordination and hierarchal control.463    
Within this model, Factory Department staff were ‘knights’, public servants enabling their 
superiors to accomplish their goals.464  The state played an omnipresent role, ‘The structure and 
personnel of the state exert their own independent influence on this process’.465   
Regulating OHS from behind the Westminster walls was largely facilitated by the apathetic 
public.  As Michael Moran noted, such closeted government could not have ‘originated, or 
survived, without the support of a wider culture of deference’.466  Though Moran conceded that 
deciphering patterns of behaviour from the past is ‘a notoriously tricky business’ he pointed to 
significant evidence for the ‘widespread existence of popular deference to hierarchies’ of the 
government.467  To this point, Williams recognised that it was difficult to provoke public opinion 
over workplace accidents because there was a feeling that such accidents were primarily a matter 
between the employers and employees; also if further action was needed, then the ‘expert 
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government departments’ were dealing with it.468  Thus, the more ‘mundane’ aspects of OHS, 
which affected the majority of workers, were left to the prerogatives of government officials.  
OHS would only receive attention at ‘irregular intervals’469;  an ILO report commented:  
It is only great disasters such as factory conflagrations and mines explosions that are brought to public 
notice by press and radio.  Such disasters only account for a fraction of the industrial accident total, and the 
everyday accidents which account for the overwhelming majority of the victims are not the stuff for the 
headlines.470  
Unless it was a major disaster, it was difficult to get a reaction; Hutchins noted that when she 
discussed the daily desperate situation of some workers, she was ‘met with an incredulous look, 
and the objection, I thought the Factory Act had altered all that’.471   
Mess saw that fervent public opinion was crucial to bring about effective enforcement and much 
more would be done about the high accident rate if the public did not see it as ‘a matter of 
course’.472  Since such opinion was not regularly forthcoming, lacklustre government thrived.  
For instance, the government had been aware of the dangers of lucifer-match making since the 
1840s.  However, ‘nothing was done’, until the enactment of the 1891 Factories Act when 
lucifer-match making was certified as a dangerous trade to which special rules were drawn up.  
Even at this point, Mess lamented that the ‘absence of any strong public opinion they could not 
be of great stringency’.  Similarly, another example of lacklustre government due to public 
inattention was the low compliance rate to the 1901 Act’s requirement that ‘every room in any 
factory or workshop’ should provide ‘sufficient means of ventilation’.473  He regarded the non – 
compliance was a reflection of the public’s ignorance about the ‘value of fresh air’.474  The 
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requirement of ventilation could only achieve extensive compliance once it received the public’s 
‘steady pressure over a number of years’.475 
Arguably, the Westminster model of OHS regulation hindered the potential of the initiatives to 
significantly decrease the toll of death and disease.    More specifically, there were five crucial 
interrelated issues of the government of the workplace that either protracted gains or failed to 
bring about desired outcomes; the sluggishness of the machinery of government; the 
government’s inadequate data collection; the Factory Department’s low staffing levels, Home 
Office’s undue influence and government – centricity.  These hindrances were intrinsic to OHS 
and remained with OHS until the very last factories act. 
 
4.1.1 The sluggishness of the government’s reforms                                                                      
A significant hindrance to the effectiveness of the government’s initiatives was the time it took 
the government to push through reforms.476  Arguably, reforms would have been more impactful 
if they were implemented in a timelier fashion.477    This was because the progressive nature of 
some reforms was often eroded with the passage of time.  Such delay was the consequence of 
developing OHS in the confines of Whitehall.  Particularly, the Home Office, which was a 
‘highly conservative’ department of government.478  The type of progressive innovation that was 
required proved problematic in a department created to maintain the King’s Peace.  Pellew 
observed that Home Office officials were typified by their observance to precedent and 
tradition.479   David Dixon added, ‘[U]nusually centralized, precedent-bound, hierarchical, 
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isolated from the rest of Whitehall, notoriously slow in dealing with individual cases and 
proposals for reform, and jealous of its wide discretionary powers’.480  Also, Hugo Young saw 
that the Home Office's procrastination stemmed from two issues.  First, it was a product of 
liberal officials carrying out illiberal functions.481   Second, there was also a constant fear of a 
crisis that could erupt due to a decision that was made, given the controversial nature of the 
Home Office’s role.482  
Looking at the wider perspective, government departments were met with a list of concerns that 
went beyond workplace safety.   Maintaining Britain’s international competitiveness, national 
efficiency and the country’s ‘racial health’ often trumped OHS reform.483  Morris Greenberg 
observed that ‘Even modest demands in the field of occupational health could be interpreted as a 
threat to employment and the economy, and further demonised as part of an international 
programme orchestrated to destabilize society and usher in a secular apocalypse’.484  Moreover, 
the reaction to OHS was compounded by the fact that the government was a major employer.  As 
a result, government departments were often faced with significant conflicts of interest.485   
The sluggishness of government machinery was unable to keep pace with technological 
advances of industry.486  Reviewing OHS arrangements in the twentieth century, the Robens 
Report commented, ‘In an age of rapid change in industrial structures and technologies… this 
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traditional empirical approach cannot keep pace’.487  Similarly, Andrews’ study of the period 
states, ‘The growing complexity of modern industrial processes, especially with the introduction 
of new chemicals and a rapid increase in electric power, has enormously increased the problems 
of health and safety’.488  Losing pace with industry is fathomable considering the limits of 
government, but what was blameworthy was the delay in reforms for processes that were known 
to be harmful.    In this regard, the delay that has received considerable attention is the regulation 
of the use of asbestos.  N.J. Wikeley commented, 
It cannot be considered a convincing explanation of why, with the primitive conditions that prevailed and 
had been described in the Chief Inspector of Factories' reports, and with the anecdotal accounts by his staff 
of the health hazard of working with asbestos, and the persuasive supporting evidence of excessive disease 
and deaths from France, America and the UK it took some 60 years from the start up of the industry before 
the department acted.489 
He maintains that the failure to act faster meant that ‘the history has been one of a long series of 
lost opportunities for earlier recognition, effective intervention and the prevention of avoidable 
disease’.490  The history of OHS is plagued with examples of such delays; among them is the 
example of industrial lighting.  In 1909, the dangers of poor lighting were known to the Factory 
Department.491  A special report was authored in 1911, which in turn led to the appointment of a 
departmental committee two years later.492  The committee issued three reports in 1915, 1921, 
and 1922.493  Though the reports ‘stimulated public interest’, there was no legal compulsion for 
decades.494  To this point, an inspector lamented, that the regulation ‘has not kept up with 
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progress with factory conditions’.495  It was not until the passing of the 1937 Factories Act that 
every factory was required to provide sufficient and suitable lighting for the first time in in the 
history of British factory legislation.496   
Another well-cited example of the delay was the recommendation of a departmental committee 
in 1920 that called for a significant increase of factory inspectors.  However, this 
recommendation was not carried out, the number of factory inspectors was left to decline.497    
Three years of inaction caused much disquiet; it was argued that the rising trend in factory 
accidents was attributable to the insufficient number of inspectors.  The Home Secretary ‘bought 
time’ by insisting that legislation was being worked on.498   It would take a decade after the 
committee was set up to recruit more factory inspectors, however, by this time more staff was 
needed to cover the Inspectorates’ increased responsibilities.499   The culture of delay had a 
corrosive effect.   A former miner turned politician spoke to this, ‘This long delay must, as it has 
done, always leave with the workmen the idea that Parliamentary methods are slow and 
cumbersome, and that they have to resort to other methods which are not either in the interests of 
the employer, the workmen, or the country generally’.500   
 
4.1.2 The government’s inadequate data collection                                                                           
In order for the government’s initiatives to impact industry, it required a thorough knowledge of 
what was happening in British factories.  However, the collection of government statistics on ill 
– health and accidents in the workplace had long been inadequate.501  Remarkably, until 1949, 
there were no official figures available for the accidents and disease sustained each year by the 
working population.502  It was essential for the organs of the modern state to have at its disposal 
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sound data.   For the government to comprehend and promote the best interests of its 
constituents, identify areas of concern, monitor areas of progress and regress, allocate and 
withhold resources, a sound information base was essential.  
The government was not solely to blame, fraudulent and apathetic employers and noncompliant 
workers who failed to report accidents and ill – health contributed to a patchy and incoherent 
statistical base.    The strides towards more efficient and productive use of statistics seemed to 
have plateaued in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.   Home Office officials, in official 
and unofficial discussions, appeared to be unconcerned about such things.503   Only through 
public criticism, argues Pellew, came a recognition of the weaknesses of the collection and use 
of factory statistics.504  As a result of this criticism, there was an attempt to improve the poor 
state of factory statistics.505  However, for several reasons, such efforts did not result in vast 
improvements.  First, consistent low staffing levels weakened the information gathering capacity 
of the Factory Department.  The Department’s wide remit and limited resources meant that the 
Inspectorate had insufficient time to develop, maintain and utilise a sound statistical base, ‘This 
was the province of the inspector - a man who was, typically, overworked’.506  Second, the status 
of the Factory Department and all the work associated with was diminished as a result of the 
prominence of the criminal justice.507  By the 1880s, the Criminal Department was the superior 
department, as a Home Office clerk explained, ‘All of the interesting work having been 
gradually gathered in the Criminal Department’.508  Thus, the more able men and resources were 
redirected to the Criminal Department.509  Third, there was a general undervaluing of statistics in 
the Home Office.  Unlike officials at the Board of Trade where valuable statistics were being 
collected, analysed and applied, Home Officials were remarkably vague and apathetic about their 
data gathering activities.  This is evidenced by the low status of the Statistical Branch when 
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compared to the Registry and Accounts branches.510  The Statistical Branch was side-lined as it 
was shuffled around from the General Department to the Criminal Department to the Industrial 
Department and Parliamentary Department.511    
Since the Factory Department was housed and developed under the auspices of the Home Office, 
it may have been influenced by the same apathetic approach to data gathering.512  Whatever the 
influence, it is clear that many factory inspectors believed that ‘preparing statistics for official 
purposes and parliamentary returns, seriously interfere with their duties’.513  While housed in the 
Home Office, the Factory Inspectorate’s lack of information about workplaces and factory 
accidents were evidence of apathetic attitudes.  Moreover, unlike other government departments, 
there was no central branch of the Factory Department which specifically handled statistical 
information.  Thus, Pellew noted, ‘Information collected by the inspectorate… took little account 
of statistical developments’.514 
Another issue with the information gathering capacity of the Factory Department was that it was 
hampered by the way in which OHS had developed.   A mixture of piecemeal improvements and 
extensions of factory legislation and overlaps with other government departments made it 
difficult for the Factory Department to identify trends or even gain an accurate picture of the 
modern workplace.  The Home Office was aware of this and did try to find a more innovative 
way of recording accidents through examining returns from insurance companies in respect of 
workmens compensation claims.  However, Williams noted ‘this was a haphazard and 
incomplete arrangement’.515  Even at the Factory Department’s most developed state in the 
1950s, it was sombre about the accuracy of its estimates.516  Williams did a masterful job of 
picking through the Factory Department’s annual reports of the 1950s to reveal the 
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inconsistencies, deflections and inadequacies of the information provided.517  Moreover, 
Williams noted that there was no explanation given for the elaborate estimates of the Factory 
Department.  References to its ‘undisclosed ratio’ which were ‘obtained some time ago’ were 
simply too vague.518  Its calculation of accidents was largely an internal matter, none outside of 
the Factory Department could understand the basis of their calculations.519    
 
4.1.3 The government’s inadequate staffing of the Factory Department                           
Adequate staffing was essential for the government’s initiatives to be effective.  However, the 
Government’s staffing levels of the Factory Department were incredibly low.  This was 
instituted from the first Factory Act, giving rise to the famous quote from Karl Marx, 
‘Parliament passed 5 labour laws between 1802 and 1833, but was shrewd enough not to vote 
a penny for the requisite officials etc’.520 The antecedents of such low staffing levels were found 
during this period.521  Peter Bartrip noted that the ‘desire for economy was a pervasive and 
stifling influence’.522   This not only protracted the expansion of the Factory Department, but it 
also provoked disputes over inspectors' salaries, expenses, and even over trivial matters such as 
whether the Home Office should pay for geological maps and protective clothing.523   Thus, 
when the first four inspectors took up their duties in 1833 there were around 3,000 textile mills 
in their charge, some 90 years later their responsibility had grown to 280,000 workplaces and the 
number of inspectors had increased to only 205.524    
The accumulated responsibilities of the Factory Department did not correspond with the 
recruitment of new staff.  This observation became particularly clear with the passing of the 
1871 Factory and Workshop Act that added more than 90,000 workshops to the Inspectors’ 
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estimated 30,000 factories.525  With over 120,000 establishments apportioned, each inspector 
would have had 2,000 premises to inspect.526  There was no significant increase in staff to 
correspond with their remit.   On the contrary, Djang observed that recruitment sometimes 
stalled, for instance, from 1878 to 1891; the size of the Inspectorate remained stationary.527    
Such low staffing numbers was a source of continuous strain for the Factory Department.528   
The Inspectorate continuously experienced organisational problems arising from its meagre 
numbers, its ‘thin’ dispersal across the country and growth of paperwork.529    Pellew outlines the 
dilemma:  
(The growth of paperwork) was causing the serious problems for the staff at headquarters which was 
clearly in arrears.  In the field the district inspectors were also finding paperwork a problem and there was a 
serious danger of their losing sight of important communications from London because of the mass of 
information they received.  Moreover, the inspectorial districts were large and unwieldy. 
Consequently, rumblings of criticism emerged from the 1880s; A.J. Mundela, President of the 
Board of Trade, protested to the Prime Minister about lacklustre inspection of factories, mines 
and workshops.530   By the early twentieth century, there were consistent demands for an 
increase in the number of inspectors.531   This is best exemplified by a parliamentary session in 
the summer of 1923 in which Mr Arthur Greenwood informed the House of Commons to the fact 
that:                                                                                                                                                                                  
During the last few years the administrative burden upon the factory inspectors of this country has been 
steadily increasing, but there has not been a commensurate increase in the staff to cope with the work.  On 
the contrary, since 1914…  there has been an actual decrease in the number of factory inspectors.’532   
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Correspondingly, Lord H. Cavendish – Bentinck referred to the low staffing levels of the Factory 
Department as a ‘deplorably penny-wise, pound-foolish policy’.533  Crucial to these protests was 
the notion that increases in factory accidents were ‘attributable to the insufficiency of 
inspectors’.534 
 
4.1.4 The Home Office’s undue influence on the Factory Department                                
Although the Factory Department was an important influence on legislative developments, its 
influence should not be overstated, the ecosystem in which the Factory Department inhabited 
meant that it had ‘limited power in the big issues’.535   Pellew’s study of the early twentieth 
century arrangements revealed that the Home Office exercised considerable control over the 
Factory Department.  Pellew notes that the question of the ‘desirable level’ of factory inspection 
was left to be decided by the Secretary of State and the Treasury.   Observing the formulation of 
factory and workshop bills, she found the Home Office discussed proposals with the 
Inspectorate, usually the Chief Inspector.  However, the central government had the ‘final 
word’.536   
Surveying the history of the Factory Department, Djang observed that the Factory Department’s 
powers were curtailed by the Home Office.  The initiatives of the government would have been 
more impactful if the ‘wide experience’ of the Inspectorate was better utilised.537   Thus, he 
argued that the powers of the Chief Inspector of Factories should be ‘considerably increased’.538  
In particular, much of the powers that lay in the hands of the Home Secretary should be 
transferred to the Chief Inspector of Factories.  He saw that this would improve OHS regulation 
because he was more conversant with the industrial problems of the nation, the conditions of 
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employment, the risks of occupational accidents and diseases and the ways and means they could 
be prevented.539   
Djang’s recommendations subtlety reveals the subordination of the Factory Department by an 
Office of the State that was not at all conversant with the industrial conditions of the day.  The 
Factory Department was subject to a rigid hierarchy.  Deference to layers of authority typified 
the existence of the Factory Department.  The Factory Department was at the bottom of the 
‘totem pole’.   At the head was the Secretary of State for Home Affairs who had a plethora of 
responsibilities, such as the prison system, police administration, local, civil and criminal 
courts.540   Underneath him was an Under – Secretary of State for Home Affairs, who often 
delegated this power to an Assistant Under – Secretary of State.541   This latter official was the 
head of the Industrial Division of which the Factory Department was situated.  The Head of the 
Factory Department was the Chief Inspector of Factories who was handpicked by the Home 
Secretary.  The Home Office was responsible for the recruitment of the personnel of the Factory 
Department.  Applications were scrutinised by the Home Office, with the assistance of the Civil 
Service Commissioners and potential recruits were interviewed by a selection board of 
individuals nominated by the Home Office and the Commissioners.542    The absence of the 
Factory Department in such processes was particularly striking. 
The Treasury also exerted significant control over the staffing of the Factory Department.  The 
Home Office needed the approval of Treasury to set numbers and salaries of factory inspectors.   
From the creation of the Inspectorate, the Treasury had scrutinised its expenditure.543  However, 
from the 1870s, the processes were more formalised, government departments were placed under 
extraordinary pressure to keep their expenditure ‘acceptable’.544  The level of ‘acceptability’ was 
never laid down by statute it was left to the negotiations of the Secretary of State and the 
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Treasury.545  It is telling that Factory Department officials were excluded from such negotiations.  
Even Home Office officials believed that the Treasury looked at the needs of the Factory 
Department in isolation without considering the excessive statutory demands being made on the 
Department or the increasing ‘social importance’ attached to factory inspections.546 
The government’ s wider political concerns often constrained the development of OHS.  
Bartrip’s commentary on the regulation of white lead is a case in point.547  In 1904, the Swiss 
government issued invitations to the governments of Western and Central Europe to send 
representatives to an International Conference on Labour regulation to be held the following 
year.548  The conference sought to bring about international harmonisation on the limiting of 
hours of women night workers and the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of 
matches.549  The British government sent Home Office officials Henry Cunynghame and 
Delevinge.  However, both officials were not authorised to sign any agreements, no matter what 
their terms, the position of the superiors was that no ban on white phosphorus would be 
accepted.550   Despite the mounting evidence provided by the Inspectorate, the British 
government took a very ‘political’ view on this subject.  The government stipulated that if 
Britain had signed the Convention, it would have destroyed a part of British industry and given 
the competitive edge to other countries.551   Even though Britain was not alone in 'sabotaging' the 
conference, the government attitude attracted criticism in Parliament.  The Earl of Lytton 
suggested that, ‘If this country is to take part in these Conferences at all it would surely be better 
for the Government to send its representatives to them in rather a different spirit from that which 
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has animated them in the past’.552  Mess brought a similar example of delegates that attended the 
Berlin Conference.  Most of the delegates, including the British attendees, had recommended the 
raising of the age of employment to 12 years.  However, the British Government dissented and 
proposed leaving the age at ten years as before. The Home Secretary contended that children 
working half-time were at least as healthy and as intelligent as those attending school full 
time.553 
 
4.1.5 Government – centricity                                                                                           
Government – centeredness was a significant barrier to reform.  Though engagement with non – 
state actors increased significantly in the twentieth century, the engagement was rigid and 
circumscribed.  The various professions working in industry protested about their lack of access 
to policy formulation.  Although the determination of what constituted a safe working 
environment should be a medical or technical matter, it was also a matter of political, legal and 
economic constraints of which the government was best suited to decide.554  Thus, it was not 
uncommon for the government to dismiss the concerns of experts and professionals if it decided 
upon a particular action.   
A significant indicator of government centricity is the factory legislation produced in that period.  
Observing this extension of government power, Price believed that they were ‘new tendencies 
not fully embraced in former legislation’;555   All the government’s initiative to encourage 
voluntary action on the factory floor was offset by its ‘top-down’ legislation.  Even the 
progressive consolidating acts of the twentieth century imbued the government to exercise 
significant powers over industry.   Government responsibility continued to grow with each 
factories act.  The British Association for Labour Legislation noted, ‘The Home Secretary for 
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the Home Department has very wide powers under the factory and workshop acts, and these 
powers are freely used in certain cases’.556    Paul Almond looks at this growth from the late 
nineteenth century in which a ‘raft of legislation’ authorised the Home Secretary powers to 
certify industries as ‘dangerous trades’, apply special rules to them and impose prohibitions on 
the employment of any class of people.557   
The first consolidating act of the century, the 1901 Act, was ‘notable’ because of its ‘centralising 
administrative content’558; the 1901 Act provided the Secretary of State with the power to make 
special regulations for OHS in respect of factories, workshops, building operations, operations at 
docks, quays and warehouses.559   Moreover, the Act entailed requirements of notification and 
reporting which placed a greater onus upon the regulated to exhibit prescribed behaviour laid 
down by the state.560    The 1901 Act was followed by the Police, Factories, etc. (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1916.  This was the Home Office’s sole legislative contribution to OHS during 
the War.  The 1916 Act’s main provisions gave the Home Secretary the power to require proper 
arrangements for washing facilities, serving meals, supply of drinking water, protective clothing, 
first - aid facilities, seating, cloakrooms and the supervision of workers.561   It was within the 
period of this Act that it was believed that government extended ‘a hitherto undreamt-of degree 
of control over the private industrial production, the employment of workers and civilian life’.562  
Similarly, Charles Baker wrote in the period of the Great War, ‘Government operation and 
control of industry in the past four years has not merely driven the last nail into the coffin 
containing the defunct laissez-faire theory of government; it has dumped that coffin without the 
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benefit of clergy into the grave… and has heaped high the earth over it’.563   The 1937 Factories 
Act did not break the pattern of overt government control, rather Long contends that it placed 
even more responsibility in the hands of the Secretary of the State and his advisers.564  John 
Bridge, the then Chief Medical Inspector of Factories also stated that the Act bestowed powers 
on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for medical supervision where he had reason to 
believe that cases of illness were caused by a particular type of work.565 
The government’s initiatives of the twentieth century could only go so far without the inclusion 
of non-governmental organisations.  The government could have benefited from the expertise 
and experiences of the thousands of individuals that worked in industry.  These men and women 
were acquainted with the work of factories, processes of manufacture, the conditions of labour 
that were injurious to the health and lives of the workpeople.566   More specifically, initiatives 
like self – inspection and welfare promotion required ‘boots on the ground’.  However, the 
barrier erected by the government was the cause of ‘incredibly slow’ progress in these areas.567   
Dixon describes the closeted nature of the Home Office, ‘There is - or was - a lack of open 
discussion within the Department and a reluctance to consult external advice and expertise’.568  
The government’s insistence to maintain a central role hindered any real contribution from those 
that worked with the risks.   
Groups such as the certifying surgeons likened such rigidity to a ‘straitjacket’.569  Stephen 
Huzzard argues that the subsidiary role ascribed to surgeons and similar entities stunted efforts to 
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advance sanitary science and protracted remedies to occupational diseases.570  Similarly, John 
Rimington noted that, ‘Almost nothing had been done to harness the nation’s science base to the 
emerging problems.  Such professional and scientific effort took place in the corners of 
inspectorates’.571  Ultimately it led to the government ‘legislating in the dark… much of it was 
found to have been ill contrived and some positively so bad that it obstructed, and to a great 
extent prevented, the attainment of the object’.572   
Arguably, the state’s reluctance to work closer with industrial groups created an atmosphere of 
misunderstanding; since these groups did not play a significant role in the development of the 
government’s initiatives, such initiatives may have been prone to misinterpretation by these 
groups.   They may have misinterpreted the government’s initiatives to be detrimental or 
inconsequential to their operations.  Thus, their much-needed assistance was not forthcoming to 
the government’s initiatives.  Such a scenario could explain organised labour’s reluctance to aid 
some of the government’s initiatives.  Initially, unions were antagonistic towards the 
government’s promotion of welfare provisions because they believed that they were aimed not 
so much at improving conditions for workers but at undercutting the influence of trade unions 
and pacifying worker unrest.573  Such negativity often spilt onto the factory floor; employers 
realised fairly quickly that their appointment of welfare supervisors had ‘ruffled many feathers’ 
of those that resented their ‘intrusive presence’.574  If the government’s project of welfare 
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promotion was developed with close cooperation with the unions, much of their fears and 
resentment could have been addressed through the negotiation process. 
Additionally, union help was not forthcoming with the promotion of the Home Office’s 
Industrial Museum.  The Museum was not as successful as the Home Office had hoped.  To no 
avail, the Factory Department wrote a series of letters to the TUC seeking its assistance in 
promoting the Museum to its members.575  It would seem that unions saw little benefit in helping 
the government promote the Museum.  Again, if the unions were invited to help with the 
founding of the Museum, perhaps we would have seen a greater concern for the project. 
The need to establish a closer working relationship with non – governmental organisations was 
not an idea reached retrospectively, from the late nineteenth century, such demands were made.  
The English manufacturer A.J. Mundella believed that as long as the powers remained solely in 
the hands of the Inspectorate, ‘it will never be done by them in a thorough manner’.576  However, 
if such powers were dispersed among the regime, it would ‘strengthen the hands of the 
inspectors’ and the action of the inspectors would give ‘weight and authority’ to the regime, and 
the two would thus ‘work together for the public interest’.577  Similarly, the TUC sent several 
deputations to the government in the late nineteenth century pleading for representation in the 
inspectorates.578  It was argued that the slender inspection force could be bolstered through the 
appointment of experienced workpeople.579   However, the Factory Department rebuffed their 
demands, the reason for the rebuff reveals the disposition of government officials.  The reason 
given by officials was essentially the preservation of the ‘purity’ of government; unlike the 
government, workpeople and manufacturers were not independent of men and masters.  
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Moreover, if either side of industry were given such representation in the Factory Department, 
both sides would question the partiality of the Department.580  However, the zeitgeist of reform 
in the 1890s and the excessive workload compelled the government to soften its stance.  A 
‘lower class of officials’ was appointed by the Home Office in 1893 from the working classes, 
but their size was negligible, they had an inferior status, no meaningful influence on policy and 
legislation, disproportionately supervised and unions were not given representation.581   
Consigning non – state actors to the fringes was not particular to the nineteenth century, the 
practice continued in the twentieth-century.  There were a handful of studies on British factory 
inspection, conducted in the pre – Robens era that spoke indirectly of the government – centred 
approach to OHS. 582  One of which was Djang’s Factory Inspection in Great Britain that 
pointed out that governmental regulations alone, without the co-operative effort of industry, 
resulted in ‘apathy, procrastination, or possible inactivity’.583  Elsewhere he noted that:  
It is upon the full development of such voluntary associations as works committees, safety committees, 
welfare departments, National Safety-First Association, the Industrial Welfare Society, and so on that the 
future success of factory inspection in Great Britain mainly depends. Without such voluntary effort on the 
part of industry, governmental inspection has little hope of achieving complete success (emphasis 
added).584   
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He saw that the Factory Department should do more to recruit experts outside of its doors.585  
Djang also advocated that research on factory health and welfare should be entrusted to the 
Industrial Health Research Board.586  Mess’ Factory Legislation made recommendations along 
similar lines.587  Andrew’s British Factory Inspection saw the Factory Inspectorate as 
overdeveloped, highly trained and well paid, more so than any other country but the peripheral 
aspects were underdeveloped.   Everything outside of the Factory Department was in a poor 
state; he noted that the factories acts were ‘out of date’, Britain’s ‘supplemental administrative 
codes are in some fields either lacking or suspended in the form of the gentlemen's agreements’, 
the accident compensation system was ineffectual and that there was not much in the way of 
innovation.588  Also, Andrews’ section on the government’s cooperation with other entities was 
unable to bring many examples and the examples that he did bring were atypical.589   The last 
study was George Moses Price’s Administration of Labor Laws and Factory Inspection.  
Although Price noted that inspectors had arranged occasional conferences and had good relations 
with employers, he saw that the Inspectorate’s relations with employees did not ‘seem to so close 
or genial’ and that there were no official relations between the factory department and labour 
organisations.590 
Further evidence of the limited role of non – state actors is best exemplified by two 
representative examples.  The first of which was the transfer or ‘capture’ of the accident 
reporting role from certifying surgeons.  The most prominent profession in OHS was the medical 
profession.  Consequently, the British Medical Journal was a popular venue to express the 
dissatisfaction with the government’s lack of consultation.591   In 1911, a government 
departmental committee concluded that the surgeons’ reports were superfluous because the 
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Inspectorate was now so closely in touch with factories that an inspector could judge from the 
occupier’s report whether their personal investigation was required.  It was also concluded that 
the certifying surgeon’s report seldom added anything of value; the certifying surgeon was not 
an expert in accident risks, so his report did not eliminate that need for an inspector to visit if an 
investigation was required.  Moreover, the sum paid to surgeons could be better spent on more 
effective accident prevention strategies.592  As a result of these observations, the government 
opted to abolish the accident reporting role of the surgeons, except in special cases where a 
special inquiry was thought to be necessary.593  
It was protested that the government’s decision to transfer the reporting role of certifying 
surgeons to the Inspectorate was taken with very little input from the surgeons, the Journal 
criticised that such a decision occurred without their involvement. 594  The Certifying Factory 
Surgeons' Association alongside the British Medical Association (BMA) sent several deputations 
to the Home Office pleading their case.  They put forward strong arguments for the continuance 
of their duties.  They argued that the government would be unable to deal with the increased 
workload and thus struggle to fulfil its responsibility to see that workpeople were properly 
protected against accidents.595  They also argued that without their reports the government would 
have to rely upon the employers for an account of the nature and causation of an accident.596   By 
denying access to surgeons, the government denied itself access to professional opinion which 
was not subject to the same biases of unions and employers.597   None of these arguments 
changed the government’s course. 
Second, it was not just the professions that were subject to such experiences, organised labour 
and capital had to work within a rigid structure, their muted role in establishing an acceptable 
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standard for asbestos exposure is evidence of this.598   Assessing the influence of both sides of 
industry becomes apparent when looking at the development of asbestos standards.  The use of 
asbestos, regarded as the ‘grand-daddy of all occupational killers’, illuminates the government – 
centred approach to OHS.599   Moreover, it illuminates the deficiencies of both sides of industry 
that necessitated the government to take ownership of OHS.600   From the outset, it was clear 
who played the central role; the Home Office opened the proceedings to consider asbestos 
hazards in 1931.601  The influence of employers has always suffered from exaggeration.  
Undoubtedly, Home Office officials leaned towards the concerns of employers.  However, it was 
the former that decided whether to take on their views.  Moreover, it was the former that decided 
which employers to correspond with and who to invite for further negotiations.602  In an informal 
conference chaired by the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops, arrangements 
were put forward to draft regulations, the manufacturers present ‘took the view – rightly… that 
their interests would be better protected if they co-operated with the department’(emphasis 
added).603  The draft regulations of these arrangements compromised of 25 agreements for 
improving conditions in asbestos factories, the bulk of which were drawn from an earlier 
government report.604  Wikeley pointed out that relatively ‘few concessions were made to meet 
the employers’ concerns’.605 
The unions fared much worse.  Although Wikeley acknowledged that Home Office officials 
made a ‘genuine attempt’ to canvas union views, the TUC was only able to make improvements 
at the margins, rather than fundamental issues; the TUC was effectively presented with a fait 
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accompli.606   Correspondingly, Bartrip’s Dusty Death utilised Wikeley’s sources, though his 
conclusion was more muted than Wikeley, he concurred that the union influence was marginal, 
and they were aware of the limits of their influence.607 
The development of the asbestos regulations also illuminates why the government maintained a 
central role in OHS standard setting.  If not the government, then who?  It was extremely 
unlikely that employers would push for regulation in previously unregulated industries.   Long’s 
study of twentieth-century occupational health could not identify an ‘active interest’ amongst 
employers’ associations in such matters. 608   Rather their involvement was largely defensive, 
either seeking minimum standards or exemptions.609  Equally, it was not beyond an employer to 
‘turn the tables’ and claim that the factory environment improved the health of their employees 
who irresponsibly jeopardised their health and consequently in their own time and own homes.610   
The TUC’s demand for such regulations was also non – existent.   This was due to a number of 
reasons.  First, the unions had no authoritative medical evidence to counteract the arguments of 
the Home Office.611  In contrast to the unions, the government had conducted and funded studies 
in this subject area since the turn of the twentieth century.612   The second reason for the failure 
to demand regulation was that unions were faced with a series of more pressing concerns.  In 
particular, the Great Depression had a devastating impact on the Lancashire cotton trade.613  
Third, the Government's decision in 1931 to cut unemployment insurance and introduce the 
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household means test inevitably consumed the time and resources of the unions.614  All of which 
prompted the government to take a lead role in the regulation of asbestos.  
 
 
4.2 The limit of government 
All the issues discussed in this section hindered the full development of the OHS system.  
Despite the government’s willingness to address the inadequacies of OHS, these hurdles 
hindered any fundamental change.  In a sense, the development of OHS had reached its ceiling; 
it required a significant impetus to move beyond its mediocrity.  
 
 
5.0 Conclusion                                                                                                                           
There is little doubt that the extremities of the nineteenth century were greatly reduced or 
entirely eradicated in the twentieth century.  However, fundamental problems remained.  To 
emphasise this dichotomy, Mess asks us to imagine an observer who spent a considerable 
amount of time visiting factories and workshops in the late nineteenth century.615  Then after 
three or four decades of absence, he revisits those same workplaces.  To his delight, he would 
not find a single child working in these locations and he would notice that working hours were 
greatly reduced.  He would see better ventilation, higher levels of hygiene and an array of 
protective clothing.  He would also see the reduction of the most common occupational ailments 
of the nineteenth century; phossy jaw and lead poisoning.   He may come across a safety 
pamphlet and during the war periods he would also have seen a welfare supervisor.   
However, if the same individual would scratch beneath the surface, he would find much to alarm 
him.   As Mess notes, ‘He would probably get the impression… that risks had been much 
reduced.   However, if he looked into the statistics of accidents, he might well feel doubtful 
whether that was indeed the case’.616  The veneer of the improved factory conditions would be 
welcomed, but the reality of the challenges for continued improvement would be disconcerting.  
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He would not know whether the improvements ‘was due to legislation and what was due to the 
spread of enlightenment and to scientific progress’.617  In the realm of occupational health, he 
would be concerned that the government was being outpaced by the technological developments 
of industry.  Regarding accident prevention, he would be aggrieved about the lack of significant 
improvements in safety, despite the wider use of machinery.  He could attribute the limited 
impact of government action in the nineteenth century to the lack of precedent, ignorance and the 
fortification of industrial opposition.  However, by the twentieth-century, these hindrances were 
greatly reduced, yet progression remained protracted.    
All these observations would cause him to ponder whether the efforts of the government to bring 
about a safe and healthy workplace had plateaued.  OHS had been ‘incubated’ Westminster, but 
the time was approaching for its departure.  The government’s initiatives that centred on causing 
industry to act on its own accord, such as welfare supervision, self – inspection and engagement 
with non – state actors were a tacit acknowledgement that a state-centric approach to OHS was 
limited.  Therein, clearing the stage for greater industry involvement in the development of OHS 
policy and practice. 
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Chapter Four: The Loosening Grip of Government (1930s – 1960s) 
1.0 Introduction                                                                                                                                 
The decades leading up to the appointment of the Robens Committee were typified by the 
expansion of corporatist and non - governmental efforts to improve working conditions.  This 
expansion coincided with the growing realisation that the Westminster model of OHS regulation 
was ill-suited to tackle the accident problem.  Both developments pushed the government to 
appoint the Robens Committee, which would take OHS in a radically new direction.    
 
1.2 The Layout of the Chapter                                                                                                                                        
The chapter commences with a discussion on the initial interaction between the government and 
non - state – state actors, which was augmented with Ernest Bevin’s appointment to the newly 
established Ministry of Labour and National Service in 1940.618  He and his officials undertook 
significant initiatives to encourage non – state actors to contribute to the betterment of OHS.619  
Even after his departure in 1945, he left a legacy of corporatist machinery and a reactive 
legislature.  In maintaining Bevin’s momentum, the Ministry of Labour had stretched the 
boundaries of the conventional approach to OHS.620 
The following section documents two developments that came out of the Ministry of Labour’s 
stretching of the boundaries.  First, it contributed to a period of intense non – governmental 
activity in the arena of OHS.  What was remarkable about this activity was that it was not state-
led or legislation - inspired, instead it was non – state actors taking it upon themselves to 
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improve working conditions.  From the post-war period, we saw increased investment in the 
employment of personnel, propaganda, safety training, welfare provision and knowledge 
transfer.621  Though these steps did not significantly reduce the toll of death and disease, they 
were essential steps to cement the notion that industry could undertake measures to prevent 
accidents and incidences of ill – health.   Rather than accept that ‘accidents happen’ or the 
occurrences of ill – health, one could take undertake efforts to ameliorate the situation without 
recourse to the government.622  Therein, first articulating key precepts of the Robens 
philosophy.623  Additionally, these steps allowed for the intake of experiences and maturation of 
processes.   
The second development of the Ministry of Labour’s stretching of the boundaries was that it 
enlarged expectations of what the state could achieve.   However, these interventions failed to 
impact the accident problem, in fact, matters deteriorated.  This led to the perception of 
government overload, for officials, the ‘business of government’ became too difficult.624  
Solving the accident problem was beyond the Westminster model.625  Correspondingly, for the 
public, a seemingly endless series of tragedies challenged the notion that they were protected 
effectively.626  In light of these developments, Barbara Castle, the then Secretary of State for 
Employment and Productivity627 sought to ‘get away from the conventional approach’.628  
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2.0 The government and non – governmental organisations                                                       
The dissemination of responsibilities to non – state actors was a slow and congested process.  
However, there were landmarks along the way.  Our earlier discussion about the government’s 
engagement with non – governmental organisations is an appropriate place to begin.629  The 
government’s initiatives that centred on activating industry to act on its own accord, through 
welfare supervision, self – inspection and engagement with non – state actors, allowed for the 
input of non-state actors.  Although rigid and circumscribed, it opened the door for organised 
capital and labour.  It became evident from the 1930s that organised labour and organised capital 
were the prime recipients of the government’s outreach.630   
The relationship progressed to the extent that the Factory Inspectorate stated in the 1930s, ‘At no 
time in the history of factory legislation have the relations between the Inspectorate and the two 
chief partners in industrial progress - employers and workers - been closer or more friendly and 
with the spirit of reasonableness on all sides’.631  In the same period, John Forbes Watson, 
Director of the British Employers' Confederation (BEC) made an ‘open confession’ that when he 
first came in touch with the Factory Inspectorate, an impression still lingered here and there that 
the factory inspector was more of an inquisitor than a friend’.632  However, he noted ‘that spirit 
had changed, and the change was largely due to the fact that…  the Factory Department had 
been so ready to consult the employers and the workers in drawing up their regulations 
(emphasis added)’.633   
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As Watson noted above, the government welcomed organised labour and organised capital to 
work on regulations.634    Among the well – documented examples of this engagement were the 
Factory Department officials meeting with asbestos company representatives to formulate the 
1931 Asbestos Regulations.635  Also, the BEC and TUC discussed every clause and aspect of the 
1937 Factory Bill with Factory Department officials ‘with the result that when the Bill came 
before Parliament it was more or less an agreed measure’.636   It was believed that a ‘piece of 
legislation drawn up in that way was much more likely to achieve its results than one which was 
thrust upon the parties without practical consideration of circumstances’.637   
Also, a number of corporatist projects began to develop.  In 1934, the Home Secretary 
cooperated with the National Confederation of Employers' Organisations (NCEO) to work out a 
‘satisfactory solution’ to the excess of accidents among young persons.   Two years later, a 
printed memorandum was circulated among employers' organisation, embodying the various 
suggested safety measures for juvenile agreed between the Home Office and the NCEO.638  
Unions and employers associations took part in the Conferences of the International Labour 
Office at Geneva.639  Additionally, unions and employers associations were called upon by the 
government to disseminate information to their members.640   The novelty of such events caused 
the Chief Inspector to state that, ‘This movement must certainly be regarded as one of the most 
interesting developments in industry’.641 
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2.1 The transfer of the Factory Department to the Ministry of National Labour and 
National Service                                                                                                                           
Though advances had been made in the 1930s, they were amplified when the Factory 
Department relocated to the newly established Ministry of Labour and National Service in 1940.  
From this point, we see a momentum towards corporatist projects in the field of OHS. 
The transfer of the Factory Department to the Ministry of Labour and National Service642 in 
1940 was debated for many decades.  In 1894, Sidney Webb proposed to the Royal Commission 
on Labour that a new department of labour should be formed by amalgamating the labour 
statistics branch of the Board of Trade and the Factory and Mines Department of the Home 
Office.643  Tom Keenoy argues that, despite the differences in terminology, the Webbs’ 
collectivist proposals concerning industrial relations were more than prescient of what 
commentators have termed ‘corporatist’.644  The proposal for a Ministry of Labour was again 
proposed in 1909 in the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission.645  This was followed by 
a succession of bills proposing to deal with the setting up of a Ministry of Labour.646  In 1915, 
the TUC carried a unanimous resolution which stated, ‘This Congress calls upon the 
Government to appoint a Minister of Labour with full Cabinet rank…  Factory Acts, mines, 
docks, railway regulations, provisions for ‘dangerous’, ‘unhealthy’ occupations to be supervised 
by the Minister, together with a staff of inspectors’.647  A year later, the Ministry of Labour was 
established as a concession to the Labour Party.648 
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2.2 The arrival of Ernest Bevin                                                                                                       
Before Ernest Bevin was appointed the Minister of Labour, it was a ‘second class department’ to 
the extent that Norman Price notes that it was unable to absorb the Factory Department even 
though it should logically have been part of the Ministry of Labour, more so than the Home 
Office. 649  However, the Home Office’s territorialism prevented any transfer of 
responsibilities.650  Such obstinacy would melt away with the outbreak of War.651    S.E. Finer 
noted that, ‘It took the dominant personality of Mr Bevin, the demands of the Second World 
War, and a row in the cabinet to wrench the function from the place where history has deposited 
it’.652   Ernest Bevin’s ‘dominant personality’ was the crucial factor; wars and cabinet rows had 
occurred, yet the Factory Department sat comfortably in the Home Office.653   It was the arrival 
of Bevin at the Ministry of Labour that ‘turned the tide’.654  It is telling that it required a ‘non – 
governmental figure’ like Bevin to extend the corporatist machinery of the Ministry; Bevin had 
no experience of government, he had never sat in Parliament and he was ignorant of ‘process’.655   
He did not see himself as just a Labour politician, rather he saw himself as a representative of the 
trade union movement and the wider working class.656   
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Correspondingly, the Ministry of Labour was fertile ground for his ideas.  Arguably, of all the 
ministries, his innovative proposals could only have flourished in the Ministry of Labour.657 The 
Ministry of Labour was a young department unfettered by precedent and tradition like the Great 
Offices of State.658   It was accustomed to adopting new roles and responsibilities placed on it by 
other departments.659  Moreover, when Bevin accepted the ministerial post in Winston 
Churchill's coalition government, he did so on the condition that he be allowed to take measures 
to improve the conditions of workers.660   On his very first day, Bevin filled up four sheets of 
paper with a programme of action that ‘transformed the attitude and the role of the Ministry of 
Labour’.661  Prime among his programme of action was the transfer of the Factory Department.  
Price’s unique study of the relationship between the Ministry of Labour and the Home Office did 
not regard this transfer as insignificant; it served to give OHS a new footing.662  
Bevin saw that this transfer was crucial to ‘raise of the profile of industrial welfare’.663   
Additionally, Bevin felt that the Factory Department housed in the Home Office had taken on an 
inappropriate association with police, prisons and the control of vice.664  He saw that the 
development of safe and healthy work practices could not be brought about by state-centric 
policing only through the installation of a comprehensive welfare service.665  Moreover, his 
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years as a trade union leader had convinced him that ‘brandishing compulsory powers’ was not 
an effective means to bring about compliance.666  
The effect of transferring the Factory Department to the Ministry of Labour was 
‘considerable’.667 A few months before the transfer of responsibility, the staff of the Factory 
Department totalled 208.  This must have been a daunting prospect for a relatively young 
Ministry.668  Nonetheless, Bevin’s Ministry engaged fully with the accident problem.  This was 
due to an interest in accident prevention, occupational health and the large numbers of 
inexperienced workers entering factories.669   He told an audience of unions, employers and state 
officials, ‘Attention to the human problems of employment in industry had lagged behind 
attention to production problems but should be ahead of it’.670  Within just a few months in 
office, he issued orders that empowered factory inspectors to compel large businesses to appoint 
welfare officers and doctors and also the provision of canteens.671  A year later, the Ministry 
instructed employers to match the increase in the proportion of women workers by appointing 
more women welfare and personnel officers.672   His efforts of promoting industrial health had 
yielded some results.   By the end of 1944, the number of full-time appointments for doctors rose 
from 30 to 181 and of part-time from 50 to 890, the number of nurses had risen from 1,500 to 
7,800.673  Additionally, the number of work canteens rose from 200 to over 5,000.674   
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2.3 Sowing the seeds                                                                                                                    
Though the above advances were admirable, Bevin’s impact should be measured by its long-
term effects.  His time in the Ministry was crucial for several reasons.  First, activities that he 
introduced and oversaw normalised the engagement with non – state actors.   Although there was 
some machinery to engage with non – state actors before the Bevin arrived, little use was made 
of it.675  Meetings with both sides of industry were often ad hoc, isolated and after regulations 
had already been drawn up.  He signalled his seriousness about making better use of the 
corporatist machinery by bringing together industrialists and trade unions and announcing his 
plans of a greater union between unions, employers and government.676   
He saw that his powers as Minister of Labour were not used to replicate the previous ministers or 
dictate to industry, ‘but to bring both sides together – always on equal terms – face them with 
what was required and get them to work out an agreed solution which he could put into force in 
statutory orders and regulations where necessary’.677  The practical aspect of this philosophy 
came in the form of the Factory and Welfare Board, composed of representatives from trade 
unions, employers, voluntary organisations and Ministry officials.678  The Board was set up to 
‘advise him on welfare questions and to assist him in developing and stimulating health, safety 
and welfare arrangements inside the factory and lodging, feeding and welfare arrangements 
outside the factory’.679  The Board was designed to be a permanent fixture of decision – making 
that met monthly.680   Bevin told the House that, ‘We tried to the best of our ability to bring into 
association representatives of the employers and the trade unions together with people of 
experience’.681  The Board allowed both sides of industry to sit in the same room to discuss the 
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issues of the day before any regulations had been proposed.  Bevin spoke of the importance of 
such gatherings,  
While it is true that it is called an advisory body, it has been a good deal more than that.  It receives regular 
reports covering the whole field and acts as a focal point in the development of policy. I do not remember 
having had to reject a single recommendation which has been made.682 
It is important to point out that this Board was seen as an alternative to the conventions of the 
period.  In fact, Bevin saw it as a ‘safeguard against the rigid bureaucratic methods’.683   He saw 
such a system as vital because it gave:  
[I]ndustry and public service a proper place in this branch of administration, and I hope that a board of this 
character will remain a permanent feature to enable us to get over the changes and difficulties which will 
arise in our industrial system in the vexed and difficult times which lie ahead.684 
The necessities of the War gave Bevin space to expand the tripartite decision – making 
machinery; he utilised this space to infuse the Ministry of Labour with a host of tripartite 
boards.685  Alongside the Board sat the Central Consultative Council which was created to utilise 
the experiences and services of voluntary organisations interested in questions of welfare686; the 
Catering Wages Board composed of representatives of the state, industry and labour, and was 
empowered to set minimum wages in trades without organised representation and more 
radically, to enforce agreed-upon standards687; the Seamen’s Welfare Board was chaired by 
Bevin and supported by a range organisations to provide welfare facilities for merchant 
seamen.688  Beyond employers and unions, Bevin also reached out to a whole host of non – state 
actors.  The Ministry initiated a ‘consistent and persistent campaign’ of ‘safety first propaganda 
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with the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA).689 To increase the amount of 
medical personnel in factories, the Ministry instructed the BMA (British Medical Association) to 
set up the Committee on Industrial Health in Factories.690  All of these initiatives were 
considered ‘wise policy’ because it enabled Bevin to ‘draw on a fund of energy and local 
initiative which no government department could have supplied (emphasis added)’.691 
Once established, this method of decision - making took root in the Ministry, distinguishing the 
Ministry from its counterparts.692  Allan Bullock wrote:  
What is interesting in this development is that Bevin as Minister of Labour not only established for the first 
time the regular practice of the Government calling in the trade unions for consultation, but began to 
introduce a tripartite pattern of consultation and co-operation between Government, employers and unions 
as a way of dealing with industrial and economic problems.693 
Bevin had wedged the door open for unions and employers to enter Whitehall.  The Ministry of 
Labour was regarded as a significant conduit for organised interests.694  This remained long after 
Bevin left the Ministry.695  David McCrone, Brian Elliott and Frank Bechhofer provided a 
chronology of corporatist endeavours starting from Bevin that lasted decades.696   
Second, Bevin was a visionary; he saw a future industrial order in which workers would be 
treated fairly under a system of rational direction and co-operation, thus lessening the need for 
recourse to class conflict.697   He envisioned a world in which fully unionised workers 
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cooperated with enlightened owners to manage the economy rationally.698   This unity of 
interests was remarkably similar to the philosophy of Bevin’s successor in the Ministry of 
Labour, Alfred Robens.699  Bevin had shown consistency in his attempts to establish such ‘joined 
up’ thinking.   Five years before his appointment to the Ministry of Labour, Bevin had pressed 
trade unions to think outside of the box and avoid relying on the state’s measures.  Walter 
Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC, recalled a meeting in which Bevin was unimpressed with 
the lack of progress in the implementation of occupational health education, he urged the TUC to 
broaden their approach and not rely on the state’s mechanisms.  Instead, they should establish an 
advisory committee to enhance themselves with information regarding accident prevention, 
social insurance and occupational health.700   
 
2.4 The surge                                                                                                                                
Before Ernest Bevin departed from the Ministry of Labour and National Service in 1945, he 
stipulated that the Ministry’s corporatist arrangements and the pursuit of better working 
conditions should not cease with the cessation of the War.701  It would appear that his advice was 
upheld; the initiatives to improve working conditions following the War were very impressive. 
The legislative output dwarfed earlier periods.   In 1946, special rules were made for patent fuel 
manufacture and magnesium grinding.   In the same year, the Gowers Committee was appointed 
by the government to consider the extension of statutory standards to workplaces not already 
subject to legislation.  In 1947, controls were enhanced over health hazards in the pottery 
industry.  The 1937 Factories Act was amended by the Factories Act of 1948, which extended 
the age limits for the medical examination of young persons entering factory employment, 
widened welfare benefits to include male workers and extended building regulations.  The 
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National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 came into force in 1948, providing the 
government with better statistical information about industrial accidents and disease.702  1948 
also saw new regulations for clay works and jute manufacture.  Dry cleaning and blasting of 
castings processes were covered in 1949.  In the same year, the UK helped develop and ratify the 
International Labour Organisation’s Convention concerning Labour Inspection in Industry and 
Commerce 1947 came into effect in 1950 and laid down principles for inspection of conditions at 
work.703  In 1950, a Working Party was set up to look at Precautionary measures against toxic 
chemicals used in agriculture.  In 1952, the Agriculture (Poisonous Substances) Act was passed 
to protect workers using specific toxic chemicals.  In 1954, the Minister of Labour presented to 
the House a White Paper on the staffing and organisation of the Inspectorate, following an 
examination carried out by the Ministry, the Government decided to significantly increase the 
staffing numbers of the Inspectorate.704  Additionally, Williams observed that during this period, 
OHS was the subject of numerous private members bills and parliamentary debates, motions and 
questions.705 
When the Conservative Party won the 1951 general election, there were no significant signs of 
departing from Bevin’s legacy.  Carrying on with Bevin’s legacy, the Ministry of Labour was 
committed to working ‘in co-operation with those concerned in industry and to help them in 
studying these problems… Much of this kind of work has been done in the Ministry and I have 
tried to intensify it a good deal in the last few years (emphasis added)’.706  Evidence of which 
was the establishment of a succession of joint consultation committees from 1954; the Industrial 
Safety Sub – Committee of the National Joint Advisory Council of the Ministry of Labour, the 
Industrial Health Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee on Safety and Health in the 
Building and Civil Engineering Industries and Interdepartmental Committee on Industrial Safety 
                                                     
702 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) p11 
703 David Eves, ‘Two steps forward, one step back: A Brief History of the Origins, Development and 
Implementation of Health and Safety Law in the United Kingdom, 1802–2014’ (History of Occupational Safety and 
Health, 2014) <http://www.historyofosh.org.uk/brief/#chapter08> accessed 24 June 2018 
704 ‘Factories Bill' HC vol 595 cc853-956 (17 November 1958) 
705 John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) p458 
706 ‘Factories Bill' HC vol 595 cc853-956 (17 November 1958) 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 129 
Research.  There were also three influential reports published in the late 1950s; the Industrial 
Safety Sub – Committee’s Industrial Accident Prevention (1957), the Industrial Health 
Advisory’s Committee’s Halifax Industrial Health Survey (1958) and the Factory Inspectorate’s 
Industrial Health Survey of the Pottery Industry (1959).    
 
3.0 The developments following the government’s surge                                                                
The range and intensity of government’s surge detailed above contributed to two developments.  
First, the government’s opportunities for collaboration and input contributed to the significant 
non-state interest and activity in the arena of OHS.  Second, it helped create a sense of 
‘government overload’.  The surge of activity detailed above did not have a discernible impact 
on OHS, therein reinforcing the perception of ‘government overload’, it was simply beyond the 
Westminster model to effectively the accident problem, the load was too much bear.  Each of 
these developments will be discussed below. 
 
3.1 The activation of industry                                                                                                       
The government’s surge was not only within the legislative realm, but it also sought to activate 
industry through voluntary measures.  For example, the Factory Department worked with the 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) to educate and influence management 
and workers alike. 707    The managerial staff received a monthly bulletin, and the workers, 
weekly posters, ‘both drawing attention to specific hazards and aiming to cultivate the sense of 
personal alertness and responsibility’.708  The Government also produced several safety films 
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with private firms.709  Also, safety courses were held in conjunction with universities and 
factories across the country.710      
Proactive and collaborative government was not just at the organisational level, the Ministry of 
Labour wanted to see better government of the workplace on the shop floor level through 
encouraging joint consultation in the private sector and nationalised industries.711   Joint 
consultation was envisioned to be a regular and organised discussion between employers and 
employees.  It was regarded as an essential device for the creation and maintenance of 
harmonious industrial relations.712  The Ministry of Labour held conferences across the country 
to discuss and promote schemes of joint consultation, and the Ministry also worked with other 
government departments concerned with industry to promote the adoption of consultative 
machinery.713    Additionally, the National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC), representing the 
Ministry and both sides of industry, recommended to employers and unions the establishment of 
joint consultation arrangements.714  By late 1948, a census taken by the Ministry showed that of 
54 industries, 38 operated some type of formal joint consultation.715  The efforts to establish joint 
consultation were the Ministry’s attempt to implement a ‘reasonable’ interpretation of Bevin’s 
industrial utopia in which both sides of industry settled disputes and solved problems without 
resorting to conflict.716 
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Arguably, we can posit that the government’s project to activate industry had a residual effect.  
Accident rates had long been troubling, the Factory Department had long been stretched and the 
factories acts had long been problematic, yet we did not see significant activity from non – state 
actors until the Ministry of Labour was charged with the regulation of OHS.   
Equally, there was a range of post-war developments that could have also stimulated non-state 
activity.  The first set of developments stem from the war itself; the need to protect a skilled and 
trained workforce became even more necessary given the labour shortages during and after the 
War.717  Commentators have also attributed the surge of activity to the overflow of research into 
the ‘human factor’ of production that was generated by the government’s war industries and 
fighting services.718    The second set of developments that stimulated activity centre on the 
government’s post-war capital development programmes of large-scale industries producing 
coal, steel, chemicals and other primary products; the new knowledge acquired informed the 
more established industries.719  The third set of developments related to the legal developments, 
H.R. Payne, the Chairman of the Industrial Safety Committee of the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA), noted that changes in the law that industry was compelled to 
become more proactive as a result of a growing number of claims for damages on the grounds of 
negligence.  Judging by the period of the article, Payne may have been referring to the Law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 which made it possible for judges to make awards 
of damages to plaintiffs who were in part responsible for their injury, because of their own 
negligence.  Before this Act, if the plaintiff were at all negligent, no damages could be awarded.   
Additionally, The Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 made it possible to access free legal help for 
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those that were unable to pay for a solicitor.720  The consequences of these acts, according to 
Payne, stimulated employers to act.   
As a result of such post-war developments, industry had to go beyond traditional practices, if 
not, the continuance of their operations was threatened with the ‘dislocations of production, 
damage to the plant, the injury to morale in the works, the diversion and cost of medical 
services’.721  OHS could not be considered apart from the balance sheet; workplace conditions 
materially affected the ‘economy of an organisation’.722    
This consideration found expression in larger organisations significantly investing in 
propaganda, welfare provision, joint consultation, orientation and safety training.723  The most 
significant of these developments was the employment numbers of personnel following the 
War.724  The employment of medical and safety staff was a means to improve occupational and 
health safety.  This was often well beyond what factory legislation stipulated.   Regarding the 
employment of medical personnel, Schilling observed in the 1960s, ‘During the last twenty years 
there has been a rapid growth of medical services in Great Britain, first in industry and later in 
other workplaces such as shops, offices and universities’.725   There were 400 full-time doctors 
and over 3,000 part-time doctors employed within factories by 1957.  This was a doubling of full 
– time personnel and a fourfold increase in the number of part-time doctors since 1948.726  By 
the 1960s, the British Medical Journal observed that in the vast majority factories employed full-
time industrial medical officers; doctors were often observers on the safety committee or 
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reviewed the minutes and on some occasions, they acted as chairmen.727   The Ministry of 
Labour conducted a study entitled Health at Work that shed light on this influx of medical 
personnel.  Even though its sample base consisted of just fourteen British factories, it exhibited a 
range of services offered by medical professionals; medical examination, first aid provision, 
monitoring of the work environment, physiotherapy services, accident prevention, dentistry and 
chiropody.728    
In addition to medical men, the employment of safety professionals intensified in the post-war 
period.729  Contrary to their medical colleagues, safety officers were employed in the field of 
accident prevention.  For the most part, the link between the medical profession and accident 
prevention had been severed with the introduction of the Police, Factories, & c. (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1916.730  The initial impact of safety professionals was felt first in the 
collieries.731  However, they soon spread to other industries where their role expanded; as a 
result of the lack of statutory instruments for accident prevention, firms relied upon voluntary 
arrangements to protect the workforce from the accidents.732   In such a volatile environment, the 
services of safety officers were needed to not only educate and influence the workforce but also 
to review, modify, and formulate measures to improve safety.733   
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In light of the above developments, the notion that industry could undertake measures to prevent 
accidents and incidences of ill – health was not uncommon in the post-war period.734   Rather 
than accept that ‘accidents happen’ or the occurrences of ill – health, one could take undertake 
efforts to ameliorate the situation.735   Within this context, nearly two decades before the Robens 
Committee was appointed, the core of the Robens philosophy was pronounced at a gathering of 
industry leaders and members of government, ‘There is no escaping the conclusion, reached after 
some years of experience, that the main burden of responsibility for reducing industrial accidents 
lies in the places of work where the accidents occur’.736   
Reviewing the safety literature of the period, P.C.G. Isaac remarked, ‘At the present time 
employer and employed are showing increasing concern for the safety of the worker’.737  This 
transition was also witnessed by Professor T.U. Matthew who spent the War period as a 
government technical adviser visiting factories across the country.  The initiatives that he saw 
were of such a novelty that he believed it was the coming of ‘industrial democracy’ enabled 
through the machinery of joint consultation between employers and employees on all matters 
affecting production.738  This coming together represented ‘an extension of means of personal 
contact between management and workers.  It is also an additional informal means for 
transmitting ideas and information rapidly and effectively between different levels in the 
organization’.739   
Whether an ‘industrial democracy’ in the field of OHS had occurred in the post-war period is 
questionable, but something was happening in-between the gaps of factory legislation.740   There 
was a search for solutions outside of the factories acts.741   Correspondingly, Professor Schilling 
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saw ‘a relative decline in the importance of statutory legislation’.742  He believed that the decline 
was due to the predominance of voluntary effort coupled with the recognition of the inadequacy 
of factory legislation.743  Similarly, the National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC) report observed 
that:  
In more recent years, over and above efforts to ensure full compliance with the law, much has been done in 
industry on a voluntary basis to achieve higher standards of safer safe environment and of safe behaviour in 
matters note regulated by law.  There has been a growing recognition that many common causes of 
accidents cannot be removed by legislation, its enforcement and its observance.  The increasing attention 
given to improving standards of industrial management, human relations in industry and industrial 
efficiency generally has been reflected in greater attention being paid by both employers and workers and 
by their organisations to the problems of reducing industrial accidents (emphasis added).744 
The parallels between this statement and the later Robens Report are striking.  Though this report 
was published several years before the Robens Report, it illuminates non – governmental efforts 
to tackle the accident problem.   Such approaches were exemplified by the semblance of OHS 
regime that began to form in the 1950s.  Employer associations, trade unions and the new safety 
organisations started to fill in the gaps left by factory legislation. 
 
3.1.1 Employers associations                                                                                                            
From the late 1950s, employers associations undertook significant activity in the field of OHS.  
Concurring with Long’s observation, the archives reveal very little positive action in the arena of 
OHS before this period.745  However, from the late 1950s, we start to see some documentation 
about the activities of employers associations.  Arguably, their ‘awakening’ in the arena of OHS 
was part of the broader ‘Brighton Revolution’ in 1960.  The ‘Revolution’ developed from a 
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conference organised by the Federation of British Industries (FBI) at Brighton in 1960 which 
brought together leading industrialists to discuss the problems facing the British economy.746  
The significance of this gathering is that it represented a willingness to work towards a tripartite 
management of the economy by government, business and unions; to unify their efforts to 
facilitate ‘a more effective dialogue with government’, to step out of the shadows and  publicly 
‘project industry as a dynamic entity'; to work within government to reform its ‘machinery’.747   
Similarly, Wilks saw that a ‘revisionist faction’ among industrial leaders came out of this period 
who argued for a statesman-like balancing of national interests on the part of the business.   They 
came to dominate both the FBI and the CBI created in 1965.748  
The foundations of the accident prevention projects of employers associations were detailed at a 
well-attended conference held in Eastbourne in 1957.749  Employers organisations organised the 
Eastbourne conference to develop and review several safety initiatives, independent of 
government assistance.750    Far from being a glossy booklet on the aims of employer 
organisations, what we find is an honest document of employers’ organisations aware that a 
much more proactive project was needed. 
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From the conference papers, we can identify four initiatives pursued by employers’ organisations 
to reduce workplace injuries and deaths.  Many were existing practices that employers 
associations wanted to see implemented across all industries.751  First, the use of accident 
statistics, employers associations insisted that firms sent them a copy of the forms used to notify 
accidents to the Ministry of Labour, in order to ‘compare progress which they themselves had 
made from one period to another, but also enabled them to compare their position with those of 
other firms in the industry concerned’.752  This initiative was not restricted to the domestic 
market, the extractive and chemical industries were encouraged to supply statistics of accidents 
based on the international frequency rate.753  The BEC hoped that this scheme would encourage 
firms to strive to improve their own position and were at the same time given the motivation that 
they were not acting in isolation but were taking part in an industry-wide effort.754   
Second, employers’ organisations had also undertaken a number of detailed investigations of 
risks associated with machinery.  The Rubber Manufacturers Employers Association, for 
example, had found a solution to the problem of the safe working of two roll mills, which had 
been in operation in the industry for 100 years and had given rise many serious accidents.  
Similarly, the British Iron and Steel Federation had investigated the causes of accidents with 
certain types of machinery and equipment and had made recommendations as to their design.   In 
the Cotton Spinning and Weaving Industries, the Employers organisations gave detailed advice 
on the guarding of machinery.755   
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Third, training was deemed to be very important to employers’ organisations.756   Employers 
organisations played a significant role in the formulation of schemes of apprentice training, the 
running of courses for foremen and supervisors and the production of safety training films.757   
Fourth, the promotion of safety committees to its members.  Employers associations stressed the 
importance of safety committees at industry level and also smaller subcommittees to cover 
specific technical issues.758  The Eastbourne Conference left an impressionable mark on the 
business community; it was the hope that such gatherings would take them forward;759  R.W. 
Lunn of the Leyland and Birmingham Rubber Company wrote a letter to the BEC in which he 
proclaimed, ‘I think you should be congratulated on the whole affair… I wonder what comes 
next!  Some kind of organisation will have to be built up’.760   
Employers associations also exhibited a discernible interest in occupational health in the 1960s; 
the reluctance to positively engage with occupational health and the wider medical profession 
significantly reduced.761  This new direction was reflected in the BEC’s increased enthusiasm to 
actively participate in joint conferences with the BMA to sketch out a plan for an occupational 
health service and the distribution of BMA’s publications on occupational health amongst its 
membership.762  The BMA witnessed this transformation by the Confederation and saw it as an 
‘important first step… to encourage firms to set up an occupational health service’.763  This first 
step would be the first of many coaxed by a new cooperative spirit, the TUC and the BMA made 
appeals to the BEC to commit even more resources.764  The latter seemingly responded in their 
                                                     
756 Robert Carr, ‘Apprenticeship: A Conference’ (1958) 106 JRSA 5027 p813 
757 BEC, ‘British Employers’ Confederation Report on the Industrial Safety Committee at Eastbourne’ May 1957 
(Archive no. MSS.13//3/2/C 1220) MRC - University of Warwick p6 
758 BEC, ‘British Employers’ Confederation Report on the Industrial Safety Committee at Eastbourne’ May 1957 
(Archive no. MSS.13//3/2/C 1220) MRC - University of Warwick 
759 BEC, ‘Correspondence from R.W. Lunn and the Leyland and Birmingham Rubber Company in Safety 
Conference at Eastbourne’ 1957 (Archive no. MSS.13//3/2/C 1220) MRC - University of Warwick p5 
760 BEC, ‘Correspondence from R.W. Lunn and the Leyland and Birmingham Rubber Company in Safety 
Conference at Eastbourne’ 1957 (Archive no. MSS.13//3/2/C 1220) MRC - University of Warwick 
761 British Medical Journal, ‘Occupational Health Committee’ (1960) 1 BMJ 5167 p18,19 
762 British Medical Journal ‘Conference on Occupational Health’ (1962) 1 BMJ 5292 p262; British Medical Journal, 
‘Occupational Health Committee’ (1960) 1 BMJ 5167 p18,19; British Medical Journal, ‘Occupational Health 
Committee’ (1961) 1 BMJ 5266 p242 
763 British Medical Journal, ‘Occupational Health Committee’ (1964) 2 BMJ 5414 p152 
764 British Medical Journal, ‘Occupational Health Committee’ (1964) 1 BMJ 5397 p234-235 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 139 
dissemination of a booklet entitled The Advantages of a Company Health Service.765  Through 
such means, the BEC instructed more than 22,000 to consider the advantages of industrial health 
services, on either a company or a group basis.766 
 
3.1.2 Trade unions                                                                                                                           
Though patchy and inconsistent, trade unions held a far better track record in OHS than 
employers associations.767  They had been involved in the movement behind Workmens 
Compensation Acts, the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 and the giving of 
evidence for statutory safety provisions.768  However, their involvement in OHS was weakened 
by their fixation on seeking compensation and ‘danger money’.  The majority of trade unions 
focused their safety policies on securing compensation cases rather than securing accident 
prevention measures.769  The assumption was that tort liability encouraged firms to adopt 
effective safety practices, if firms refused to adopt such practices, they would be penalised by 
higher insurance premiums and harsher compensation payments.770  However, this assumption 
was flawed, Roy Lewis and Geoff Latta remarked that in some cases it might have been 
advantageous to endure a higher accident cost due to the increased profits derived from 
hazardous method of production.771  Also, the Robens Report found limited evidence ‘to indicate 
that liability insurance premiums paid by individual employers – as distinct from the general 
level of such premiums - are adjusted to any very significant extent in the light of claims 
experience’.772  Simply put, spreading the risk left negligent employers not much financially 
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worse off than businesses that implemented more stringent safety measures.773  Even more 
controversial than seeking damages was the union acceptance of ‘danger money’, that is the 
negotiation of special wage premiums to compensate workers for working in riskier situations.  
Lewis remarked about the how it side-lined trade union safety efforts because it condoned the 
acceptance of unsafe working conditions.774 
However, from the post-war period, doubts were raised about the fixation on securing 
compensation and danger money,775  Coinciding with these moments of clarity came the early 
formulation of an accident prevention policy.  Williams observed among unions that, ‘For the 
first time the principle of a comprehensive accident prevention organisation involving the 
workers and for all employment was recognised (emphasis added)’.776  The centrepiece of their 
prevention policy was the safety committee.777  The safety committee was envisioned to be a 
committee set up within a workplace, consisting of members from management, the workforce 
and other concerned personnel.  Located at the ‘epicentre’ of hazards, safety committees would 
draw upon practical knowledge and experience of the workers that worked closely with the 
hazards. 778  The safety committee was hoped to inculcate safety consciousness, analyse accident 
experience and develop policy.  Also, their existence would assist and reinforce the work of the 
Inspectorate.  From the late 1950s. trade unions worked in unison to establish such committees 
in workplaces across the country.779  This is not to say that unions did not continue to secure 
financial settlements for their members, but from the late 1950s, it was accompanied with 
preventative measures.   
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3.1.3 Safety organisations                                                                                                              
The recruitment surge of safety men provided the impetus for organisation.   Before the 1950s, 
the majority of safety men that entered industry worked separately with little to no interaction 
with their counterparts in other firms.  Also, the safety men entered industry were largely 
novices that employed rudimentary means to prevent accidents.780  However, years spent striving 
to prevent accidents led to greater organisation and sophistication of techniques.  This evolution 
was exemplified by the formation of the Institution of Industrial Safety Officers, the forerunner 
to the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH), the founding of the British Safety 
Council (BSC) and the increased attention paid to workplace accident prevention by RoSPA.   
The ‘Big Three’ provided a foundation for the raising standards of professional competence 
amongst its members, exchange of information and development of accident prevention 
techniques.781   
The ‘housing’ provided by the Big Three allowed for the development of accident prevention 
techniques.   Within these units, approaches to accident prevention were refined, explored and 
rolled – out across the country.  From the late 1950s, we can point to two broad approaches to 
accident prevention; motivational and technical.  The motivational aspect of accident prevention 
was a maturation of existing practices that had typified the safety officer since his initial entry 
into industry.  Motivational approaches were designed to engender and maintain a positive and 
compliant attitude towards technical controls of hazards.  They sought to develop a ‘safety 
culture’ among the workforce founded on notions of responsibilisation and accountability.782   
The second area was technical controls that were a means to arm the safety officer with a 
scientific arsenal.  A fitting way to explain this area of accident prevention is to conceptualise as 
                                                     
780 E. King, ‘Book Review of The Training of Safety Officers’ (1969) 26 BJIM 3 p248 
781 E. King, ‘Book Review of The Training of Safety Officers’ (1969) 26 BJIM 3 p248 
782 Sandra Dawson, Philip Poynter & David Stevens, ‘Safety Specialists in Industry: Roles, Constraints and 
Opportunities’ (1984) 5 JOB 4 p253; Ministry of Labour, ‘Institution of Industrial Safety Officers / Witness 
Examination - Committee on Safety and Health at Work / Minutes of Evidence’ 5 July 1971 (Archive no: Lab 
104/52) TNA – Kew Gardens; Ministry of Labour, ‘British Safety Council / Witness Examination - Committee on 
Safety and Health at Work / Minutes of Evidence’ 6 May 1971 (Archive no: Lab 96/46) TNA – Kew Gardens; 
James Tye, Management Introduction to Total Loss Control (British Safety Council 1970) 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 142 
a cycle.  This involved, ‘The assessment and evaluations of the risk; development of controls and 
standards to eliminate or contain the risk or to mitigate the consequences should the hazards be 
realised; implementation of controls and standards; longer-term monitoring and adaptation of 
risk and standards’.783 
 
3.1.4 A semblance of an OHS Network                                                                                         
Out of the pursuit to improve working conditions came a closer between unions and employers 
from the post-war period.  This was not only caused by their working relationship in the 
government’s corporatist fora but also due to the practicalities of the day.  For unions, they saw 
the employers as a critical component in the development of the safety committee; it was hoped 
that a closer union would result in employers associations putting more pressure on their 
membership to establish more safety committees and also the promotion of best practice.784  For 
employers, despite their reservations about trade unions’ pursuit of danger money and 
compensation, employers indicated that,  ‘No safety policy in the works could be fully 
cooperative and effective unless it received the full support of the workpeople concerned...  trade 
unions assist... in creating create the right atmosphere’.785  Throughout the 1960s, the union 
between organised labour and capital grew stronger with each joint conference.  Relative to other 
disputes between unions and employers, their joint conferences revealed a congenial and 
complementary approach to accident prevention.786 
Additionally, unions and employers welcomed safety officers as a crucial ally of accident 
prevention, particularly in the operation of safety committees.  The presence of the safety officer 
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on such committees was projected to reduce the accident rate and ease the pressure that the 
Ministry of Labour was placing on unions and employers.787  Both groups depicted an officer 
that would ‘not be distracted by other duties and could stimulate positive accident prevention by 
safety inspection, followed by action and advice to the works engineer or production manager…  
even with the best of legislation…  a safety officer was an essential service to industry’.788   
There may have been another reason for the enthusiastic acceptance of the safety officers, the 
safety officer was seen as a malleable component of accident prevention.789    The safety officer 
was not seen as a threat to the dominance of organised labour and capital, even the formation of 
safety associations was just seen as a means to facilitate ‘national – cooperation amongst 
themselves’.790  For trade unions, the safety officer was a tool that could aid the safety work of 
trade union representatives.791  There is little evidence of conflicting interests during this period 
because the safety officer’s primary focus was safety; even though he looked after the interests 
of the employers, he looked after the safety interests of the employer, not the financial, safety 
was his only focus.  In fact, his remuneration was reliant on keeping accidents rates low and his 
membership to safety associations reinforced professional standards.  Thus, there was limited 
evidence of union distrust, like that which existed with the medical profession.792  Employers 
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organisations expressed similar sentiments of congeniality and even set up working parties to 
examine the best possible way that safety professionals could serve employers.793    
Though there was not any central ‘housing’ for non – governmental organisations to come 
together, regular conferences and meetings between industrial groups provided ‘temporary 
lodging’ for discussions to take place.  Such gatherings offered industry groups interested in 
accident prevention an opportunity to formulate a coherent and cooperative vision of accident 
prevention.  By the mid-1950s, there were at least 60 industries covered by agreements which 
allowed for some considerations of the safety, health and welfare of employees.794  This was 
fertile ground to codify and develop practices and create a more cohesive, concentrated and 
collaborative project.  Just as state practice attuned itself to the problems of accidents and ill – 
health through experience, so did its non - governmental counterparts.   The industrial space 
filled with new organisations eager to build on the gains made and rectify previous mistakes.795  
Moreover, a succession of governments ‘intensified the pressure’ on industry to ‘develop better 
safety organisation and practice’.796   
Though non – governmental efforts were dynamic and ground-breaking, even the ‘greatest 
optimist’ was forced to admit that there was significant variance over what to do and how to do 
it.797  However, there was just enough accord to bring about the spread of safety committees in 
the 1960s.  The safety committee was a symbolic and genuine representation of various groups 
working in unison to prevent accidents independent of government.798   They were set up, 
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maintained on an individual, regional, national basis without government support.  Safety 
committees were a testament of what industry could do if left to its own devices.  Without the 
aid of factory regulation, safety committees spread across various industries; by the early 1960s, 
the Cement Makers Federation reported that numerous committees were put into operation.799   
Electric Cable Makers Federation noted that every large company in their sector had either safety 
committees or discussion panels.800  The Glass Manufacturers’ Federation relayed that matters 
relating to safety are considered by the National Joint Council for the Glass Container Industry 
and that most works have joint safety committees.801  In the years leading up to the appointment 
of the Robens Committee, the safety committee became standard industry practice.802   
The spread of safety committees gave credence to the belief that factory regulation was not the 
only impetus for industry to address the accident problem.  Moreover, once cooperation was 
established, accidents would decrease because it was assumed that most safety endeavours failed 
through weaknesses in communications and the lack of individuals taking responsibility.803  The 
acknowledgement of which was reflected in the Chief Inspector’s Annual Reports and the last 
factories acts; Factories Act 1959, Factories Act of 1961 and the Offices, Shops and Railway 
Premises Act 1963.  These acts represented the ‘old world’ of government prescription meeting 
the ‘new world’ of non – state activity.  In a sense, these factories acts were paradoxes; they 
were the last attempts of government seeking to govern the workplace, at the same time offering 
non – state actors significant roles in accident prevention.   Arguably, the latter aspect spoke to 
the volume and ordinariness of non – state accident prevention activity. 
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3.2 Government overload                                                                                                                 
Successive governments innovated, reformed, consolidated and collaborated, yet there was no 
discernible impact on OHS.  Moreover, the accumulation of factory legislation ‘overloaded’ 
government with a diverse set of responsibilities.  This created a feeling of government overload, 
that is, the ‘business of government’ became too difficult.  Solving the accident problem was 
beyond the Westminster model.  Though modified, this notion is derived from studies that came 
out of the crisis – striven 1970s.804    A number of explanations were offered to explain the crises 
of the period; among the most prominent was the ‘overloaded government’ thesis or the 
‘ungovernable’ thesis.  Primarily emanating from two articles addressing changes on both sides 
of the Atlantic, Michael Crozier’s analysis of the United States805 and Anthony King’s account 
of the UK806, both scholars questioned why it was harder to govern in the post-war period.807  
The resounding answer was that governments became overloaded when expectations were more 
than what government institutions could achieve.  There were two aspects to the overload thesis, 
one of which was politicians asked more of government than it could provide.  The second 
aspect was that the positive perceptions of citizens were challenged by a series of government 
fiascos.808  What follows is an exploration of both aspects of overload. 
 
3.2.1 Internal perception of government overload                                                                           
The overload thesis speaks to the expectations of government officials who administered factory 
regulation but saw little gain from their efforts.  Governments had implemented a number of 
initiatives without correlation to any significant success.  This was even more apparent in the 
post-war period in which the expansion of welfarist and corporatist policies enlarged 
                                                     
804 Richard Rose, ‘Overloaded Governments: The Problem Outlined’ (1975) 5 ESN 3 p13; Samuel Brittan, ‘The 
Economic Contradictions of Democracy’ (1975) 5 BJPS 2 p129; James Douglas, ‘The Overloaded Crown’ (1976) 6 
BJPS 4 p483; Michael Crozier, The Crisis of Democracy (New York University Press 1975); Anthony King, 
‘Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s’ (1975) 23 PS p162; David Richards, ‘A Crisis of Expectation’ in 
David Richards Martin Smith and Colin Hay (eds), Institutional Crisis in 21st Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 
805 Michael Crozier, The Crisis of Democracy (New York University Press 1975) 
806 Anthony King, ‘Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s’ (1975) 23 PS p162 
807 Anthony King, ‘Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s’ (1975) 23 PS p162 
808 Richard Rose, ‘Overloaded Governments: The Problem Outlined’ (1975) 5 ESN 3 p13, p14 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 147 
expectations of what the state could achieve.   However, the post-war government’s intense and 
innovative initiatives to reduce the toll of death and disease did not have a significant impact on 
accident figures, in fact, Bevin’s time in the Ministry of Labour saw matters deteriorate, as they 
often did in times of war.  Workplace accidents and deaths peaked in the 1940s.809  
Several scholars have looked at the data of the post-war period to reveal appalling rates of ill – 
health and accidents.810  Denis Gregory's chapter on the link between the NHS and OHS argued 
that the belief that industry had become safer in the post-war period is ‘one of our more 
misguided examples of conventional wisdom’.811  Considering the activity, Gregory said that 
activities of the period should have made industry safer but accidents in industry did not 
significantly decline.  He used ‘restricted data’ from the Factory Inspectorate812 to show that 
there had been a sharp rise from 193,059 in 1950 to a peak of 322,390 in 1969.813  Likewise, the 
two most prolific scholars of the period, John Williams and P.B. Beaumont, saw the accident 
rate as a source of concern.  Williams saw that the postwar surge of activity had brought mixed 
results.   He made use of the improved dataset brought about by the enactment of the National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946.  Williams observed that throughout the 1950s, 
accidents that caused at least three days of incapacity in all forms of employment remained at 
approximately the same level.  Fatal and serious accidents in employment covered by statutory 
standards tended to reduce, accidents that caused at least three days of incapacity in mines 
tended to increase; accidents that caused at least three days of incapacity in factories showed 
fluctuation with a tendency to decrease.  Unfortunately, industrial disease showed no signs of 
decreasing.814  Rereading the available data, Beaumont argued that it was not until 1970 that we 
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saw ‘a period of relatively stable accident rates in Britain’, whereas throughout most of the 
previous decades the number of industrial accidents and rate of ill – health rose each year.815 
Moreover, while Britain stagnated, many industrialised nations experienced significant gains. 
Parliament was informed of the fact that in 1957, there were four-and-a-half times more 
accidents in the British iron and steel industry than there was in America.816  They were also 
informed that the British Productivity Team visited America and saw that, ‘The United States 
companies have established a good record.  Their lost time accident frequency rate per million 
man hours worked for the year 1949 is reported as 7.2, while the British frequency rate is 
32.6’.817  Moreover, the USA saw continued progress, from 1948 a substantial and continual 
reduction occurred to the extent that by 1955 there was a 47% reduction in the rate of 
accidents.818    
Britain was also outpaced in its corporatist efforts to reduce the toll of death and disease, 
Sweden’s Workers Protection Act 1949 provided for workers’ safety delegates to be elected by 
workers in every workplace employing more than five persons.819  These delegates had the 
statutory powers of inspection of the workplace, and if an employer failed to take the appropriate 
action in relation to hazards identified by the delegates, then they were empowered to call in the 
government inspectorate.820  The effect was immediate, a continual reduction rate was observed 
from 1950 onwards.821    
Also, a 1958 report presented by Dr H. Stephany, Ministerial Director of the Ministry of Labour 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, at the Second World Congress on the Prevention on 
Occupational Accidents further denigrated British performance compared to other industrialised 
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countries.822  Following an analysis of 30 national systems, he postulated 16 measures for an 
effective prevention system.  Of Stephany’s 16 measures, Britain had one which was wholly 
effective, twelve were partly effective and three were not effective.823  Williams believed that the 
rating would have been much worse if the British government had submitted accurate 
information.824  
The fundamental problems remained; the Robens Report observed that the legislation that came 
out between the 1940s and 1970s ‘added new provisions but no fundamental changes in the 
scope and pattern of the legislation (emphasis added)’.825   Reforming OHS within the context of 
the Westminster model was the only option for government officials, but this was strewn with 
problems, for one, OHS was compartmentalised into numerous departments and ministries.826  
Though the Ministry of Labour oversaw the majority of OHS regulation, the supervision for 
OHS was also ‘shared’ across multiple government departments.827   Long attributed the 
multiplicity of departments and overlapping interests to the failure of government action.828     
Thus, despite the determination of the Ministry of Labour, it did not have full responsibility to 
carry out a ‘full makeover’ of OHS.   OHS was too fractured to undergo any real reform.  For 
any reforms to take place, it would require an agreement between multiple government 
departments.829  This was a feat that proved difficult even with the simplest of matters.  For 
example, the Ministry of Health wanted oversight of industrial medical services.  The Ministry 
saw that such services should be incorporated within the NHS.  However, the Ministry of Labour 
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contended that these medical services should be within their purview, given the industrial nature 
of many of the health problems arising at work.  They also disagreed with the philosophy of 
placing these services in the parameters of health; rather industrial health problems were best 
alleviated through the intervention of experts in an industrial setting.830   Williams brought 
another example of the divergence that existed between government departments.   In 1959, the 
Occupational Health Unit at the Central Middlesex Hospital was threatened with closure 
following some confusion between the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labour’s statutory 
obligation to fund research at the Health Unit.831  Out of the 24 weaknesses of the post-war OHS 
system identified by Williams, more than half could be attributed to fragmented government 
control.832   
It was hoped that the relocation of the Factory Department to the Ministry of Labour would bring 
about more significant change.   However, many of the issues of the Home Office’s 
administration of OHS remained with the Ministry of Labour’s administration.  Though the latter 
significantly opened the door wider for non – governmental organisations, OHS was still very 
much a government-run enterprise.  For the most part, it was business as usual; delayed reforms, 
inadequate data gathering, chronic understaffing and government centricity continued in the 
Ministry.   The government of the workplace had seemingly reached its limit. 
 
3.2.2 External perception of government overload                                                                   
The range of matters for which the public held governments responsible for had increased in the 
post-war period.833   Many issues that affected the public were housed in a department of 
government.   Thus, when a tragedy occurred, the fingerprints of government were not far 
away.834   This was particularly apparent with ‘workplace’ accidents that ‘spilt outside’ of the 
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workplace and killed and injured members of the public.835  A series of accidents occurred from 
the late 1950s that exposed the frailties of the OHS system and thus, provoked immense criticism 
of the government.836  David Vogel noted that there was a uniqueness about tragedies of this 
period that reverberated beyond the site of the calamity.837   Surveying the impact of the tragic 
events, David Eves noted,  
It was becoming increasingly obvious that the narrow, prescriptive approach of Factory Law and the 
limited powers of Factory Inspectors were no longer sufficient for the effective regulation of modern 
industry…   Political support slowly grew for stemming the tide by another revision of Factory Law.838 
A seemingly endless series of tragedies challenged perceptions about the capacity of the 
government to protect the public.839  Its notional definition of a factory was outdated; the 
workplace had broadened since the nineteenth century to include such varied premises in which 
the public could be adversely affected by work practices.840   Moreover, the tragedies occurred in 
an era of television news; disturbing scenes of disasters and relief operations was relayed to the 
British public in their homes.841   The transmission of unpraiseworthy acts of government has 
always been a visible part of the cultural milieu.  What was new, however, was the way in which 
the details of these tragedies were amplified by the electronic media.842   
 
3.3 The last straw                                                                                                                         
The result of the overload pressures led the government to attempt its most radical factories act.   
R.C. Simpson observed that the government was convinced that reform was a ‘matter of 
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considerable urgency’.843  Thus, the Minister of Labour announced on 30th June 1967 that 
preparatory work had begun on a comprehensive revision of the Factories Act 1961 and the 
Offices Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963.  Later that year, under the auspices of the CBI 
and the TUC, the Ministry published for comment and discussion the First Consultative 
Document containing proposals for a comprehensive revision and amalgamation of these two 
Acts.  700 organisations were invited to comment.844  This unprecedented number of 
organisations invited to comment not only speaks to the amount of non – state activity but also to 
the government’s desire to reach out to every corner of industry.  Seldom proposed factories act 
have received such attention.   
Consideration of these comments continued throughout 1968 and 1969, however, the proposals 
that came out of these considerations failed to make the statute book.  Even though the 
Government had invited comment from hundreds of organisations, it was just a ‘comment’.  In 
every practical sense, it was still a government project.  Thus, the Ministry of Labour noted ‘that 
the result would be fundamentally the same kind of legislation as already existed’.845   Similarly, 
Sirrs argued that the proposals ‘remained trapped within the established logic of the Factories 
Act model of regulation’.846  The 1967 proposals were the final straw; it fully convinced the 
Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP)847 that they needed to ‘get away from the 
conventional approach…  mere consolidation and revision of existing legislation are not 
enough’.848  From this juncture, the DEP made preliminary plans to appoint a committee that 
would redefine OHS regulation.  
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4.0 Conclusion                                                                                                                          
Regulating the workplace from Westminster had reached its limits.  As Eves put it, ‘the 
movement that had so successfully built on past achievements had now run out of steam’.849  The 
government was unable to significantly impact the accident problem.  The government had 
exhausted its arsenal; it had set up corporatist machinery, incorporated non – state activity into 
its legislation, increased its legislative output and consulted with hundreds of non – 
governmental organisations.  Yet, these actions did not translate into any real progress. 
Moreover. OHS regulation was also not able to guarantee the protection of the public.  The 
twentieth-century peril of the mass disaster was disconcerting.   The authorities were ill-
equipped to protect the public from the consequences of rapid technological advances, greater 
economies of scale and the clustering together of communities. 850    The ‘disaster’ loomed large 
and frightening in the public mind.851  The twentieth century made it abundantly clear that 
accidents could drift from industry to wreak havoc on an unsuspecting public.  Once the smoke 
cleared, the public would ask the usual questions; who had foreknowledge?  Who was aware of 
potential danger?  What was the contingency plan for the occurrence of such a disaster?852  The 
public was consistently disappointed with the answers they received from those that had 
authority over them.853   
While acknowledging such limitations, the state witnessed the advent of non – state actors, 
engaged in and committed to improving working conditions.   The activities that would inspire 
the Robens Report were happening across industry.  Years in the ‘field’ significantly matured 
their approaches.  Individual experiences were shared with one’s counterparts through 
organisational linkages allowing for a repository of knowledge to build up.  Moreover, their 
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organisations filtered dissension and encouraged alignment with other organisations allowing for 
some degree of cohesion to the extent that we start to see a semblance of an OHS regime in the 
1960s.  The government was confronted by this OHS regime, unified in their disapproval of the 
factories act model of OHS regulation.  The government was encouraged to listen to their 
concerns because of their shared experiences; hundreds of individuals and organisations were 
now able to talk about OHS with some authority.  The fluctuating accident rates and tragedies 
that plagued the 1960s gave credence to their criticisms about factories acts.   In the last 
remaining months of Wilson’s government, a consensus was reached; the factories act model 
had reached its limit, a new approach was needed, preferably one that came outside of the walls 
of government.   
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Chapter Five: The Release of OHS (1970 – 1974) 
1.0 Introduction 
The Department of Employment (DE)854 had exhausted a plethora of initiatives to address the 
accident problem.  It found itself governing matters with no demonstrable effect on outcomes.  
Instead of setting up another government committee to produce conventional solutions to the 
accident problem, the DE opted to set up a non–governmental committee to do what government 
could not; disseminate responsibility.  The terms of reference formulated for this non–
governmental committee was unprecedented in their scope and strongly reflected the corporatist 
mood of the period.  What came out of this committee was a blueprint to give prime 
responsibility to those who create the risks and those who work with them.   
 
1.1 The layout of the chapter                                                                                                                                         
This chapter commences with a brief discussion on the significance of the Robens Committee.855  
It was a forthright attempt to reform the state-centric OHS system.  This intent colour the 
remainder of this chapter.  The following section looks at main aspects (terms of reference, 
appointment of committee members and engagement with industry) of the Committee’s work.856  
This was highlighted to demonstrate that the government wanted to go beyond the conventional 
approach.  Also, this section highlights the shifting scales of power.  The TUC, CBI and the 
government worked together on the terms of reference until the arrival of the Heath government 
in 1970.  The Heath government’s objective of a less burdensome and ‘hived off’ OHS system 
aligned much more with organised capital than their labour counterparts.857  As a result, TUC’s 
influence was muted.  This led to a much more non–governmental and self-regulatory vision 
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coming to the fore.858  The appointment of the committee members represented the prevalence of 
this self-regulatory agenda.  Each committee member was selected through a well-documented 
process.  The government needed committee members who would not oppose the establishment 
of a self–regulatory system.   
Central to this system was the proposal of a National Authority for the Safety and Health at 
Work.859  Thus, this latter part of the chapter observes how the CBI and the TUC worked to 
influence the independent character of this Authority.  Their efforts were rewarded with the 
enactment of HASAWA that placed the Authority at the heart of the new OHS regulatory 
system. 
 
2.0 The cliff’s edge                                                                                                                          
The Department of Employment had ‘run out of steam’.860  The DE had exhausted a plethora of 
initiatives to address the accident problem.  Officials were devoid of answers.  The sense of 
bewilderment was present in Barbara Castle’s, First Secretary of State for Employment and 
Productivity, address to Parliament.  MPs were eager to hear specific details about a proposed 
Bill, but instead, they were met with more questions:  
[We] ought to be asking some far-reaching questions about our safety legislation.  Are we, for example, 
putting enough emphasis on voluntary action and self-help by employers and unions?  Do we need joint 
safety machinery, regionally and nationally, run by industry itself—as the T.U.C. has been suggesting?  
Industry changes very quickly and the law is apt to lag behind the changes. Is the present machinery 
adequate to cope with major new hazards which are emerging from new technology coupled with the 
increasing scale of industrial operations?  Again, are we doing enough to protect the public from the risks 
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to them of industrial processes—whether large-scale risks through the blowing up of an industrial plant or 
small-scale but still important risks such as those which may arise in a launderette?861 
Barbara Castle’s address and her Department’s correspondence was typified by a lack of clarity 
on the way forward.862  Thus, an announcement was made on 2 March 1970 about setting up ‘a 
small, high-powered body to conduct a general inquiry across the whole field…  It would 
examine how we can best extend protection over the whole field of employment.’863   
It was intended that this committee would do three things.  First, the committee would chart a 
new course.  It would not repeat what had been done previously, as Castle stated, ‘We need to 
get away from the conventional approach… the mere consolidation and revision of existing 
legislation are not enough’.864  The DE wanted the committee to produce; ‘The abolition of the 
present statutory regulation – making procedure… this is highly desirable’.865  Just a few years 
prior, the DE had misspent a significant amount of time gathering the comments of hundreds of 
non–governmental organisations, only to have these comments ‘sucked’ into the government 
machinery, ‘disinfected’ of any originality, and ‘emitted’ out as unremarkable and conventional 
proposals.866  Second, the committee’s recommendations would echo what was already being 
said in industry, that is, responsibility should be disseminated to those that worked directly with 
the risks.867  Third, the committee would provide a blueprint of how to achieve this.  Past 
experiences have shown that government had trouble ‘letting go’.  Attempts to disseminate 
greater responsibilities to non – state actors had failed.  Thus, this committee was to be filled 
with ‘independent’ members who could show the government how this could be done, as was 
reiterated in the House of Lords, ‘We are hoping to learn a great deal from this Committee of 
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Inquiry… The Committee's report should provide us with a firm basis for the activities in this 
field for many years ahead’.868 
It could be argued that the committee was not appointed for such lofty goals. Instead, it was just 
a ploy or a means to bide time. As Lord Wright alleged, ‘Committees of inquiry are well-known 
devices used by Governments to dodge an issue’.869  This argument is without merit.  From their 
investigations of committees of inquiry, Mike Rowe and Laura McAllister found that, ‘More 
generally, commissions convey a genuine spirit of inquiry…  The spirit of genuine inquiry was 
clearest where commissions were formed by non-governmental bodies’.870   Correspondingly, 
the DE’s correspondence and public addresses do not indicate anything other than a ‘genuine 
spirit of inquiry’.  Moreover, if it was a ploy, then to whom?  If it was a ploy to the Houses, it 
was not well – thought out because there was no appetite for the setting up of a committee.871  If 
the ploy were intended for a public audience, then Alfred Robens would not have been selected 
to head the committee.872  Professor McLean described Robens appointment as ‘beyond 
satire’.873  Robens did not have the confidence of the public to lead a committee on workplace 
safety and health.  Alfred Robens was the Chairman of the National Coal Board (NCB) at the 
time of the Aberfan disaster in 1966.  He received considerable criticism for his evasive actions 
and apathetic attitude after the Aberfan disaster.874 
 
3.0 The terms of reference                                                                                                          
The first matter to be considered by the government was the formulation of the terms of 
reference.  Just a few days after Barbara Castle announced the committee, work on the terms of 
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reference began.  The services of the TUC and the CBI were called upon to discuss what ‘the 
scope of the new inquiry should be’.875  There were ‘preliminary informal meetings’ with both 
sides of industry to formulate the terms of reference;876 the DEP was adamant that it would 
consult the TUC and CBI at every turn.877  After numerous drafts, the terms of reference were 
agreed upon by the DE, TUC and CBI.  C.H. Sisson, a renowned poet, novelist and essayist who 
briefly worked in the DE, observed that Richard Dale, head of the TUC Social Insurance 
Committee, ‘left the discussion in a mood to recommend his Committee to give the Inquiry a 
welcome’.878   He also stated that, ‘It is fairly clear that the Inquiry is welcome to the CBI and 
that the sort of terms of reference we have in mind are broadly acceptable to them’.879  The CBI 
and the TUC’s role in the terms of reference reflected the healthiness of the corporatist 
project.880 
The corporatist effort produced a unique terms of reference. 881  No committee or commission 
considering OHS had such a vast remit.  To grasp the breadth of the terms, it is essential to quote 
the full text:  
To review the provision made for the safety and health of persons in their course of employment (other 
than transport workers while directly engaged on transport operations and who are covered by other 
provisions) and to consider whether any changes are needed in: (1) the scope or nature of the major 
relevant enactments, or (2) the nature and extent of voluntary action concerned with these matters, and to 
consider whether any further steps are required to safeguard members of the public from hazards, other 
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than general environmental pollution, arising in connection with activities in industrial and commercial 
premises and construction sites, and to make recommendations.882 
Reading such a vast remit, one observer noted, ‘Many committees are quite purposely kept to the 
straight and narrow… Not, however, in this case… Although there have been a number of 
committees which have studied segments of the subject, there has never, until Robens, been a 
comprehensive review by a single body’.883  Its broad remit was constructed to give the 
committee members ‘maximum depth of focus’ and analyse the ‘root’ and ‘branch’ of OHS.884  
While the committee was skilfully shielded from contested areas and matters that were already 
being considered, it was given a wider remit than its predecessors to do what had not been done 
before; the dissemination of responsibility to industry. 885   
 
3.1 Change of government during the setting up of the Robens Committee                                        
Ted Heath’s Conservative government came to power in the summer of 1970.  From this point, 
the corporatist project became ‘lopsided’, leaning disproportionately towards employers 
organisations.  The Heath government and the Wilson government were equally committed to 
reforming OHS, but the former opted to let business interests take the lead in the matter, as the 
business case was much more fixated on the dissemination of responsibility to those that worked 
directly with the risks.886  A CBI briefing document stipulated, ‘What is wanted is not just new 
legislation but a completely new approach and method of presentation centred upon the 
predominance of the basic common law principle which places responsibility on every individual 
for reasonable conduct in his relationship with others’.887   
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With a choice between organised labour and capital, the Government opted for the latter since it 
was committed to ‘hiving off’ health and safety, which it favoured over the former’s inclination 
for increased legislation that would place more statuary obligations on employers.888  Though 
both the CBI and TUC had reached an agreement on OHS practices, the CBI’s vision of a 
reduced statutory basis for the OHS system aligned much more with that of the Heath 
government.889  Before the Committee had even convened, the government wanted the Robens 
Committee to plot the course away from ‘the present statutory regulation–making procedure’.890  
Moreover, the DE sought counsel from the leading OHS academic, John Williams, in the 
preliminary stages of the setting up the committee.  He advised that a committee should consider 
promoting voluntary cooperation between the parties concerned, in line with a school of thought 
which argued that there was already too much statutory regulation of safety standards.891   
We cannot discount the influence of the Heath government’s broader neoliberal agenda on its 
desire to support the CBI’s ‘minimal state’ vision of OHS.892  The neoliberal inclinations of the 
Heath government were comparable to that of the Thatcher government.893  The Heath 
government saw the CBI and employers as their best possible ‘partner’ to liberalise the state 
from its paternal obligations.894  However, the viewpoint of the organised labour could not be 
completely dispensed with.  The views of the TUC on OHS still held considerable weight.  To 
maintain a delicate balance, the government had to give at least the appearance that the views of 
organised labour and other industrial groups mattered.  Correspondingly, the DE could not 
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acquiesce to all the demands of employers, considering the bright spotlight placed on the 
appointment process.  A large number of organisations watched attentively as the DE appointed 
the committee and formulated the terms of reference.895  Additionally, on balance, the 
government was aware that the TUC had far more substance in their contributions to policy than 
their counterparts; employer’s organisations had spent much of the twentieth century in a 
defensive posture, seemingly disinterested or unable to make any positive contributions to 
OHS.896 
 
3.2 The appointment of the Robens committee                                                                                                  
The terms of reference had already been established by the Labour government, so the incoming 
Heath government did not alter them, but the appointment process was still ongoing when the 
Conservatives entered government.  Thus, this was the point that the influence of business 
interests began to overshadow that of organised labour.  In the spring of 1970, the new 
government set about appointing a committee.897  In line with John Chicken, surveying the 
appointment of the committee allows us to observe the measures taken by the government to 
avoid the conventional approach.898   
The government expended significant resources to keep the committee independent or ‘non–
governmental’.  This was because the appointment of an independent committee was a means to 
produce ‘radical solutions’.899  Essentially, the appointment of independents was ‘a device to 
break through the political impasse that inhibited earlier reform efforts’.900  The DE’s 
correspondence on the establishment of the Robens Committee revealed that it was a well-
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documented and well-thought-out selection process, with officials demonstrating a desire to 
avoid any repetition of past efforts.  It is safe to say that all the committee members were ‘safe 
bets’.901  The DE was fully aware that the proposals of the committee needed the consent of 
other government departments and it ultimately had to pass through both Houses.  Thus, even 
though the DE stated that the ‘final choice could not prudently be made until the TUC/CBI have 
had its way’, their choice was restricted to individuals that the DE had ‘cleared’.902  
The Government, TUC and CBI settled on six members; Alfred Robens, Sydney Robinson, 
Anne Shaw, George Beeby, John Wood and Brian Windeyer.903  Lord Alfred Robens was 
appointed to chair the committee.  The fact that the DE officials put forward Robens to chair the 
committee indicates three matters.  First their intent to put forward proposals that would please 
both Labour and Conservative MPs.  Even though Robens was a Labour MP, he was appointed 
to head the NCB by the Harold Macmillan government.904  Robens depicted himself as a 
practical man that had a ‘sensible business approach to politics’.905  Moreover, Robens’ ‘NCB1’-
registered Daimler, private plane, and exclusive apartment in Eaton Square may have eased 
concerns about his socialist origins.906   
Second, the DE appreciated the radical nature of their mission; there seems to have been 
foresight that it would cause departmental friction.  Thus, they needed a seasoned and strong 
individual to break the political impasse; Robens, or the ‘New King Coal’, was that individual.  
Derek Ezra, Robens’ NCB successor, spoke of his predecessor as an individual that was able to 
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forge a new path, ‘He is a very dominant, vigorous and human personality, and he definitely left 
his imprint on the coal industry in a way no one else will.  The coal industry could be 
considerably different today if he had not been skilfully selected by Macmillan to take the job 
on’.907   
Third, it represented the desire to see voluntarism come to the fore.  Robens was well – versed in 
the voluntary approaches to tackle workplace accidents.  Christopher Sirrs notes: 
As NCB chair, Robens became closely acquainted with health and safety in a major hazardous industry… 
As a nationalised industry able to draw upon public funds, the NCB developed a more comprehensive 
approach to health and safety compared to other industries.  In response to the high accident rate among 
miners, Robens raised the status of professional safety staff, and pioneered a variety of methods to 
disseminate the safety message: publications, posters, league tables, as well as shock films, ‘more horrific 
than any Hammer Films production’.908 
Robens’ experience was derived from the collieries, an extremely hazardous industry 
distinguished by its dissemination of responsibility to non–state actors.  What is clear from 
Robens was his desire to ‘decentralise’.  In an interview shortly after the cessation of the 
committee, Robens stated, ‘In every large industry it is a mistake to centralize…  You should 
devolve as much as possible the day-to-day operations in management down to the operating 
units.  Right down to the foremen on the workshop floor’.909  Robens’ idea expressed itself in the 
milder form of ‘self – inspection’.  However, in contemporary times, it is referred to as 
‘responsibilisation’; through internal responsibility frameworks, the workforce is strongly 
encouraged to take personal responsibility for their own safety while they are at work.910  We 
would see varying forms of Robens idea with the passing of key legislation in the late 1970s.   
                                                     
907 Industrial Management ‘New King Coal’ (1972) 72 IM 1 p46, p46 - 7 
908 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the 
Management of Occupational Risk' (PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 2016) p146 
909 Education + Training, ‘Interview’ (1972) 14 ET 5 p154, p155 
910 Garry Gray, ‘The Responsibilization Strategy of Health and Safety’ (2009) 49 BJC 5 p326 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 165 
Also, the collieries were distinguished by cooperation between workers and management.911  
Robens carried these ideas with him into his deliberations on the Committee.912 
The union element of the committee was dwarfed by business interests and ‘two independents’.  
Anne Shaw was a management consultant, George Beeby was the Chairman of the British Titan 
Products Co and the Director of Cape Universal Building Products and Tory MP for Melton, 
Mervyn Pike was the Director of Watts, Blake, Bearne & Co.  The two independents, Sir Brian 
Wellingham Windeyer and Professor John C. Wood, were selected due to their non – partisan 
background.913  This left one trade unionist, Sydney Robinson, by himself.  On paper, he seemed 
the perfect ‘union’ candidate.  However, there seems to have been some friction between Mr 
Robinson and the TUC leadership.  These feelings were manifested with Robinson’s earlier 
appointment to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the late 1960s.  The Minister of 
Labour, Ray Gunter, wanted Mr Robinson on the Committee to the dissatisfaction of The TUC 
General Secretary, George Woodcock, who refused to endorse Mr Robinson and proffered his 
own shortlist.   
The rank and file of the labour movement also expressed dissatisfaction of Mr Robinson’s 
appointment to the Robens Committee:  
So there we have it; for all the talent in the trade union movement and for all the long service by many 
people such as Dr Murray, Chief Medical Adviser to the TUC, none of them was on the Committee. The 
sole representative of the trade union the labour movement was Mr Sydney A. Robinson; no room for the 
National Union of Mineworkers, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers or the Transport and 
General Workers' Union and many others. A foretaste of things to come in the Report (emphasis added).914   
Thus, instead of Robinson, the TUC wished to put forward ‘a short list for the trade union 
member’ to sit on the Robens Committee, the DE did not afford the TUC this privilege; instead, 
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the DE’s deliberation process made sure that ‘right’ unionist sat on the committee seat, to the 
extent that no other candidate was so heavily scrutinised.915  
 
3.3 The Robens committee’s interaction with industry                                                                                                             
Once appointed, the DE sought to expose the Committee to the voice of industry.  It did this 
through the process of meetings.  In these meetings, the Committee was exposed to influential 
governmental and non – governmental actors.  From the Committee’s appointment in May 1970 
to its dissolution in March 1972, there were a total of 47 meetings.  These meetings were not 
conducted in a room in a government corridor.  Instead, they were held in Robens’ NCB office 
which opened its doors to employers’ organisations, trade unions, professional and industrial 
organisations.  The meetings with the safety organisations were particularly engaging.  Though 
the ethos of the committee’s report reflected the influence of the CBI and DE, much of the 
technical substance came from safety organisations.916  By the time that the safety bodies met the 
committee, their respective memberships had grown massively.  The British Safety Council had 
16,000 subscribers, an ‘increase of about 18.6 or 18.7 per cent on a weekly basis’.  RoSPA had 
5,000 members and 3,200 subscribers to its Industrial Safety Service.917    Subscription materials 
were sent to 6,500 works throughout the country and abroad.  The number of subscribers has 
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increased by an average of 5% per annum during the last three years.918  The Institution of 
Industrial Safety Officers had also grown exponentially to number around 2,000 members.919  
The committee held extended meetings with these safety organisations in which the latter was 
requested to showcase their approaches to accident prevention.920   They stressed to the 
committee that their techniques would raise safety consciousness, which would help companies 
avoid liability claims and lost production time.921  Their sessions were ‘idea-intensive’922, for 
instance, the BSC intrigued the Committee with their Safety Pyramid, a memo recounts:  
Most of the large firms are very good at self – regulation, but towards the bottom of the pyramid are many 
firms who will not act responsibly unless by the law…  The corollary of his (James Tye) thinking is that 
Inspectorates should concentrate much more on the smaller firms and on the smaller firms and on those 
with bad records, and should spend less time at very large sophisticated plants.923   
Some years after their meeting, Robens noted about their encounter,  
When my colleagues and I were producing the Robens Report - which led to the present legislation on 
health and safety at work – we leaned very heavily on the advice that was freely available from James Tye 
and I want to reiterate my fulsome appreciation for the help he gave…  it was largely due to the efforts of 
people like him that the legislation was being looked at all.924   
Similarly, the IISO met the committee and impressed upon them a number of ideas that were 
incorporated into the final report, Labour MP Harold Walker noted:  
It must give the Institution of Industrial Safety Officers much satisfaction to see so many of their sensible 
recommendations embodied in the Robens Proposals.  For example, the proposal that plant machines and 
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equipment should be required by statute to be designed and constructed to comply with safety needs will be 
widely welcomed, as will the recommendations on noise control.925   
The IISO proudly proclaimed to its members:  
Members will naturally be concerned as to how the Institution’s evidence was received, an indication is 
that it was selected for inclusion in the printed Report…  Our recommendation that there should be a 
unification of Inspectorates to avoid duplication of functions was also reflected in the Report’s advice that 
an Authority for Safety and Health at Work should take the place of the existing seven separate 
Inspectorates.  There are other matters on which the Committee’s findings are in close parallel with the 
IISO ideas, so it can fairly be claimed that we came out of the exercise pretty well.926    
Arguably, we can posit that the ‘how to’ portion of the Committee’s findings came from safety 
organisations.  They were best placed to speak about such approaches more than any other sets 
of actors.  Since the 1950s, the ‘housing’ provided by the Big Three safety organisations allowed 
for the development of accident prevention techniques.   Within these residences, approaches to 
accident prevention were refined, explored and implemented across the country. 
Exposure to industry also came through the request of information from every corner of 
industry.927  Correspondingly, an unprecedented number of organisations wanted to contribute to 
the committee. 928  Professor Andrew Hale observed that the submission of evidence to the 
committee was devoid of any restriction and explicit agenda.929  He also noted that submissions 
were made with seemingly very little contact between parties.930  Most of the evidence submitted 
was published as a second volume to accompany the final report. It amounted to 718 pages. 
Also, the committee’s exposure to the industrial practices came through travelling to various 
worksites all over the UK and even meeting with Government officials from Europe and North 
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America to see how occupational health and safety policy operated further afield.931  R.L. 
Howells observed that the committee was particularly influenced by Canada’s Labour (Safety) 
Code 1966 and the United States’ Occupational Health and Safety Act 1970.932  These legal 
systems emphasised the use of administrative orders, or cease and desist orders and the 
encouragement of employers and employees to work together to ‘institute new and to perfect 
existing programmes’.933 
 
3.4 The invisible hand                                                                                                     
Throughout the Committee’s activities, Theo Nichols’ observed that they were ‘quietly and 
gently guided by the hand by the civil servants …  they were, oh so gently, led up the garden’.934  
Building on these observations, Sirrs offers the more descriptive account; ‘Officials gently 
prodded the CSHW (Robens’ committee) towards reforms under the DE’s sphere of 
influence’.935  He pulled out from the archives the DE’s early review of evidence, just six months 
into the committee’s proceedings it stated ‘the existence of a mass of detailed restrictive 
legislation may inhibit the natural development of self-help and continuous self-regulation by 
industry itself’.936  He believed that much of this document was similar to the committee’s 
eventual conclusion.937  However, the allegation of manipulation is too simplistic.   The undue 
influence could have been an issue of logistics; the DE’s role in the establishment and allocating 
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resources to the committee meant that the committee was more exposed to the DE’s viewpoint 
than any other government department or organisation.938   
Moreover, there was little need to manipulate the committee, considering the ‘business makeup’ 
of the committee which was predisposed to notions of minimal government intervention.  
Evidence of this was reflected in their orientation towards the CBI as opposed to the TUC.939  
The committee members outright rejected many of the TUC’s suggestions of statutory 
interventions, in favour of the CBI’s argument of general duties.940  The CBI’s annual reports 
leading up to the appointment of the committee propagated the idea of voluntary effort on the 
part of management, opposing all forms of statutory compulsion.941  The committee even sought 
significant logistical support from the CBI.  This arrangement was not something initiated by the 
CBI, and the number of requests for help from the committee was such that there is a sense that 
CBI became overwhelmed.942  The committee sought consultation on appropriate work sites to 
visit, content of questionnaire drafts and individuals to interview; the CBI acted as a conduit for 
companies, which desired to give evidence to the Robens Committee; it even requested the CBI 
to find a researcher that would aid their adjacent advisory committee.943   
Flicking through the volume of evidence that accompanied the Robens Report, it is plain to see 
that the CBI’s evidence dwarfed all other parties, except the DE.944  Nichols also observed that 
the CBI expected the results of the Robens enquiry, to the extent that the CBI did not even 
bother to put out a written comment because, as an official explained:  
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The Report has come down so remarkably close to the line we suggested that it was felt that ‘comment’ 
could wait until the Government came up with firm recommendations for legislation – (for) if the Report 
was accepted any comment would be a duplication of our evidence.945   
Furthermore, the committee’s slant towards the CBI may have also been caused by the anti-
union rhetoric they heard from many of the organisations interviewed.946  There was surprisingly 
little critique about employers organisations contained in the exchanges between industry groups 
and the committee.  Instead, much of the derision was aimed at unions and the under-performing 
and overstretched Inspectorates.947 
 
4.0 The road to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974                                                          
The report of the committee was published in 1972 with an accompanying volume of selected 
written evidence.948  The central ethos of the report was that the primary responsibility for 
addressing the poor levels of occupational accidents and diseases lies with those who create the 
risks and those who work with them, ‘Our present system encourages too much reliance on state 
regulation, and rather too little on personal responsibility and voluntary, self-generating 
effort’.949  The Work Study Journal observed that these recommendations were designed to 
create ‘a more self-regulating system for securing safety and health at work’.950   Graham 
Moffat, also observed the emancipatory nature of the report, noting that although a critical role 
remained for State regulation albeit in an ‘amended form’, the report recommended ‘a clear need 
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for a more effective self-regulating system of control’.951  Harold Walker, who had played a key 
role in crafting the terms of reference before his government lost power in 1970, saw that the 
final report espoused, ‘The philosophy of voluntarism – of self-regulation and self–inspection – 
the retreat from the law – the idea that these matters are best left to industry’.952   
Perhaps the most significant evidence of the self – regulatory spirit of the committee’s 
recommendations was the TUC’s reaction.  The TUC was extremely critical of the report.  A 
TUC working paper revealed the discontent: 
The Robens Report…  (was) criticised by the trade union movement and others on various counts.  The 
main criticisms have been that the Report advocates that the State’s role should be to promote a policy co – 
operation and advice, rather than stronger enforcement of the statutes on safety and health.  In fact, Robens 
describes legislation as one of the causes of apathy and tends to discredit the role of law as a means of 
improving standards.953   
To quell the discontent of the unions, the then Secretary of State for Employment Maurice 
Macmillan addressed trade unions at the Conference on the Report of the Robens committee.954  
He reiterated throughout his brief speech that the committee’s recommendation had met the 
approval of Sydney Robinson, the unionist on the committee and more importantly he tried to 
quell concerns about the nature of self – regulation: 
Now I know that the TUC is worried in particular about the Report’s emphasis on the greater use of 
voluntary codes and standards, but I think that part of trouble here is simply a matter of words.  The Report 
uses the word ‘voluntary’ to contrast with the word ‘statutory’.  But as I see it and understand it and as I 
understand the Report, an approved voluntary code would not be something to be observed or not, 
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something to choice.  There would be a statutory obligation, but the precise means of implementing that 
obligation could be a voluntary code.”955   
Perhaps sensing that his explanation of the Robens Report was not believed by the disgruntled 
crowd, he left the conference abruptly without answering any questions from the floor.956 
The emancipatory nature of the recommendations is best understood by looking at them on three 
levels; the workplace, non – governmental organisations and the British State.957  Regarding the 
workplace, the committee reasoned that the most effective way to improve working conditions 
was by ‘creating the conditions for more effective self-regulation by employers and workpeople 
jointly’, using tools such as safety committees, education, advice, and voluntary standards to 
raise the standing of OHS in the workplace.958  On the second level, the committee 
acknowledged the valuable work of industrial organisations and associations in formulating and 
coordinating accident prevention efforts, establishing joint standing committees and the growing 
spirit of cooperation.  The committee believed that these arrangements should be allowed to 
grow ‘without being unnecessarily hindered by legislation or the state’.959  The third and the 
most fundament level concerned the state.  There was a need to scale back the state’s reactive 
legislative impulse that had produced nine main groups of Acts and 500 regulations, all of which 
could be simplified and reorganised under a single enabling Act.  Such an act would be bolstered 
by voluntary standards and codes of practice instead of state-centric prescription.  Through the 
use of voluntary standards and codes of practice, industry would be given greater responsibility 
for OHS regulation.  For this new framework to work, a quasi-independent single authority to 
supervise and enforce OHS regulation was proposed.  Referred to as the ‘National Authority for 
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Safety and Health at Work’, it would be released from the day-to-day control of the central 
government, possessing its own director, staff and budget.960 
The recommendations of the committee garnered significant acclaim from across the political 
spectrum.  However, the Robens Report was just a document with no intrinsic power to bind 
Government to carry out its recommendations, and while state officials may have expressed 
support for the Report, implementation of the Report was another matter entirely.  The real test 
came with transporting the Report’s proposals into corresponding legislation.   
 
4.1 The National Authority for Safety and Health at Work                                                     
Despite the lack of movement from the government, non–governmental organisations continued 
to work to fulfil Robens’ vision.  The proposal that received the most attention from non–
governmental organisations was the autonomous ‘National Authority for Safety and Health at 
Work’.  The Authority imagined by the Robens Report was:  
A separate and self - contained organisation, clearly recognisable as the authoritative body responsible for 
safety and health at work former idea…  it should have autonomy in day – to – day operations.  Much of its 
work will be executive and technical in character, and it should be allowed to do it without unnecessary 
interference.961   
The idea for such an Authority did not originate from Robens Report.  The notion was conceived 
in the 1940s.  It began with the idea of greater centralisation.  In 1942, Djang wrote about the 
need to centralise and unify efforts.962  In 1949, the TUC argued that the Factory Department 
should expand to become the ‘Department of Health and Safety’, a hub for all things OHS.963   In 
1956, an NJAC report noted that, rather than periodical and separated activities, ‘there must be 
vigorous, more extensive, more sustained, better organised, and better informed voluntary action 
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by everyone in industry; planners, designers, managers, technicians, research workers, 
supervisors and workers all have an important contribution to make’.964  In 1957, there was a 
much more precise vision of central housing, the Labour MP W.R. Rees–Davies argued for:  
A close cooperation, in particular, between the government, the safety organisation, the insurance 
companies, the employers, and through them the workers and the trade union movement… It is time to 
form a national organization, a safety council, for the purpose of achieving these objectives, with 
specialists chosen in these various fields to achieve them.965   
Rees – Davies based his idea of a ‘national organisation’ on the National Safety Council;966  he 
viewed it as ‘a focal point of an accident prevention movement covering industry, transport, 
agriculture, home and factory accidents.  Its function is the publication of all types of documents, 
posters, films, broadcasting, consultation and lectures’.967  Similarly, in 1960, Williams 
suggested a ‘Ministry of Health and Safety to direct and coordinate official machinery in 
connection with all activities relating to the health and safety of the community…  no 
opportunity for teamwork would be denied.  In fact, the opportunity would arise for closer 
cooperation and for more uniformity in practice’.968  Thus, the idea was already in the ether, the 
committee’s engagement with industry, government and academics exposed it to the idea of a 
National Authority.   
 
4.2 Lobbying the government for the establishment of the National Authority for Safety 
and Health at Work                                                                                                                     
The TUC and CBI used their privileged access to campaign for the establishment of an 
autonomous Authority.  Initially, the CBI outright rejected the need for an autonomous National 
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Authority,969 a policy position they maintained from the 1960s until their submission of evidence 
to Robens Committee.970  Even when the CBI came around to the idea, they remained cautious 
about an unrestrained National Authority.  The organisation they envisaged was firmly planted 
within the Whitehall system, it was an organisation with an active Ministerial head who would 
be solely responsible for the safety and health of employed persons, and the Minister would be 
put in charge of the body by ‘personally’ chairing the body.  The Minister would ‘personally’ 
appoint the Chairman, Executive Directors and members of the Managing Board and in 
consultation with the Treasury would determine the body’s annual budgetary provision.  This 
body was to function under the policy directives of a departmental minister.971   
However, several circumstances gravitated both sides of industry towards establishing an 
autonomous National Authority.  First, the popularity of the idea spread through Whitehall and 
eventually made its way into the Robens Report, the TUC and CBI had little choice but to 
concede to its inevitability.  Second, the Authority was the last resort; it was hoped that such an 
Authority would reform the poor state of OHS.  It became increasingly clear to both sides of 
industry that the Authority had the propensity to reverse the trend of rising accident rates and 
remedy the incomprehensible legislation.972  Particularly for the CBI, which began to see that 
such an Authority would protect industry from not only ‘politics’ but also from ministerial 
interruptions and excessive government bureaucracy.973  Third, both organisations needed 
regular ‘victories’ to appease their membership, controlling such a vital institution would be a 
significant triumph.  The TUC began to see little value in solely relying upon the Labour Party to 
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promote their aims; rather they sought other ways to influence outcomes.974  Mick Marchington 
believed that this new focus led the TUC to push for positions of influence on national 
authorities designed to devise and execute policy such as the Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service, the Equal Opportunities Commission, Manpower Services Commission and 
the Commission for Racial Equality.975  For the CBI, failure to ‘escort’ the Robens Report to the 
statute books was not an option.976  The CBI believed that as long as the Robens Report was not 
secured by legislation, it was in danger of being altered.  The DE observed the tremendous 
amount of pressure being placed on the CBI, ‘It seems to be that their members are expecting 
them to take some overt steps about Robens and they are tired of having nothing to report.  No 
doubt CBI members are hardly very restive’.977  This should be seen in the context of their 
significant membership decline in the 1970s.978  David Marsh noted that companies of various 
sizes were deeply unhappy with the CBI's performance and its ability to influence government.  
The unrest resulted in the decline of their membership.979  In the face of diminishing and falling 
subscriptions, the CBI set their officials to work on an Authority that would showcase their 
capability.   
The success of the TUC and the CBI’s project to establish an autonomous Authority was best 
reflected in three crucial negotiations.  Before the discussion of these negotiations, it is worth 
noting that there was a marked difference between the CBI’s eagerness for an autonomous 
Authority and the TUC’s tacit assistance.  The vast majority of negotiations on the establishment 
of the Authority were between the CBI and the DE.  This can be explained by their close 
relationship and also by the fact that the Robens Report was more the CBI’s ‘project’ then it was 
the TUC’s.  The CBI put so much energy into crafting the Authority to the extent that a DE 
internal memorandum stated, ‘The CBI want frankly to come as near as they can to employers 
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running the whole show themselves’.980  However, the Department bluntly told the CBI that this 
was ‘politically untenable’.981  Thus, the CBI had to enlist the support of the TUC, and it became 
clear to the CBI officials that a core group of the DE’s civil servants placed a disproportionate 
amount of ‘political significance’ on the demands of the TUC.982  A joint project was crucial to 
the establishment of a National Authority, this seems to have been picked upon by the 
Department’s officials, who noticed that the CBI ‘appear happy to go along with the TUC’ on 
certain issues ‘in the hope of getting TUC support for the CBI line on other matters’.983  The 
bargain struck appears to have been that if the TUC backed the CBI's campaign for an 
autonomous Authority, it would give the TUC support for statutory requirements for safety 
representatives and safety committees.984 
The CBI and the TUC made numerous joint deputations to the DE, cementing their union by 
scrutinising every aspect of the Authority and ensuring that they were creating an autonomous 
body that would provide them both with maximum influence.985  First, there were intense 
negotiations regarding the need for the Health and Safety at Work Act to be an ‘enabling act’.986  
An enabling act was essential for the Authority to draft regulations as and when they became 
necessary without having to rely on the full parliamentary process.987  Such a privilege was 
arguably essential for an administrative authority of this sort:  
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The authority of administrative agencies to make rules and regulations having statutory effect is a power of 
enormous consequences.  In its effect upon the community, its exercise is of scarcely less importance than 
the actions of the Legislature itself.  Rules and regulations, no less than statutes, lay down patterns of 
conduct to which those affected must conform.988   
The second aspect of the negotiations was concerned with the character of the Authority.  The 
TUC and the CBI were adamant that they should dominate the ‘commission’ of the Authority so 
that they could exercise control over the subordinate ‘executive’ of the Authority.989  The CBI 
believed that the commission was the key to restraining the executive's enforcement operations.  
The DE emphasised that the CBI were anxious that the powers of the executive were not 
‘uncontrolled’ and that the commission was able to set a limit on their use.990  The DE appeased 
the CBI in this regard, but the CBI was still disappointed that Section 11 of the Health and 
Safety at Work Bill prevented the commission from ‘giving to the executive any directions as to 
the enforcement of any of the relevant statutory provisions in a particular case’.991  However, the 
DE explained that this was not a derogation from the ‘control function’ of the commission, but 
rather a means for the commission to avoid becoming subject to external pressure in any 
particular case.  Thus, this provision did not interfere with the commission's power to direct the 
executive’s overall enforcement policy.992   
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Moreover, the TUC and the CBI were equally adamant that professionals and experts should be 
excluded from the membership of the Commission so that the governing of OHS should be 
carried out by employers’ associations and trade unions.993  As the TUC stated:  
Experts, doctors, lawyers and industrial hygienists will all have a valuable role to play in finding out and 
conveying information about risks, hazards and precautions, but the final decisions themselves have to be 
taken by trade unions and employers.”994  The only pathway open to OHS organisations would be a 
peripheral role, they could not be allowed to bypass the Commission in order to raise a matter at ministerial 
level.995  
Third, the negotiations surrounding the independence of the Authority were bitterly fought over; 
even seemingly unobtrusive clauses were scrutinised by their CBI and TUC officials in order to 
protect the organisation from even the remotest threat.  For instance, a sub-clause of Section 10 
of the Health and Safety at Work Bill revealed that the functions of the Authority were to be 
performed on behalf of the Crown.  The CBI demanded its removal, complaining that such 
‘statute might adversely affect the independence of the commission’.996  However, the DE 
officials alleviated their fears by ensuring them that the regulatory and enforcement 
responsibilities of the commission and the executive were of a kind which made Crown status 
necessary, having no real bearing on the Authority’s independence.997  Another example was 
Section 11 of the Bill, which placed a duty on the Authority to provide information to ministers.  
The CBI argued that such a request had the potential to provide ministers with unwarranted 
access leading to ‘unnecessary intrusions on the independence of the commission.’998  The DE 
quieted such claims and assured both sides of industry that such a clause was necessary to ensure 
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that government departments could be adequately informed where an overlap of interest 
occurs.999 
Negotiations that centred on the consent of the Secretary of State for Employment consumed the 
most amount of energy.  This was because this section went to the very core of the Authority’s 
independence.  The chief concern of the TUC and CBI was whether all the Authority’s issued 
regulations and codes of practices were subject to the phrase ‘the consent of the Secretary of 
State’, without which the Commission would be unable to issue regulations.  From the outset, the 
CBI had sought to eliminate the word ‘consent’ because it was felt that this would be ‘damaging 
to its independence and contrary to the spirit of the Robens Report’.1000  This was a rare occasion 
in which the Department did not falter.  It could not afford to acquiesce to the demands of the 
TUC and CBI because Parliament would not allow any regulatory agency with such powers to 
be outside the ambit of a Ministry.1001   
In hindsight, we can observe a tacit compromise; the formality of seeking the consent of the 
Secretary of State would remain, but in practice, the regulations could be submitted without fear 
of opposition from the Secretary of State.1002  Graham Wilson observed that the Secretary of 
State never exercised his legal right to reject a regulation, and it has not been seriously 
challenged – let alone rejected – by Parliament.1003  Even in the face of opposition from the IMF 
and the Conservatives, controversial regulations were still passed by the Secretary of State.1004  
Moreover, during the negotiations, the DE would have considered that it was too difficult to 
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exercise ministerial oversight once the Authority was established; Michael Asimow explained 
that the sheer breadth and depth of regulations produced by regulatory bodies could not be 
overseen by even the most accomplished government department.  In a sense, the Secretary of 
State for Employment was merely the ‘figurehead’ of OHS.1005  Furthermore, an Authority had 
the ability to bypass the Secretary of State by issuing ‘informal regulations’,1006 thus allowing 
the Authority to make broad policy decisions through guidance memoranda, informal rules, and 
other policy devices.1007   
The negotiations between the DE and the TUC and CBI culminated in a well–rounded blueprint 
of an autonomous Authority with wide-ranging powers.  The only hurdle left was to get the 
blueprint through Parliament intact.  
 
5.0 The Whitehall war 
The Regulatory Agency Model did not spring from premeditated efforts to improve regulatory governance, 
but rather is the outcome of political or bureaucratic conflict.1008 
Upon the completion of the blueprint for a National Authority for Health and Safety, a 
‘Whitehall War’ erupted.1009  The paternal vestiges of the state were appalled that DE had agreed 
to establish such an autonomous authority.  Michael Foot, the Secretary of State for 
Employment, commented: 
There occurred what was described in one of the papers presented to me as a prolonged and intensive 
period of interdepartmental consultation.  What that means is that there was a first-class Whitehall row…  I 
was informed that there had been a war which…  was a classic in Whitehall history1010   
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The regulation of OHS went to the very heart of what defined Government.1011   It was no longer 
just a cosy set of negotiations between the Department of Employment, trade unions, and 
employers’ associations.  The issue concerned several Government departments,1012 including 
the Civil Service Department, Home Office, Lord Chancellor’s Office, Treasury, Customs & 
Excise, Welsh Office, the Ministries of Defence, and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the 
Departments of Energy, Trade and Industry, Health and Social Security and Education and 
Science.1013  As Sirrs commented: 
Whitehall departmentalism constituted a significant practical and conceptual barrier to the more all-
embracing vision of health and safety demanded by the Robens Report.  It threatened to confine health and 
safety regulation within the work gates and propagate a fractured and disjointed system. 
The conflict arose for a number of reasons.  First, some departments feared that they would lose 
manpower and resources, and hence prestige, to an external, non – departmental body.  
Recollecting on the conflict, John Rimington, a former Director-General of the HSE, stated that, 
‘Many of those departments, at least seven, would lose segments of the department which they 
greatly valued’.1014  This was substantiated by another former Director- General, ‘It was a 
Whitehall battlefield, because essentially what we were doing was trying to get departments to 
give up their responsibilities, which they always hate doing, and push those into another 
body’.1015   The second reason was issues of overlap between departments and the proposed 
National Authority.1016  The third reason revealed itself through the archives some officials 
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viewed that the Authority was a threat to Parliamentary control.1017  The most substantial 
skirmish was between the Lord Chancellor’s Office and the DE, both departments were locked 
into a series of intense discussions, the Lord Chancellor’s Office insisted that every code 
generated by the Authority should be subject to Parliamentary approval.  However, the 
Department of Employment stood their ground and maintained that there would be no such 
approval system for the enactment of regulations.1018  With the help of the Civil Service 
Department (CSD), the DE’s blueprint of the National Authority survived the ‘Whitehall War’.  
Within just a month of the minority Labour government coming to power, Michael Foot 
announced victoriously, ‘We are glad that that Whitehall war has led to triumph all round.  We 
are prepared for the laurels to be shared by every Department in Whitehall so long as we in the 
Department of Employment retain the sword, as we do.  We believe, therefore, that a perfectly 
proper arrangement has been reached (emphasis added)’.1019 
 
6.0 The Flixborough tragedy                                                                                                            
The ferocity of the explosion at the Nypro factory in Flixborough prevented any reneging on the 
concessions given to the DE.1020  The Flixborough Works of Nypro (UK) Ltd was virtually 
demolished by a massive explosion which killed 28 people, outside of the works, many more 
were injured and property damage extended over an area that included 1,821 houses and 167 
shops and factories.1021  Flixborough was unlike anything that had happened before.  The public 
did not believe that such devastation could be unleashed by a factory; aeroplanes, trains, road 
transport and ships had been instrumental in causing a considerable loss of life and serious 
injury, but such terrible things had never before happened in a factory. 1022  ‘Now’, as one 
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observer witnessed, ‘everything was changed.’1023  The images of the devastated area displayed 
to millions of Britons played a vital role in this ‘change’.1024  Flixborough removed any 
inclination to further delay the passage of the Health and Safety at Work Bill and, a few weeks 
after the tragedy, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was passed. 
 
7.0 The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974                                                                                    
The ‘blueprint’ had made its way through the Houses with the passing of the Health and Safety 
at Work Act (HASAWA) in July 1974.  Seldom observer disagreed that HASAWA was a bold 
and emancipating piece of legislation.  It marked a significant departure from the factories acts.  
First, it reversed the exclusionary approach to the involvement of non–governmental 
organisations.  The CBI and TUC’s endeavours were rewarded with a porous and non–
governmental-friendly National Health and Safety Authority, re-titled the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).  Second, HASAWA offered a 
new framework based on less prescriptive and more goal-based regulations, supported by 
guidance and codes of practice.  Third, HASWA was an enabling Act which acted as an 
umbrella so that secondary legislation or regulations can be made ‘under it’.1025  Fourth, 
HASAWA extended protection well beyond the traditional industrial sphere to reach another 8 
million people working in local government, healthcare, education and a host of other services.  
Fifth, HASAWA imposed general duties to preserve the health and safety of members of the 
public who may be affected by work activities.   
The HSE’s first Director-General described HASAWA as ‘a bold and far-reaching piece of 
legislation’.1026  The enactment of HASAWA was a watershed moment, enabling a 
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fundamentally different regulatory system to emerge.  Moreover, it was a recognition that the 
existing system was ill-suited to keep pace with industrial and technological developments. 
 
8.0 Conclusion                                                                                                                                  
The enactment of HASAWA was the culmination of a long process of reform.  It saw ideas that 
had been discussed for many decades finally being enacted into law.  However, this was also a 
process that caused considerable conflict within and around government.  The notion that OHS 
would be governed and policed by a quasi-autonomous authority concerned many government 
officials, as OHS had been a core area of government for nearly two centuries.  Upon viewing 
the proposals for what would become the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, a commentator 
recalled,  
I confess that when I first learned of the proposals in the then draft Health and Safety Bill, I thought that 
they could never be made to work. Would ministers really stand aside and pay large sums of public money 
to semi-independent organisations which they could not control, from which they could get no kudos, and 
whose activities were difficult to understand and value?1027 
 
In spite of the potential conflict, the DE embraced the notion of an autonomous Authority.  This 
appears to be due to two reasons.  First, as opposed to other government departments, the DE 
had decades of experience with corporatism.  Disseminating so much responsibility to the CBI 
and the TUC was not as radical as it seemed to other departments.  The DE was confident that a 
tripartite structure would have a positive effect on the regulation of OHS.1028  Second, the DE 
may have been more receptive for a solution than other departments because it felt the brunt of 
most of the problems associated with OHS.  Since it had the most extensive responsibilities of 
OHS, the spotlight regularly fell on the DE when matters went awry.  OHS was the ‘hot potato’ 
of the day which other departments could ‘toss around’ when it became too hot.  However the 
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DE’s wide responsibilities did not allow this, so it had its ‘hands burnt’ regularly. 1029   Aside 
from the DE’s institutional responsibilities to OHS, the public connected the DE to the entire 
spectrum of OHS because OHS was erroneously seen as an issue just within factories.  Thus, 
other departments that oversaw non–factory elements of OHS were not held as responsible.1030   
The uneasy predicament of the DE prompted opposing government departments to let the DE 
‘retain the sword’.  Such sentimentality and tradition had to give way to the realities of the day.  
There was an increasing sense of ungovernability; the DE was overloaded with matters that were 
beyond its capability.  Thus, the enactment of HASAWA was a means for the government to 
‘pass the baton’.  A Report published just a few years after the enactment of HASAWA spoke to 
this motivation, ‘Because the work is more effectively carried out by a single purpose 
organisation rather than by a government department with a wide range of functions; in order to 
involve people from outside of government in the direction of the organisation’.1031  Through the 
enactment of HASAWA, the government took a step back from the delivery of services.  
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Chapter Six: The OHS Network (1974 – 1979) 
1.0 Introduction                                                                                                                                      
The introduction of HASAWA was not the end of the story.  Far from it, it was the beginning of 
a new era in OHS.  There were two major consequences of the enactment of the HASAWA.  The 
first of which was the ‘hollowing out of the state’.  The second consequence of the HASAWA 
was that the ‘hollowness’ of the state was ‘filled’ by the OHS Network.   
 
1.1 The layout of the chapter                                                                                                                                           
This chapter commences with a discussion of the hollowing out of the state that followed the 
enactment of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HASAWA).  The ‘hollow state’ is a 
metaphor used to describe the practice of governments contracting out service provision to third 
parties.1032  In the latter decades of the twentieth century, the ‘hollow state’, ‘state of agents’, the 
‘substitute state’, ‘disarticulated state’, ‘third party state’, ‘networked state’, ‘enterprise state’ 
‘neo-managerialist state’ and ‘marketized public administration’ were all attempts to explain 
how conventional ‘government’ had ceded some of its core functions.1033  In this light, 
HASAWA established the Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSC/E) to oversee OHS policy and implementation.  Through the creation of these bodies, the 
core executive conceded its capacity ‘outwards’, which resulted in the hollowing out of the 
state.1034  There was now a greater degree of distance between the government and the services 
that it funded.   
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The following section looks at the OHS Network that filled the hollow state.  Individuals and 
organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors working for the betterment of OHS 
came together to form the OHS Network.   The formation of the OHS Network was among the 
earliest signals that the hollowed state was disintegrating into self–organising inter-
organisational networks.1035  The notion of a ‘network’ came out of a range of ‘decentred’ 
accounts that sought to document the shift from ‘hierarchically organized, unitary systems of 
government that govern by means of law, rule and order, to more horizontally organized and 
relatively fragmented systems of governance that govern through the regulation of self-
regulating networks’.1036  The network form exists when many ‘nodes’ (experts, governmental 
and non–governmental organisations) are linked to many other ‘nodes’, which are all ‘tied’ 
together by a common area of interest.1037  Numerous metaphors have been used to describe this 
configuration, ‘lattice’, ‘web’ and ‘matrix’, network’ was but one of these.  All of which sought 
to evoke the logic of decentralised and integrated connectivity which defined the essence of the 
OHS Network.1038   
The last section of the chapter seeks to frame the activities of the OHS Network to show its 
dynamism and uniqueness.  Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing’s typology of a governance 
network will be utilised for this task.  Their typology outlined five crucial features; ‘(1) a 
relatively stable horizontal assemblage of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors 
(2) who interact through negotiations (3) which take place within a regulative, normative and 
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cognitive framework (4) that to a certain extent is self-regulating; and (5) which contributes to 
the production of ‘public purpose’.1039  
 
2.0 The hollowing of the state                                                                                                                
The enactment of HASAWA ‘hollowed out the state’.1040  Through this Act, power and 
responsibilities shifted from the central government to non–departmental public bodies and non–
state actors.  Before its enactment, government departments played a much larger role in service 
delivery and policy making.  However, after HASAWA was introduced, government 
departments devolved responsibilities to non–departmental public bodies and non–state actors to 
carry out service delivery and policy making.  This is best exemplified in an exchange between 
Harold Walker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State of the Department of Employment, and 
Bob Cryer, a Labour backbencher, in which the latter attempted to introduce a bill to limit the 
maximum weight a worker can lift but was promptly stopped by Walker and told that the 
Government now regarded amendments to the law as the prerogative of the HSC.1041  This 
exchange is particularly pertinent considering that Walker was one of the architects of the 
Robens Committee and HASAWA, thus, re-emphasising that delegation was in line with the 
original intentions of OHS reform.  Correspondingly, we find that the HSC/E presented itself to 
the public as ‘independent of government’.1042 
With the passing of HASAWA in 1974, the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) was 
established and its operational arm the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was created the 
following year.  Referred collectively as the HSC/E.  Former HSC Chair Bill Callaghan noted 
that the ‘HSC/E model’ was wholly unique within Whitehall; it combined two separate and 
distinct bodies which performed their functions on behalf of the Crown, each with a separate 
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legal personality yet gradually intertwined both by legislation and a series of administrative 
developments.1043  Regarding the HSC, sections 1, 10 and 11 of the HASAWA endowed it with 
a mandate to take the appropriate steps to secure the health, safety and welfare of people at work 
and the public generally against risks arising out of a work situation.  The HSC was central to 
reforming the existing system of regulations, proposing new regulations and codes of practice, 
providing information and advice and conducting research. The HSC was a tripartite institution.  
Three members of the HSC were nominated by the CBI, three were nominated by the TUC, and 
two were nominated by local authorities.  Robert Baldwin noted that the local authorities were 
involved to represent the general interest of society.1044  However, in practice, the power levers 
of HSC policymaking remained firmly in the TUC and CBI.1045  The first Chair of the HSC was 
William (Bill) Simpson a former General Secretary of the Foundry section of the Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) and occasional chairman of the Labour Party.    
Legally, the HSE was subordinate to the HSC; its remit was to follow the directives of the HSC.  
Also, under section 18 of the HASAWA, the HSE was charged with making ‘adequate 
arrangements for the enforcement’ of OHS legislation.  The HSE brought together nearly 3,000 
members of staff from nine separate government departments and inspectorates to be headed by 
a ‘three-person statutory body’ consisting of a Director General, a Deputy Director General and 
another senior official. 
The establishment of the HSC/E significantly hollowed out the state.  Specifically, the loss of 
capacity of the core executive to alternative delivery systems.1046  Linking the hollowing out of 
the state to the creation of autonomous agencies, David Vogel commented, ‘By turning over the 
task of establishing standards to the representatives of the interest groups directly affected by 
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them, the British system reduced the direct role of government in the regulatory process’.1047  
Although there was a reduction in the direct role of government, it is important to stress that the 
HSC/E carried out their activities under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, Rhodes explained,  
Many networks work in the shadow of hierarchy; that is, they are dependent on central agencies for legal 
authority and financial resources but are at arm’s length for implementation.  In turn, because they include 
the private and voluntary sectors, the networks provide more resources for central agencies.1048 
The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ can be explained by observing the ‘negotiated independence’ of the 
HSC/E.  The DE’s had three broad areas of restrictions in which the HSC/E had to negotiate its 
independence.  These restrictions were not entirely rigid and would ‘give way’ and loosen from 
time to time.  This ‘negotiated’ independence could be observed in three matters.  First, the main 
restriction was the HSC/E’s specified mandate.  On occasion, when the HSC/E’s activities or 
even its proposals went beyond its mandate, the DE would deter such incursions.  An example 
was the refusal to allow the HSC/E to inspect, investigate and prosecute crown bodies.1049  At the 
time of the HSC/E’s establishment, crown authorities such as government departments were not 
subject to the same sort of legal sanctions as any other employer.1050   However, such restrictions 
were not completely rigid.  They could be disregarded if the case was well-argued or deemed 
necessary, as in the case of the government’s eventual agreement to allow the HSC/E to pursue 
certain crown authorities.  
Second, the DE held on to the ‘purse strings’, under the watchful of the Treasury, the DE 
oversaw the budget of the HSC/E.1051   Plausibly, the DE could use the HSC/E’s annual budget 
as a means to alter the behaviour or restrict the reach of the HSC/E.  Cutting the budget of the 
HSC/E was politically tenable given the fact that OHS was much lower down on the list of other 
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‘politically sensitive’ areas under the purview of the DE.1052  Nonetheless, such actions were not 
present in the first six years of the HSC/E’s operations.  In fact, the OHS budget increased.1053   
Third, HASAWA imbued the Secretary of State with powers to modify and reject regulations.  
However, in practice, the government exercised minimal oversight over the HSC/E’s activities.  
The HSC/E regulations went unchallenged in Parliament and the courts.1054  Writing in the mid-
1980s, Graham Wilson added that, ‘The Secretary of State for Employment has not so far 
exercised his legal right to reject a regulation passed by the HSC, and no regulation has been 
seriously challenged — let alone rejected — by Parliament’.1055   
 
2.1 The reaction to the hollowing of the state                                                                                
The powers granted to the HSC/E did not go unnoticed, Jon Tinker noted in 1976 in the New 
Scientist that the HSC/E were endowed with ‘broad powers… the degree of political control of 
the HSE is considerably less than that over other Whitehall agencies…  in practice…  it will be 
responsible to no-one, neither department nor minister.  This seems somewhat undemocratic’.1056  
Correspondingly, an article in the Observer shared a similar sentiment.  It centred on the fact that 
the HSC/E and other agencies operated behind a curtain.  The hiring and firing of individuals 
along with their activities were shielded from public view.1057   
Furthermore, several articles in the Times spoke to this new independence.1058  At the end of 
1975, a poignant article was written by Eric Wigham.1059  Fundamentally, he saw that the DE 
had undertaken an ‘important experiment’.  He raised many points about the consequences of 
‘hiving off’ powers to autonomous agencies.  He noted that the release of responsibilities left the 
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‘those at St James Square’ more time to sit back and strategise.  Coordination was difficult and 
time-consuming when it was ‘under a single control’, however, with the creation of autonomous 
agencies, adequate attention could be given to a single task.  He also pointed out the release of 
responsibilities was reflected in staffing levels.  In 1974, the staff of the DE decreased, while the 
staff of their regulatory agencies increased.  The DE employed 23,141 in 1975 compared to 
35,263 just a year before.  Also, there were only three Deputy Secretaries employed instead of 
four.  While the DE’s autonomous agencies surpassed this number, employing around 25,047 
members of staff.1060  Another article in 1977 questioned whether the DE should not be 
disbanded since it was merely a ‘shell’.1061   It was argued that the DE had spent the 1970s 
‘hiving off’ its responsibilities to interest groups, which had led to the DE becoming a ‘rump, 
merely monitoring the activities of these agencies’.1062  Given the radical nature of the HSC/E’s 
newfound autonomy, there should have been more press coverage, but the lack of coverage may 
have been because OHS had never been not particularly newsworthy.1063 
Behind the walls of government, there was still some apprehension around what functions would 
be submitted to the HSC/E.1064  However, the most vocal reaction was expressed by the 
Conservative backbencher Philip Holland.  The self – proclaimed ‘quango hunter’ viewed 
autonomous agencies like the HSC/E with great suspicion, as they were beyond the reach of 
Parliament, but able to issue ‘commands, instructions and advice that must be obeyed’ without 
any debates in Parliament, much less the approval of Parliament.1065  They were not subject to 
public scrutiny, yet they had a role in the processes of government and were funded by the 
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government.  He saw himself as a warner of things to come; Parliament had failed to understand 
the implications of the establishment of the HSC/E, ‘power was passing into the hands of 
unelected, unrepresentative executive nominees’.1066  Holland was supported by Madsen Pirie, 
the founder and President of the Adam Smith Institute.  From the late 1970s, they launched 
‘punchy and dramatic’ awareness campaigns, one of which included a photo of Howard holding 
up a long page of ‘quango’ names to signify the government's delegation to agencies like the 
HSC/E.1067  Though their exaggerated apocalyptic warnings were not shared by most 
parliamentarians, the quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations ‘quangos’ became a 
source of debate from the late 1970s.  
The first parliamentary debates on this issue revealed much about the initial concerns of creating 
autonomous agencies to carry out what was formerly ‘government work’.1068  First, what exactly 
was being created?  There was much debate about their definition.  The inability to define bodies 
like the HSC/E spoke to their newness.  There was also significant debate about the norms of 
utilising such bodies.  It was argued that creating quasi-autonomous agencies should be restricted 
to exceptional circumstances.1069   
Parliamentary concern was accompanied by a growing body of literature on governance in the 
1970s.1070  Dissatisfied with the scholarship of the period, scholars began to look at patterned 
interactions between public and private actors in the British political system.1071  Something was 
happening in – between the ‘spaces’ of government.1072  Rhodes recollected the awareness of a 
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change in the 1970s that was ‘shaking off the old order’1073; the crumbling of the ‘Westminster 
model.’1074  As a young researcher, Rhodes recalls stumbling upon this new direction of 
scholarship when he attended his first conference in the early 1970s.1075  He witnessed the 
utilisation of organisational, public management and public policy making theories to explain the 
transition from top-down hierarchal government towards a more horizontal mode of 
governance.1076  Decades later, Michael Marinetto corroborated Rhodes’ observation of the ‘new 
wave of theoretical currents on the state’ that emerged from the 1970s onwards.1077  
Correspondingly, Stephen P. Osborne remarked that a hundred years of studying the traditional 
public administration ended in the late 1970s, it was brushed aside in the pursuit of studying new 
forms of government as if it ‘counted for nothing in this momentous shift’.1078   
New insights targeted the Westminster model as a venue of criticism and scepticism; another 
model was needed to explain the change.  Having no precedent in the British literature to explain 
this occurrence, the new wave of scholarship was compelled to draw from the American 
literature.1079  These studies allowed British scholars to intellectually ‘challenge’ the traditional 
and dominant Westminster model,1080 and construct the first major criticisms of hierarchal 
conceptions of politics.  British scholars utilised A.F. Bentley and David Truman’s works which 
placed great emphasis on the ‘fluid perspective’ of the political process.1081  These works pointed 
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to the presence of horizontal relations between government, administration and organised 
interests.1082 
 
2.2 The hollowing of the state?                                                                                                      
It is important to highlight that the creation of quasi-autonomous agencies like the HSC/E was 
not seen by all observers as a hollowing of the state.  Rather, some factions argued that the 
power of the executive had increased.1083  It was argued that the creation of HSC/E expanded the 
corporate state and it empowered government departments at the expense of Parliament.1084  
Much of this critique came from the Conservative backbenches.  However, it was seemingly 
more to do with party politics than any robust and disinterested analysis.  The Labour 
government was charged with cronyism and helping out their ‘friends’ with public appointments.  
Labour ministers often replied to this charge that Conservatives were guilty of similar actions 
during their time in government.1085   
Nonetheless, there were much more scholarly arguments, which provided the early theorists with 
an opportunity to refine and contextualise their ideas about the hollow state.  One opportunity 
came very early via the work of Michael Saward, who asserted that there were no significant 
signs of hollowing out, even when it was shown that ministers relinquished their day—to—day 
control to autonomous agencies.1086  Rather, the state was redefined and reshaped, not hollowed 
out.  He based his assertion on two factors.  The first was one of intention; the executive wanted 
to get rid of some functions, and as a result, there is no loss.  The second was that the creation of 
an agency separated politics and administration, which meant the executive could exercise more 
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control without bureaucratic distractions.  Ministers gain a new flexibility to manoeuvre and a 
capacity to focus their efforts on selected issues.1087    
Though there is much validity in both of these points, for two crucial reasons, they are not 
enough to dislodge the hollowing out of the state thesis.  Rhodes argues convincingly that the 
executive’s motive for contracting out its functions is irrelevant; ‘a function willingly lost is still 
a function lost’.1088  The executive could no longer carry out a function that it used to carry out.   
Second, the ability of the executive to concentrate on core issues was offset by the fact that the 
executive had less personnel and expertise than it had before the creation of autonomous 
agencies.  The creation of agencies such as the HSC/E often resulted in a mass exodus of 
personnel from government offices to the newly formed regulatory agencies.1089  Moreover, 
Rhodes observes that evidence of increased focus has not been produced.1090   
Though Saward’s explicit arguments were rebutted by Rhodes, Saward’s implicit stance was not 
so easily dismissed, that is, the rejection of the arbitrary distinctions between the Westminster 
model and the hollow state which Rhodes was guilty of exaggerating, although in recent years he 
moderated his arguments.1091  Saward asked the questions that would ultimately lead to the later 
generations of governance theorists rightfully questioning the veracity of such sharp 
distinctions.1092    
The rush to make such sharp distinctions may have been a reaction to the momentous shifts 
which were not fully understood.1093  Also, an overzealousness to ‘finish off’ the lingering 
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Westminster model may have compelled scholars to uncritically utilise the work of 
neoliberals.1094  Sharp distinctions came out of the neoliberal discourse which disparaged 
traditional government and looked for a contrasting term to overemphasise the beloved ‘hollow 
state activity’ they witnessed.  The notion of ‘governance’ offered them such a concept.  It 
enabled them to distinguish between big government (rowing) and appropriate governance 
(steering).1095  Though notions of rowing and steering help explain much of the arrangements in 
OHS, it was not as dogmatic or static as the initial studies suggested.1096  Instead of a complete 
hollowing of the state, after 1974, this area saw a shift of decision–making so that policy was 
formulated and implemented across a plethora of governmental and non - governmental 
institutions, mechanisms and processes ordinarily referred to as ‘governance’.  Very few places 
offer a better example of this shift than the OHS Network. 
 
3.0 The OHS Network                                                                                                           
The hollowing of the state enabled a more cohesive and extensive network to develop, namely, 
the OHS Network.  Networks are central to understanding the hollowing of the state.1097  
Individuals and groups from the public, private and voluntary sectors that worked for the 
betterment of OHS came together to form the OHS Network.  ‘Membership’ to the OHS 
Network was based on contribution to the policy and practice of OHS.  In line with Rhodes, as 
long as a party ‘has an interest in a policy sector, the resources to affect outcomes, and a need for 
other resources (which it does not possess) to pursue its policy objectives’, it occupies a place 
within the OHS network.1098  Though a rudimentary and less cohesive regime existed before 
1974, it did not reach its potential; the disparate, poorly resourced, and government-controlled 
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Inspectorates that preceded the HSC/E were not sufficient ‘nuclei’ for organisations to gather 
around.1099  Organisations saw little authority and attraction to the Inspectorates because of the 
latter’s subordination to Government departments and the ability to legislate was placed firmly 
in the hands of the Ministries.1100  Much of this changed with the establishment of the HSC/E.1101   
A network is a collective of mutually dependent actors, which cluster around a problem area.1102  
This concept had its beginnings in network theory, which sought to explain how communities 
emerge from patterns of relationship among individuals in different settings.1103  In the 1960s, 
the conversation moved from individuals towards organisations.  It was part of the growing 
realisation that organisations are not isolated entities but part of a larger environmental 
system.1104  Now with the focus on organisations, there was a move to understand their content; 
what service did they deliver?  What issues did they pursue?1105  In the latter decades of the 
twentieth century, such questions were asked within the field of governance.1106  Networks 
became a focal point to understand a new form of governance that arose in situations typified by 
high levels of interdependence between organisations ‘where hierarchical forms of command 
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and control are no longer the most effective methods for policy development or 
implementation’.1107  
The literature on networks is not without its critics.  A common charge centres on the 
metaphorical nature of the network literature.1108  Undoubtedly, the notion of the network is an 
ideal type, a streamlined schematic of reality.1109  This is not necessarily a weakness; Patrick 
Kenis and Volker Schneider saw that describing the network as a metaphor enables us to capture 
the ‘architecture of complexity’.1110  As was demonstrated through past attempts, the metaphor 
of the network helped us make sense of complex and tumultuous modern realities.1111  
Interestingly, the metaphor of the network was likened to Harry Beck’s London Underground 
map; Beck designed his circuit diagram with the intent of making complex routes and confusing 
interchanges fathomable to the observer.1112  Even Dowding, a critic of Rhodes’ approach to 
network analysis states, ‘Show me an explanation that is not reductionist.’1113  Thus, to critique 
the use of networks as a metaphoric exercise is a reasonable but not a substantial weakness. 
Related to the allegation of metaphor is the notion that the studies on networks offer little 
explanatory insights.1114  The literature on networks inclines towards generality and has had a 
very irregular record on producing empirical work.1115  Moreover, the network discourse has 
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become ‘incestuous’; ‘a small group of partisans… arguing over definitions and typologies’.1116  
In response to this criticism, this study has confined itself to a particular area in the hope to 
garner ‘thick description’; no grand theory is proposed, just an illumination of key events that 
took place in one area of government.  A network focus is but one ‘angle’ of viewing the 
development of OHS practice and policy.   
 
3.1 The Centre and the Periphery                                                                                               
Not all networks are the same.  Dowding notes that ‘The different types of networks that exist 
have certain properties – which may be modelled in terms of agent characteristics and structural 
characteristics to produce descriptive and causal inferences’.1117  Thus, he stipulated that any 
engaging study of networks needed to point out such nuances.  In line with this recommendation, 
it is vital to highlight a distinctive and fundamental characteristic of the OHS Network, that is, it 
comprised a ‘Centre’ and a ‘Periphery’.  The Health and Safety Commission/Executive (HSC/E) 
provided the ‘Centre’ to the OHS Network; the ‘Periphery’ was made up of non – governmental 
professional, occupational and trade groups and individuals working for the betterment of OHS.  
Once the Centre was established by HASAWA, the Periphery ‘huddled around’ it, fortifying the 
OHS Network.  It is vital to observe the Network through the signifiers of Periphery and Centre; 
the literature has paid limited attention to the former.  So, it is imperative that we go beyond our 
state-centric fixation with the Centre and include the efforts of the countless men and women 
that made up the Periphery.  As Hugh Heclo explained, ‘Looking for the few who are powerful, 
we tend to overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of 
power’.1118  Moreover, to avoid conflation of activities, some level of distinction is warranted.  
However, such a distinction is not intended to be too rigid.  Rather, the distinction does not go 
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beyond a broad categorisation; the porousness of the Centre and the notion of the ‘revolving 
door’ prevent rigid demarcation.1119 
 
3.1.1 The Centre 
The Centre became a thriving sector.  Upon the passing of HASAWA, a number of regulatory 
and scientific organisations were transferred to the HSE; the Factory Inspectorate, Explosives 
Inspectorate, Employment Medical Advisory Service, Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, Safety 
and Health Division from the Department of Energy, the Mines Inspectorate, the Safety in Mines 
Research Establishment, the British Approvals Service for Electrical Equipment in Flammable 
Atmospheres and the Alkali and Clean Air Inspectorate.1120  Though the Centre was strengthened 
by the entrance of these entities, it was also willing to engage with Peripheral individuals and 
organisations with no government connection or statutory basis.  This was a real opportunity for 
the Periphery to affect how OHS was formulated and implemented.  Their ideas of a safer and 
more productive workplace could now flourish on the national stage.  Correspondingly, the 
Centre’s invitation to the Periphery came out of an acknowledgement that more ‘boots on the 
ground’ were needed.1121  The HSC/E realised that forging a bond with the Periphery was a 
means to stretch much wider than the regulatory framework.1122  The HSC/E was aware that its 
limited resources would not allow it to permeate workplace practices. Thus, it believed that a 
move from the policemen on the beat to a neighbourhood watch scheme was necessary. The first 
Chair of the HSC/E explained that, ‘Inspectors, however inspired and dedicated, are never going 
to be so numerous as to be in every workplace every day — but this new army of men and 
women are placed right in the front line of occupational safety (emphasis added).’1123 
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In addition to aiding the Centre’s external reach, the Periphery also strengthened its internal 
mechanisms.  The Centre learnt the lessons of their predecessors; as workplaces advanced, it was 
beyond the capacity of one institution to develop an effective knowledge base by itself.1124  
Thus, the Centre needed the Periphery to use their ‘local knowledge to address local 
problems’.1125  Sandra Dawson regarded this as the heart of the Robens Report that birthed the 
HSC/E.1126  The earliest manifestation of this logic was the encouragement of non – 
governmental actors to populate the HSC/E’s newly formed advisory committees; these 
committees were technically knowledgeable bodies set up to resolve disputes, propose 
recommendations, and investigate queries.1127  Sirrs observes that:  
Advisory committees typically included academics, industrialists, safety officers, physicians and other 
professionals…  Additional members were co-opted to serve on subcommittees and working groups. The 
absence of a particular organisation did not mean they were excluded from consultation altogether: these 
organisations were invited to respond to consultations directly, or had the opportunity to respond to 
proposals once they were published.  Hence, the HSC/E attempted to foster the total involvement of British 
industry, commerce and workpeople in policymaking.1128 
Breaking with the past, the HSC/E attached ‘great importance’ in developing this ‘network of 
advisory committees’1129, covering all the major industries; iron and steel, general engineering, 
foundries, chemicals, coal mining, construction, quarries, electricity, railways, docks, cotton and 
wool, potteries, papermaking, agriculture, hospitals, shipbuilding and repairing, food 
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manufacture and printing.1130  The Periphery’s inclusion into the decision – making process 
empowered HSC/E; the former gave the latter an informational advantage.1131  The ability of the 
Centre’s advisory committees to carry out studies, cross-pollinate findings with other bodies, and 
build consensus with various interest groups gave the Centre ‘institutional muscle’.1132 
Watching this activity from afar, the self – proclaimed ‘Quango Hunter’, Conservative MP 
Philip Holland was troubled by the influence of the unelected outsiders that sat on the HSC/E’s 
advisory committees.1133  His fears, though exaggerated, drew broad historical correlations with 
advisory committees utilised by Government departments, which developed into ‘mini’ 
departments.1134  Likewise, Holland saw the growth of advisory committees as the penultimate 
challenge to Parliamentary supremacy.  In a series of publications, he argued that the advisory 
committee was the main pillar of Quango strength and that they were Quangos within their own 
right.1135  Holland’s views aside, it was normal practice for governing institutions to create 
advisory committees.1136   
 
 
3.1.2 The Periphery                                                                                                                             
The Periphery also derived benefit from engaging with the Centre.  Undoubtedly, being able to 
participate in the policy-making process was extremely beneficial for the Periphery, but it also 
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derived benefit from the legitimation that came from being associated with the quasi-
governmental character of the HSC/E.  The deep integration of the Periphery allowed the quasi-
government appearance of the Centre to ‘spill over’ into the Periphery.1137  This was most 
present when the Periphery advertised its products and services to employers.  For example, 
Nafloc advertised to employers that their Corrosion Meter RB Mark II would aid a safe 
environment since it was accredited by the HSE.  The British Safety Council advertised their risk 
management courses under the pretext that it was in line with HSE enforcement policy.  
Rotheroe and Mitchell Air Samplers would protect their employers from silicosis and asbestosis 
since it was the same product issued to the HSE.  An HSE discussion document was used to coax 
employers that they needed to purchase Peters AP25 Industrial Automatic Audiometer to protect 
the hearing of their employees.1138                                                                       
The Periphery’s regulatory association with the Centre also had a formal legal component.  For 
example, if the employer refused to recognise a legitimate safety representative, an Inspector 
could consider an action under Section 2 of the HASWA; if the employer refused to set up a 
safety committee, an Inspector could issue an Enforcement Notice; and if the advice of a safety 
officer was not acted upon, this could draw unwanted attention from the Inspectorate.1139  No 
longer seen as the solitary safety officer or the lone noise specialist, he or she was now part of a 
wider ‘sanctioned’ Network. 
 
3.2 The typology of the OHS Network                                                                                             
To help us understand the nature of the OHS Network, we turn to Eva Sørensen and Jacob 
Torfing’s typology of a network.  As a result of what Rhodes called ‘incestuous scholarship’, the 
                                                     
1137 M. Molinuevo and S. Sáez, Regulatory Assessment Toolkit: A Practical Methodology for Assessing Regulation 
on Trade and Investment in Services (The World Bank 2014) 
1138 Work Study ‘Colour for Safety’ (1982) 32 WS 10 p26; Products and services, ‘Automatic Audiometer for 
Industry’ (1980) 80 IM 5 p6; James Tye, ‘Risk Management’ (1980) 12 ICT 3 p95; The Times, ‘Advertisements’ 
The Times (London, 4 April 1975) 15  
1139 Alan Dalton, Safety, Health and Environmental Hazards at the Workplace (Cassell 1998) 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 207 
network literature was adept at putting forth typologies.1140  Thus, there were a plethora of 
typologies to correlate with the findings of the study.  Among the closest was the five-pronged 
typology put forward by Sørensen and Torfing.  Their typology of a typical network helps frame 
the vast range of activities and manifestations of the OHS Network.  They outlined five crucial 
features; ‘(1) a relatively stable horizontal assemblage of interdependent, but operationally 
autonomous actors (2) who interact through negotiations (3) which take place within a 
regulative, normative and cognitive framework (4) that to a certain extent is self-regulating; and 
(5) which contributes to the production of ‘public purpose’.1141 
 
3.2.1 A relatively stable horizontal assemblage of interdependent, but operationally 
autonomous actors                                                                                                                          
A core feature of networks is that they are an assemblage of voluntary, private and public 
organisations who are interdependent.  Each group operates autonomously, in the sense that they 
act independently, ‘although with an eye to the expectations of the other actors’.1142  This feature 
was prevalent in the OHS Network.1143  Schemes like WorkSAFE, demonstrated the Network’s 
ability to work autonomously under a collective umbrella that brought a general benefit to the 
Network as a whole.  WorkSAFE was inaugurated in 1977 by Bill Simpson, Chairman of the 
HSC. OHS groups joined HSC/E officials on an annual national exhibition train tour promoting 
OHS to the industrial centres of England, Scotland and Wales.  Each group would take it upon 
itself to meet and demonstrate their equipment and services to industrial management in the 
                                                     
1140 R.A.W. Rhodes, Network Governance and the Differentiated Polity: Selected Essays, Volume 1 (Oxford 
University Press 2017) p35 
1141 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, ‘Network Governance and Post-Liberal Democracy’ (2005) 27 ATP 2 p197 
1142 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, ‘Network Governance and Post-Liberal Democracy’ (2005) 27 ATP 2 p197 
1143 Editorial, ‘Danger! Men at Work’ (1975) 75 IM 11 p20; Industrial and Commercial Training, ‘New Equipment’ 
(1973) 5 ICT 6 p298; Industrial Management and Data Systems, ‘Colour has a Crucial Role to Play in the Field of 
Industrial Safety’ (1980) 80 IMDS 10 p10 
 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 208 
latter's own locality.1144  It proved to be very successful; by the end of the 1970s, it attracted 
more than 12,000 people from British industry.1145   
Another example of this synergy was found in the Safety Representatives and Safety Committee 
Regulations 1977 (SRSC Regulations).1146  The SRSC Regulations enabled a recognised trade 
union to appoint safety representatives from among the workforce.  Once appointed, safety 
representatives performed a wide range of investigative and proactive safety duties. 1147  Though 
these regulations were pushed for and largely aided trade unions, they also benefitted the entire 
Network.1148  First, they increased the ‘footprint’ of the Centre; the Chairman of the HSC spoke 
of the wider benefit of union-appointed safety representatives: 
For over a century a handful of inspectors have fought an uphill battle to improve the safety of people at 
work, and today the first step has been taken for them to be joined by tens of thousands of union-appointed 
safety representatives whose daily work will involve them in a commitment to make the workplace safe 
and healthy for all who work there.1149                                                                                     
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His hopes were not unfounded1150; P. Moody observed that when the regulations came into force 
in 1978, there was 130,000 union - appointed safety representatives ready to take up their 
posts.1151  Though there were some initial teething problems, an HSE survey found in the first 
year that workplaces with safety representatives accounted for 79% of all employees.1152  
Delighted at the success of union representatives, Jim Hammer, the then Chief Inspector of 
Factories, stated in 1978, ‘Trade union safety representatives are becoming so well trained that 
they will know more about shop-floor health and safety than some of their own managers’.1153   
Second, Schmoller and Grayson observed that the SRSC regulatory framework compelled 
factory inspectors to work closely with the union–appointed representatives.1154  The torrid 
relationship between unions and inspectors was laid bare during the aftermath of the Flixborough 
tragedy; the Inspectorate refused to liaise with, or recognise, shop stewards at the plant, issuing 
their own preliminary report with no contact with the unions at any level.1155  The post–
Flixborough environment demanded that both parties come together, the SRSC regulations were 
borne out of this new resolution.1156   
Third, dispatching safety representatives purposefully opened the door for other actors to enter 
industry.  One HSC Commissioner explained that, ‘This system of safety representatives is 
deliberately designed to merge with and to work within existing systems of industrial relations in 
the United Kingdom, and, therefore, a necessary amount of flexibility has been incorporated into 
the Regulations (emphasis added)’.1157  The ‘existing systems’ being safety committees; the 
SRSC Regulations stipulated that when two or more safety representatives request a health and 
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safety committee, the employer must comply within three months of the request.  While such 
committees have existed for some years, P.B. Beaumont’s study observed that the SRSC 
Regulations resulted in a major increase in the number of committees, particularly among small 
firms and those in the traditionally low accident rate industries.1158  This created vacancies for 
the safety profession; by the early 1980s, the IISO estimated that approximately 10,000 people 
had the word ‘safety’ in their job title.1159  This consequence was not entirely unforeseen; the 
SRSC Guidance Notes stipulated that the safety professional should occupy an ex officio position 
on the safety committee.1160  Even before the publication of the Guidance Notes, the HSE had 
contemplated a much larger role for safety professionals via their vital work on safety 
committees.1161  They were expected to play a major role in determining the success of the safety 
committee through their technical and personal skill set.1162   
Both examples point to the interdependence of the post-1974 Network.  The above–mentioned 
joint projects laid the foundations for a deeply integrated Network.  However, it must be noted 
that interdependence was a process, it did not happen automatically.  Ironically, there was far 
less contention between the Centre and the Periphery, rather most of the contention existed 
within the Centre.  Sirrs noted that the HSE’s constituent institutions experienced continued 
friction years after HASAWA was enacted, as they were authorities in their own right and 
accustomed to working independently.  The HSE worked consistently as the ‘negotiating body’ 
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to eventually create a single corporate entity.1163  No entity had engaged so vigorously in 
unifying the Centre before 1974. 
 
3.2.2 Interaction through negotiations                                                                                      
Sørensen and Torfing observed that network actors interact through negotiations that bring 
together elements of bargaining and deliberation.1164  This trait found its expression in the OHS 
Network’s consensus building activities.  More specifically, the initial efforts to build consensus 
fell disproportionately on the shoulders of the HSC. The HSC was pivotal in assuring that the 
relevant interests have been heard, no interested party had been denied access and that all 
arguments have been put in such a way that they were understood and respected.1165  Such an 
emphasis can be construed as the ‘construction of consensus’ in which the Centre set the 
boundaries and ‘constructed’ the rules of engagement among the participants.  To manage the 
vastness of the interactions, it was vital for the Centre to ‘host’ negotiations, set the procedural 
rules and the mode of management.1166  The Centre did not have the option of coercion and the 
Periphery’s protest could stifle negotiations. Thus, it attached considerable importance in 
constructing consensus with each engagement.1167  Everything from the operation of meetings, 
passing motions, turn–taking, the amount of time one could speak, establishing a point, choosing 
a mediator was constructed to bring about consensus.1168  The HSC sought to actualise the 
Robens philosophy of consensus, that is, ‘a mutually beneficial co-incidence of interests amongst 
apparently antagonistic parties can be reached via relatively little or no state intervention’.1169  
The decision by HSC’s first chair to make decisions by consensus was crucial.  It meant that 
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OHS policymaking was typified by persuasion and compromise.1170  Building consensus went to 
the very heart of the HSC's activities; Dawson observed that the HSC's collection and 
dissemination of information and formulating policy, regulations and guidance were ‘all 
interlinked and imbued with the spirit of consultation and the hope of consensus’.1171 
Consensus was vital to the burgeoning Network.1172  It was not just the history of dissension that 
spurred the HSC to seek consensus, but there was a belief that consensus was a logical outcome 
if industry regulated itself.  Looking through the HSC’s first decade of documents, Dawson notes 
that there was a curious absence of any fundamental objections for lack of agreement on safety 
policy and practice between interested parties.1173  Arguably, this ‘natural’ consensus outlook 
can be traced back to the Robens Report which theorised that there was a far greater ‘identity of 
interests’ in industry than other aspects of workplace relations.1174   
Reaching consensus was a means to insulate the Network from opposition.  Dawson makes the 
convincing argument that regulations were never challenged by Parliament or the courts because 
of the HSC/E’s rigorous consensus building activities.1175  Thus, we saw a number of 
controversial proposals spearheaded by the HSC that were protected by consensus.  The most 
controversial example of the period was the HSC’s proposals for appointing trade unions as 
safety representatives; the ‘rough consensus’ reached compelled the Secretary of State for 
Employment to approve of the HSC’s proposals despite the enormous costs involved, 
parliamentary opposition and an IMF warning.1176   
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Through constructing consensus, the HSC sought to influence ‘patterns of behaviour’ between 
and within interested parties.1177  This is what Faranak Miraftab referred to as ‘a structure of 
inclusive governance’ that is crucial to secure compliance.1178  Unable to rely on the weight of 
hierarchal authority, the Centre utilised consent and perception of inclusion to ensure compliance 
and deter dissent.  It was hoped that individuals and organisations that participated in the 
formulation of regulations were more likely to comply and even promote the regulations because 
they had a ‘stake’ in the process.  Of course, compliance was desired from employers that took 
part in these fora, but it was also desired from those lower down the ladder; the various safety 
professions needed to be on board to aid their employers to meet new standards:  
Entrepreneurialising responsible units and individuals, through devolving authority, decision making, and 
the implementation of policies and norms of conduct.  These are the processes that make individuals and 
other small units in workplaces responsible for themselves while binding them to the powers and project of 
the whole.’1179 
The level of emphasis that the HSC/E placed on consensus building was at such an extent that it 
brought criticism, largely relating to the length of time it took to reach consensus.1180  For 
instance, the Work Study Journal complained that it took ‘almost two years’ for the HSE to draw 
up a certificate which specifies that eye protectors must be soundly constructed.1181  It was stated 
that the ‘writing and rewriting and getting second and third opinions’ weighed more on the 
minds of agency staff than ‘prompt action’, such was the need to strengthen organisational 
links.1182 
Though the search for consensus may have brought about a more cohesive Network, there is 
sufficient scope to argue that it created ‘regulatory degradation’; vagueness and sluggishness 
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were often outcomes of the consensus process.1183  It also eroded the ‘ambition that can 
accompany policymaking when unconstrained by compromise’.1184  However, consensus 
building was a necessary evil for a burgeoning Network, ‘Consensus allowed the regulatory 
system to weather the political storm’.1185  Dawson contrasted the consensual approach with the 
adversarial approach of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) in the USA.  
They argued that the adversarial approach tends to be less effective regarding influencing 
behaviour, except where the prevailing political climate is strongly in favour of regulation.  
However, where the opposite exists:  
There is very little chance that an adversarial approach at the national level can achieve more than a 
consensual approach.  On the contrary, it seems that in terms of actually influencing behaviour so as to 
reduce accidents and improve standards overall the consensual approach is likely to be more successful.1186 
 
3.2.3 Institutionalised framework                                                                                               
Consensus building does not occur in a vacuum; instead, they proceed within a relatively 
‘institutionalized framework, which is more than the sum of its part’.1187  Through this 
institutionalised framework, norms, values and standards are developed.  This was experienced 
in the OHS Network as a consequence of its consensus-building projects.  Such projects 
provided the Network with regular opportunities to engage, exchange ideas, discuss best practice 
and keep abreast of the latest developments.  Before the enactment of HASWA, inspectors, 
researchers, experts and professional, occupational and trade groups did not have a shared 
‘venue’ to meet on a regular basis.  The two volumes of the Robens Report detail the differences 
between approaches to OHS.  However, the establishment of the HSC/E provided the wider 
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Network with central venues to develop a shared vision of OHS.  The Centre laid the 
foundations of a shared vision by bringing the Network together to ‘sit down together and work 
out how to deal with them (risks)’.1188   
The institutional framework of engagement expanded throughout the 1970s.  For instance, the 
Fire Liaison Panel Network was in set up in the aftermath of Flixborough by the British 
Insurance Association (BIA), TUC, CBI, officials of the HSE, safety organisations and local 
authorities.  The representatives of these groups met regularly as a planning body with the main 
objective of getting senior, middle and line management to understand about fire safety and their 
responsibilities to the workforce under the law.  Similarly, in an attempt to increase 
professionalism, the Managerial Professional and Staff Liaison Group (MP&SLP) was set up by 
non–TUC affiliated unions, safety organisations and the medical profession.1189  The VDU Eye 
Test Advisory Group, consisting of trade unions, academics and civic groups, would publish 
regular discussion documents on the safety of VDU use.1190  The result of the expanding 
framework encouraged the cohesion of OHS policy and practice.  Such forums compelled the 
participants to forge common goals and tighter bonds.1191  An insider observed, ‘We talk to each 
other in a permanent forum… on a regular basis about an issue which we wouldn’t discuss with 
each other a few years back… This is a forum which is grossly underestimated (emphasis 
added)’.1192 
This move towards a shared outlook is best exemplified by the relationship between the CBI and 
the TUC.1193  Wilson’s comparative study of OHS systems observed that the relations between 
the TUC and the CBI were particularly close, with officials of the CBI and TUC referring to 
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each other as ‘our colleagues’.1194  Dalton added that there were no great public disagreements 
between the CBI and the TUC on health and safety issues.1195  What was interesting about the 
CBI and the TUC’s shared consensus was the value that both groups now gave to OHS.  This 
was bound to happen, unions and employers found themselves regularly interacting with the 
Periphery in the decision–making and implementation process.1196  From the 1970s, unexpected 
statements emerged from top CBI officials; in a letter regarding the high accident rates in the 
construction and civil engineering industries, we see a more safety conscious CBI, they 
demanded:  
An increase in the number of inspectors that the Health and Safety Executive can deploy in its construction 
division, and pressure for legislation to increase the upper limit of fines that can be levied on convictions of 
health and safety offences together with guidelines for judges and magistrates on the appropriate tariff for 
such offences’.1197   
The CBI also lambasted these industries for being full of ‘unregistered, unionised, subcontracted 
gangs’ and called for advisory committees to have more teeth.1198  Correspondingly, we saw the 
TUC adopt the CBI's language of the applicability of cost-benefit analysis to aspects of OHS 
provision.1199  Sirrs centres on this point in his critique of Tombs and Whyte when he argues that 
trade unions also acquiesced to this ‘deadly consensus’.1200 
Regular dialogue in these frameworks allowed for the nationalisation of approaches to OHS.  
Two interrelated approaches developed nationally in this fashion; safety consciousness and risk-
based approaches to regulating OHS.  The newly founded HSC/E was open to the developed, 
tested and operationalised approaches of the safety profession.  There is scope to argue that the 
HSC/E would have remained a fragmented and hollow set of institutions, if not for the influx of 
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the innovative safety profession.  After all, the Robens philosophy that gave birth to the HSC/E 
was too speculative and inconsistent to offer a complete roadmap for the HSC/E. 
Additionally, the HSC/E did not inherit a cohesive approach from the under-performing 
Inspectorates and their reactionary sponsoring government departments.  This susceptibility of 
the Centre was met by a significant portion of the safety profession who believed it was their 
duty to stimulate the HSC/E.1201  Correspondingly, discussions of the Robens Committee 
revealed that the Inspectorates valued safety bodies, many of whom were former factory 
inspectors.1202  This admiration turned to reliance as they populated the HSC/E’s advisory 
committees, consultations, and national projects, providing a direct route for ideas to flow 
straight into the heart of the HSC/E.1203  This is not to allege a conspiracy, but rather to suggest 
that the same ‘toolkits’ safety men and women used in their day-to-day activities were the same 
toolkits they brought to Centre; commentators have observed the ‘baggage’ that external experts 
carry to such fora.1204 
As mentioned, via the expanded institutionalised framework, safety consciousness and risk-
based approaches to OHS achieved national attention.  Both approaches were preventative and 
were implemented before an accident took place as opposed to the retroactive and corrective 
focus of the former Inspectorates.1205  Regarding the former approach, the HSC/E’s 
appropriation of risk-based methods shaped its approach to OHS.  Risk-based methods could be 
broadly defined as the identification of risks to health and safety and the assessment of what can 
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be done to minimise risks.1206  Though it is difficult to imagine the HSC/E without the use of 
such methods, in the 1970s, risk management techniques were still in their ‘infancy.’1207  It was 
first utilised by the safety professions decades earlier, as James Tye, the Director General of the 
British Safety Council (BSC) put it, the safety profession dragged risk-based methods out of the 
‘insurance quagmire.’1208  In its original form, it was seen as too ‘limited’ because it placed too 
much emphasis on pure finance.1209  The safety profession transformed risk by moving it away 
from pure finance towards a focus on accident prevention;1210  Once ‘renovated’ for accident 
prevention, we can postulate that the deep integration of the safety profession put it in the hands 
of the HSC/E via their work in advisory committees.1211   
From 1974, Sirrs identified that the ‘most important change’ was the movement towards a ‘risk-
based’ approach.1212  The identification, measurement, minimisation and information on risks 
constituted the core of HSC/E’s policy; everything was interpreted in terms of risk, to the extent 
that the central tenet of HASWA, to do whatever was ‘reasonably practicable’, was solely 
concerned with compelling employers to ‘adopt risk management techniques of assessing 
hazards and controlling them’.1213  As the Director-General of RoSPA put it, the new role that 
risk played in the HSE’s execution of HASWA ‘takes us a long way from the Factories Acts 
which said ‘Thou shalt not…’ to the Health and Safety at Work Act which implies ‘You may, 
subject to approval… etc. (emphasis added)’.1214  Similarly, Brian Harvey, the HM Chief 
Inspector of Factories reiterated that risk even transformed the HSE mode of inspection, 
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‘Cyclical inspection has been modified in favour of a more flexible and selective approach, 
allowing the Inspectorate to deploy its resources in relation to numbers employed and the level of 
risk (emphasis added)’.1215  The HSC/E’s risk ‘net’ was cast over the whole of industry, it 
captured more than employers; manufacturers, installers of equipment and designers had a duty 
to provide products and services which were safe and without undue risk.1216   
Risk-based approaches were complemented by the inculcation of safety consciousness, which 
was the capability of recognising danger, estimating the likelihood of an accident happening, and 
its extent, and acting accordingly.  Initially, the promotion of safety consciousness was largely 
unique to the safety profession.  Without the threat of punishment or much technical skill, this 
was the only accident prevention tool available to the first safety officers.1217  However, with 
time, safety bodies sophisticated their approaches, moving from inculcating safety consciousness 
using propaganda towards more comprehensive measures such as ‘total recall’ and 
‘Aetiology’.1218  Drawing from the safety profession, the HSC/E launched numerous projects 
under the banner of safety consciousness, as noted by one of the HSC’s earliest policy 
announcements, ‘During the Commission's first 18 months, our objective above all has been to 
raise the level of safety consciousness at work, on the part of employers and employees 
alike’.1219  In all likelihood, without the expanding institutionalised framework these approaches 
may have never left the confines of the safety professions.  Yet within the first years of the 
HSC/E, we start to see their usage on the national stage. 
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3.2.4 Self – regulating                                                                                                                   
This aspect is the hardest ‘box’ to place the OHS Network.  The Network was not self–
regulating in the sense that it was not completely autonomous.  It was restricted to a certain area 
of governance and it operated in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.1220  However, the authors mention 
another aspect of self–regulation, which is applicable to the OHS Network, ‘It aims at regulating 
a particular policy field on the basis of its own ideas, resources and capabilities, and it does so 
within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework that is adjusted through 
negotiations and regular interact’.1221  Before the enactment of HASAWA, there was minimal 
collaboration with external parties, regulatory oversight was held tightly by the Inspectorate and 
their sponsoring government departments.1222  However, the Robens Report sought to reverse 
this omission by recommending that those who created the risks and those who worked with the 
risks should have prime responsibility for the betterment of OHS.1223 
The collaborative efforts of the Centre and the Periphery operationalised Robens’ 
recommendations by forging a coherent system of ‘soft law’ that fostered the motivation and 
capacity for individuals to take more responsibility for OHS.1224  Much of this system was 
constructed through the HSC/E’s regulations, Approved Codes of Practice, recommendations, 
Guidance Notes and monthly newsletters.  The veteran OHS journalist, Bill Walsh, observed 
how the Periphery was compelled to stay in tune with an ‘unending stream of information, 
exhortation and regulation…  just keeping abreast of the volume is no mean task’.1225  By the 
end of the 1970s, The HSC/E’s first catalogue listed 1,500 publications.1226  This output 
                                                     
1220 R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability 
(Open University Press 1997) 
1221 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, ‘Introduction: Governance Network Research: Towards a Second Generation’ 
in Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (eds), Theories of Democratic Network Governance (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 
p10 
1222 Sandra Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988); 
John Williams, Accidents and Ill – Health at Work (Staples Press 1960) 
1223 Alfred Robens, Safety and Health at Work: Report of the Committee, 1970-72, Volume 1 (HMSO Cmd 5034 
1972) 
1224 Sandra Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988) 
1225 Bill Walsh, ‘Background Information: for Health and Safety’ (1982) 31 WS 1 p35 
1226 Products and Services, ‘Guide to Workplace Safety’ 9 IM 7 p9 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 221 
reverberated through industry; safety bodies had to incorporate this information into their safety 
courses and in their information and guidance to their clients.1227    
Such constant streams of information from the Centre helped the continuity of the self–
regulatory system.1228  The Centre served as the ‘glue’ of ‘regulative, normative, cognitive and 
imaginary framework’.1229  This was illustrated in an article in the Work Study Journal which 
documented how British machine makers and retailers took heed of the direction of the Centre.   
It highlighted the example of equipment which was inconsistent with the noise control guidelines 
of the HSE; the HSE Director General warned manufacturers and retailers that failure to take 
noise levels into account in the design of industrial plants would result in lost orders since HSE 
Inspectors were ordered to give ‘increased attention’ to equipment that violated guidelines.1230   
 
3.2.5 Public purpose                                                                                                                           
It was observed that networks congregate on a public purpose within a certain area.  In fact, the 
authors stipulate that the networks that do not have a public mission cannot be considered a 
governance network.  In line with the authors’ observations, a significant amount of the OHS 
Network’s activities were directed towards the public, therein securing its status as a governance 
network.  This differed dramatically from the era before HASAWA was enacted of which Lord 
Robens noted, the previous regime held ‘a long-established and deep-seated reluctance… to 
accept any explicit responsibility in relation to the safety of the public.  It is as if there was some 
invisible ring–fence around the occupational safety system with the general public left 
outside’.1231  The previous regime was content to remain inside ‘club government’, its posture 
was inward–facing, never looking beyond ‘club members’ for legitimacy and development.1232  
However, the years leading up to HASAWA was typified by a series of disasters that prompted 
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the government and those that worked in OHS to turn their attention to the public.  With the 
passing of the HASAWA, protections extended to the public for the first time.  Through such 
means, the Network was impregnated with a mandate to protect the public.  Correspondingly, 
the timing and severity of the Flixborough disaster-induced an exceptionally generous 
interpretation of HASWA; public safety was placed at the top of the Network’s priorities.1233  
Arguably, if Flixborough would have happened outside of the Network’s formative years, we 
may not have seen such a public – focused Network.1234     
Observing the change in direction, a former Superintending Inspector of Factories noted the 
effect of this provision, ‘Our work has been widened beyond that of our traditional clients—
industry and the worker—to those who may be affected by work—the public… You cannot 
reassure the public in any shape or form, if you see yourselves as a closed elitist group’.1235  
Flixborough was the first ‘test’ of the public–facing Network.  Spawned by the fallout of Brent 
Cross, Aberfan and Flixborough, the embryonic OHS Network was immediately confronted by a 
more risk-aware society, even circumstances that were considered ‘normal’, such as living next 
to a factory which produced hazardous chemicals, or driving alongside vehicles carrying 
hazardous materials, began to be seen as potential risks to one’s safety.1236  The Times reported 
that the public started to raise many questions about the safety of workplaces, ‘How many other 
factories present a potential threat?  Should there be now regulations about industrial sites close 
to built-up areas?’1237  Such questions needed to be answered, or there was a severe danger of a 
‘withdrawal of public confidence from the statutory authorities’.1238   
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The Network faced multiple protests across the country, demanding an ‘unbiased investigation’ 
of plants that handled hazardous materials.1239  The Network responded to such requests with 
vigour.1240  The Centre invested a significant amount of its budget on safeguarding the public by 
way of ensuring employers met their obligations to public safety, promotional campaigns, 
conducting risk-based surveys and overseeing planning applications for high–risk plants.1241  The 
Centre was not alone in this change of direction, within the Periphery ‘Whole new industries 
mainly in the field of consultancy have grown up around the concept of protecting the 
public’.1242  For the main safety bodies, workplace safety was used as a platform to launch a very 
broad ‘safety crusade’ that included everything from ‘seat-belts in cars, fairground safety, 
dangerous toys and consumer products, fire safety in hotels and public places’.1243  
Arguably, the most significant identifier of this change in direction was the provision of 
information of the surrounding risks.  The HSC/E took it upon itself to provide the public with a 
true depiction of industry.  Within its first term, the HSC published the most comprehensive set 
of statistics ever published on the state of OHS across the country.1244  Until 1974, a Factory 
Inspector was not allowed to let employees know, let alone members of the public, about the 
actual hazards they might have faced at work.  Even though an inspector was empowered to 
monitor a workplace for the presence of toxic chemicals, he was not permitted to relay this 
information to the employees, their representatives and especially not the general public.   As a 
result, Medawar concluded that many people died and suffered ill health without the knowing 
the reason why.1245   However, with the introduction of HASWA, Inspectors could provide 
employees and the public with sufficient information.  Enlightening the public to the surrounding 
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risks only increased the public’s need for an OHS Network with a comprehensive reach.  In 
essence, the OHS regime removed the blindfold off the public, as the Times reported, ‘Removing 
the air of ominous mystery surrounding many chemical plants which makes local residents feel 
they have stepped into an episode of Dr. Who’.1246   
 
3.2.6 OHS governance 
It is good to know that factory inspectors, safety officers, scientists, engineers and some medical are all working 
together to ensure our safety… negotiating about technical issues, investigating, writing reports, presenting 
evidence, dealing with people at all levels within an organisation – these are all part of their work.1247 
Sørensen and Torfing’s typology of a governance network allowed us to make sense of the 
activity after 1974.  Though there remained some similarities and transitions were not always 
smooth, the typology of the OHS Network was clearly distinguishable from anything that had 
come before.  With such a change, we expect a change in performance.  This change was 
reflected in its initial successes.1248  Though it is difficult to correlate the reduction of workplace 
accidents and the emergence of the Network, Theo Nichols’ study demonstrated that there was 
an improvement after 1974 that needs to be accounted for.  Though the disaster at Flixborough 
contributed to a spike in accidents, industry-by-industry comparison of average fatality rates 
between 1971 – 1974 and 1975 – 1979 point to a reduction in workplace accidents.1249  
Improvement in the initial years of HASAWA was also observed by other commentators.1250   
 
4.0 Conclusion 
‘If the Act is to work, it will need the men to back it’.1251 
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Decades of corporatist activity and non – state action came to fruition with the enactment of 
HASAWA.  This represented a shift away from government taking full responsibility for service 
delivery and traditional spheres of state activity towards provision by networks of non – 
departmental public bodies and non - governmental actors.   This shift away was not a complete 
release; the OHS Network worked in the shadow of hierarchy.  Networks cannot function 
independently of hierarchal government.   Even though the day-to-day activities were largely 
carried out by the OHS Network, the Centre was still answerable to the government; it was 
required to report its activities and liaise with government departments.  Thus, the concept of 
network governance does not seek to remove past understandings of government, ‘but… expand 
the conceptual horizon to include recent changes, in so far as they have come about’.1252   
Expanding the ‘conceptual horizon’ also allows us to see the differences between the OHS 
Network and the regimes that existed prior.  The differences were highlighted by Sørensen and 
Torfing’s typology of an archetypal network.  First, the OHS Network’s assemblage of 
interdependent actors reversed a history of unilateral activities.  The Centre drew from the 
expertise and reach of the Periphery to improve working conditions.  Correspondingly, the 
Periphery benefited from the legitimacy and the ‘housing’ provided by the Centre.   
Second, building consensus was integral to the Network’s activities.  The HSC was pivotal in 
assuring that no interested party had been denied access.1253  No entity had engaged so 
vigorously in unifying the various factions before 1974.  The Network that emerged was an 
actualisation of the Robens philosophy of consensus, that is, ‘a mutually beneficial co-incidence 
of interests amongst apparently antagonistic parties can be reached via relatively little or no state 
intervention (emphasis added)’.1254   It was hoped that individuals and organisations that 
participated in the formulation of regulations were more likely to comply and even promote 
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regulations because they had a ‘stake’ in the process.  Moreover, regulations reached through 
consensus were extremely difficult for the courts and Parliament to dislodge. 
The third aspect of the Network was the establishment of an institutionalised framework in 
which norms, values and standards were developed.  Such settings provided the Network with 
regular opportunities to engage, exchange ideas, discuss best practice and keep abreast of the 
latest developments.  Before the enactment of HASAWA, inspectors, researchers, experts and 
professional, occupational and trade groups did not have a shared ‘venue’ to meet on a regular 
basis.    
The Network was also typified by self – regulation, in the sense that the Network focused on 
regulating OHS based on its own ideas, resources and capabilities, and it did so within a 
regulative framework that was adjusted through negotiations and regular interaction.  Although 
the Factory Inspectorate had a strong tradition of exhortation, education and advice in its 
dealings with employers, it was haphazard and inconsistent.  The Network exhibited a much 
more explicit intention to codify and rationalise how industry could best regulate itself, through 
this pursuit, policies of responsibilisation and safety consciousness came to the fore. The last 
aspect was the production of ‘public purpose’.1255  A significant amount of the OHS Network’s 
activities were directed towards the public.   Before HASAWA was enacted, the public was 
largely an afterthought.   However, the years leading up to HASAWA were typified by a series 
of disasters that prompted the government and those that worked in OHS to turn their attention to 
the public. 
The building blocks of the OHS Network were laid down between 1974 – 1979.  The OHS 
Network was given the space and resources to develop into impressive governing institutions.  
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Chapter Seven: The Recapture of OHS (1974 – 2010s) 
1.0 Introduction                                                                                                                                  
The Labour government’s nurturing of the OHS Network created a quasi-autonomous, well – 
rounded and formidable governance network.  However, it was not given the opportunity to 
develop further.  From the winter of 1979, successive governments eroded and restricted its 
regulatory mandate.  Ultimately, losing much of its autonomy and effectiveness.  Setting the 
scene for the recapture of OHS. 
 
1.1 Themes                                                                                                                                               
To observe how the OHS Network endured each period of government, this chapter utilised 
several themes.  When confronting such a vast history, it is useful to use a framework to observe 
critical events.  Thus, notions of the ‘surround’, ‘targeting’ and ‘steering’ were used to 
emphasise key points, understand matters in their correct contexts and signify commonalities and 
differences. 
 
1.2.1 Surround                                                                                                                                 
The ‘environment’ that impacted the OHS Network is described as the ‘surround’.  The surround 
was one of the organising principles utilised by Keith Hawkins to direct our attention to the 
broader context in which regulatory decision – making took place.1256   Hawkins suggests that 
changes in the surround impact the leadership and actors ‘on the ground’ either through central 
policy shifts or the modification of their behaviour.1257   
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1.2.2 Targeting                                                                                                                                        
With the exception of the Labour government, the HSC/E was targeted for ‘special attention’ by 
successive governments.  Generally, before any specific action was directed towards the HSC/E, 
there were some reasons that motivated the government to focus its attention on the HSC/E.   
 
1.2.3 Steering                                                                                                                                          
After the HSC/E was targeted, it was ‘steered’ to fulfil the aims of government.  Steering 
describes how governments from the 1970s ‘managed’ their sprawling networks of public, 
private and voluntary actors.  Much of what was developed was spontaneous and reactive to the 
pressures of managing networks of quasi-autonomous non – departmental public bodies and their 
‘helpers’.1258  Thus, from the Labour government of 1974 – 1979 until the Coalition government, 
we can broadly observe an evolution of steering tools.  Rather than provide a descriptive account 
of each tool used by these governments, we will focus on the tools that typified the 
administration. 
 
1.3 The layout of the chapter                                                                                                                                            
The chapter is sectioned into five parts.  Each part describes a period of government.  The 
chapter commences with a discussion of the surround of the Labour government 1974 – 1979.  
The building blocks of the OHS Network were laid down between 1974 – 1979.  The OHS 
Network was given the space and resources to develop into impressive governing institutions, 
distinct and unique from the Labour government.   
The following section looks at the surround of the Thatcher government (1979 – 1990); the 
‘honeymoon period’ was over.   The ‘anti-public sector - pro-private sector conservatism’ of the 
Thatcher government reshaped the surround of the HSC/E.   The social contract was nullified, 
                                                     
1258 Andrew Dunsire, Execution Process: Implementation in a Bureaucracy (Martin Robertson 1978); Andrew 
Dunsire, Control in a Bureaucracy (St. Martin's Press 1978); Andrew Dunsire, ‘Holistic Governance’ (1990) 5 PPA 
1 p4 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 229 
budgets were tightened and decision – making processes were ‘interrupted’.1259  The result of 
which left the Centre weakened.   However, the Periphery was afforded opportunities to fill the 
vacuum left by the weakened Centre.    
This is followed by an exploration of the surround under the Major government (1990 – 1997).  
The key features of Thatcher’s government lingered; managerialism and neoliberalism remained 
the mood music of the period.  Anti-unionism continued to be reflected in the promotion of 
individual employment relationships at the expense of the collective.1260   All of which weakened 
the Centre even more while furthering empowering the Periphery.   
The subsequent New Labour government (1997 – 2010) mirrored the surround of the Thatcher 
and Major governments, albeit with a ‘human face’.1261  When Labour entered government, it 
inherited a series of practices embedded within the British state.1262  There was no real effort to 
reverse these practices.  What happened instead was the formalising of existing trends.  In the 
sense that the Centre’s decline and the Periphery’s ascension were part of explicit policy. 
The last section looks at the Coalition government (2010 - 2015), much of the surround remained 
the same except for a creeping populism.1263  Following the ‘cycle’ set by the Blair government, 
the Conservative leader opened the door wider to a rhetorical populism through his appeals to 
the ordinary man.1264   Such populist appeals were a deterring and critical restriction on OHS 
regulation.1265  All of which left the Centre moderated and susceptible to government influence.  
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Though the Periphery continued to expand, it suffered from being denigrated and stigmatised by 
the Coalition government.1266  As a whole, the period of Coalition government represented the 
Periphery’s first adverse consequence to its expansion. 
Over these five periods of government, there has been a gradual erosion of the autonomy, 
dynamism and regulatory mandate of the OHS Network. 
 
2.0 The surround of the Labour governments (1974 – 1979)                                                                                   
The building blocks of the OHS Network were laid down between 1974 – 1979.  The OHS 
Network was given the space and resources to develop into effective governing institutions, 
distinct and unique from the Labour government.   Despite the controversies of the period, a 
nurturing Labour government facilitated the growth and expansion of the OHS Network.  The 
documentary evidence exudes complete confidence in its regulatory activities.  Such low levels 
of scrutiny were particularly important because it meant that the Centre’s ambitions were not 
tempered by having to justify its operations through rigid and external categories.1267    
If the DE was unwilling to scrutinise the activities of the HSC/E, it still had the opportunity to 
‘hand the HSC/E over’ to Parliamentary scrutiny.1268  However, the Conservative ‘quango 
hunter’ Holland believed that the DE actively sought to screen the HSC/E from the scrutiny of 
Parliament.1269  His growing concern over the unaccountability of the HSC/E was met by a wall 
of silence erected by the DE.   He complained that, ‘Power has been bestowed on executive 
agencies of government about which the only permitted parliamentary questions are “Who are 
the appointed at what rate of pay?” and “What reports have been submitted to the minister, if 
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any?”’  He demanded that the DE ‘open up the activities’ of the HSC ‘to the possibility of 
challenge at Question time in the House of Commons’.1270   
The DE resisted such calls by offering vague reassurances.  Also, scrutiny could have come 
about through the regulatory process; the statutory instruments produced by the HSC were 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for Employment.   However, the Secretary of 
State for Employment did not exercise his legal right to reject a regulation passed by the HSC, 
and no regulation was seriously challenged by Parliament.1271  In fact, the Secretary of State for 
Employment signed off the HSC/E’s comprehensive five-year plan, which consisted of seven 
separate programmes that went beyond the factory walls; as far ranging as regulating hazards on 
the roads, ports, harbours, railways, air pollution, offshore installations and even diving 
regulations.1272   Such expansionism could have prompted an overt Government reaction, yet 
there was a high level of tolerance for this ambitious project not shown in later periods. 
The Wilson and the Callaghan administrations had ample opportunity to halt the expansion of 
the Network, particularly in the period of the Wilson administration in which the DE was a full – 
time ‘shadow executive’ of the HSC/E.   Before the ‘keys’ of the HSC/E were handed over to the 
Chairpersons, the Department of Employment was in direct control of the HSC/E; since the 
Department was the ‘sponsor’ of the Act, it was charged with administering a wide-ranging 
programme of work aimed at ensuring that the basic provisions of HASWA would operate 
correctly.1273  This privileged position of absolute authority presented a window of opportunity 
for the DE to roll back the independence allotted to the HSC/E, which in turn would have 
severely impaired the wider Network.  However, after the transition work was complete, the 
handover to the Chairpersons went as planned.  The only precaution taken by the Department 
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was to leave behind a timetable of statutory instruments and administrative arrangements for the 
HSC/E.1274  
In addition to the lack of impairments, the ‘surround’ of the Labour government provided the 
OHS Network with two material benefits.  First, the DE increased the budget.1275  Moreover, the 
government allowed regulations to pass in the full knowledge that huge costs would be incurred 
by third parties.  For instance, the government did not block the SRSC Regulations even though 
costs were estimated to be £80m per year and employers, mainly from the public sector, had to 
provide safety representatives with paid time off both for training and for the performance of 
their functions.1276  It should be noted that the government did not have to increase the HSC/E’s 
funding; underfunding the HSC/E was politically tenable, considering the turbulence of the 
period and the fact that OHS was much lower down on the list of ‘politically sensitive’ areas 
under the purview of the DE.1277   Yet, despite this, the government did not reduce the HSC/E’s 
funding. 
Under the Labour Government, the Network, as a whole, grew exponentially.  At the end of the 
1970s, the Core reached its peak, staffed by 4,700 employees.  Correspondingly, the Periphery 
had also grown, the IISO estimated that over 10,000 people had the word ‘safety’ in their job 
title.1278  This figure excludes thousands more that worked under different job titles or employees 
that incorporated safety within their core responsibilities.  
Second, the Labour government’s support of trade unionism strengthened the voluntarist 
framework which underpinned the OHS Network.1279   Nichols implores us to see that the 
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success of HASAWA in the 1970s has to be understood in the context of the strength of trade 
unionism, while the deterioration of OHS in the first half of the 1980s should be viewed in the 
context of the new industrial relations climate that saw trade union membership decline.1280   The 
government ‘s support of trade unionism stemmed from the ‘social contract’.  Discussion on the 
‘social contract’ is often restricted to an agreement between Labour and the unions; the former 
agreeing to a raft of political concessions and the latter agreeing to persuade its members to 
cooperate in a programme of wage restraint.  However, the social contract meant much more to 
Michael Foot, the then Secretary of State for Employment, and his sympathetic ministerial 
team.1281  Since Foot was the ‘most important link’ in the government’s social contract with 
unions, it is worth noting how he envisioned the contract, the Secretary of State stated in 1974, 
‘The Social Contract is no mere paper agreement approved by politicians and trade unions.  It is 
not concerned solely or even primarily with wages.  It covers the whole range of national 
policies (emphasis added)’.1282  Foot’s mission was to facilitate the way for unions to look 
beyond their membership base, they had a duty to ‘members of other unions, to pensioners, to 
the lower - paid, to invalids, to the community as a whole’.1283  We should see the unyielding 
support of the HSC/E through this lens, ‘The HSWA and HSC, therefore, were fundamentally 
linked with this movement to extend workers’ rights, and the prevailing belief in corporatism as 
a means of reaching a political settlement’.1284  The union element in the OHS Network played a 
significant role in the founding years of the HSC/E.1285  Materially represented in the 
government’s consent of the SRSC Regulations 1977.1286   
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2.1 Steering the HSC/E                                                                                                                        
The Labour government sought to moderately ‘steer’ the HSC/E rather than ‘row’.  The 
government stepped back and discouraged ministers from exercising overt control of OHS policy 
and practice.1287  Instead, the government opted to steer the HSC/E.  The Labour government’s 
mode of steering was best described as ‘boundary steering’; the government steered the HSC/E 
to investigate a particular area, prevented the HSC/E from entering into a certain area and 
instructed the HSC/E to document their activities.   By specifying the boundaries of the HSC/E, 
the state established norms of what could and could not be regulated.1288  A former Director 
General of the HSE felt the constant pressure to stay within the ‘long borderlines and overlaps 
with areas which were largely excluded from the scope of the new arrangements, notably 
environmental concerns, fire safety, food safety, transport safety and the health service itself’.1289  
Border monitoring meant that the state had to continuously prod the HSC/E to stay within their 
mandated borders.1290   
In comparison to subsequent governments, the Labour government’s steering of the HSC/E was 
minimal.  Archival materials and interviews of HSC/E officials conducted by Hawkins, Almond 
and Sirrs, are devoid of any examples of excessive control until the 1980s.  We can speculate on 
several reasons for the government’s minimal steering.   First, aversion to overt steering can be 
connected to the theme of ‘government by consent’ that was present in the first years of Labour’s 
tenure in the DE.  Foot and his ministerial team desired a move away from the authoritarian and 
bureaucratic government of industrial matters towards a status quo ante.1291  For Foot, 
‘government by consent’ was ‘the most sacred cause of all’.1292   As a young man, Ray Collins, a 
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former trade unionist and General Secretary of the Labour Party, witnessed Foot implement 
HASAWA with this idea in mind.1293   
Second, the lack of steering may have been connected to the newness of the OHS framework.   
The DE officials were bereft of any experience of steering institutions like the HSC/E.  How do 
you regulate regulators?  Moreover, it was still fresh in their minds of the pitfalls of rowing; the 
DE had expended significant resources distancing themselves from rowing.  Such concerns may 
have brought about a reluctance to exercise too much control over the HSC/E.   
 
2.2 Learning to walk                                                                                                                     
The OHS Network was given a crucial ‘head - start’ by being established under the surround of a 
supportive Labour government which was willing to develop governing institutions.  This placed 
the Centre in a unique position; the Centre was given a relatively large budget to fulfil its 
mandate, with little to no interference.  To be an effective force, the Centre needed the ‘training 
wheels’ given to it by the Labour government.  Arguably, if the Centre was established under a 
less tolerant Thatcher government, this scenario would have been debilitating for the burgeoning 
Network.  Budget cuts, increased scrutiny and no real support to regulate are not conducive for 
growth and development.   
 
3.0 The surround of the Thatcher governments (1979 – 1990)                                                             
In 1979, Margaret Thatcher entered 10 Downing Street, commencing 18 years of continuous 
Conservative rule.   The ‘honeymoon period’ was over.   The ‘anti-public sector - pro-private 
sector conservatism’ of the Thatcher government reshaped the surround of the HSC/E.   The 
social contract was nullified, budgets were tightened and decision – making processes were 
‘interrupted’.1294  Therein creating a surround that put the HSC/E in the crosshairs of the central 
government.   The surround of the Thatcher government incorporated three broad themes; 
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neoliberalism, anti-union sentiment and New Public Management.  First, under the influence of 
Keith Joseph, an active and committed publicist and polemicist with connections to the 
neoliberal Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Margaret Thatcher accepted that the post-war 
consensus had to be abandoned.  Although the Heath government had implemented a neoliberal 
programme in the first two years of government, and the Labour government used monetarism as 
a crisis management technique, it was the Thatcher government that attempted to give 
neoliberalism a fuller expression.1295  David Harvey commented that Thatcher ‘plucked from the 
shadows of relative obscurity a particular doctrine that went under the name of ‘neoliberalism’ 
and transformed it into the central guiding principle of economic thought and management’.1296  
The Prime Minister staffed her cabinet with loyal secretaries and advisers who shared her point 
of view and applied considerable pressure to officials who did not.1297    
The impact of which expressed itself in the shrinkage of the HSC/E’s budget.  As part of wider 
cuts to the public sector, the government set out to reduce the HSC/E’s staff-related budget by 
6% in 1979. 1298  Just two years later, there was another demand for an 8% cut.1299  Depicting the 
regular reduction of the HSC/E’s staff levels and expenditure in graphs, Sirrs concluded that, 
‘The HSC/E’s income effectively flat-lined.   Adjusting for inflation, the effect of financial cuts 
is clearly discernible. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of HSE inspectors fell by over 12 per 
cent’.1300  An IOSH report also observed that between 1975 to 1990 the proportion of HSE 
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expenditure which came directly from the government fell from 98% to 76%.1301   John 
Rimington who became the Director-General of the HSE in the early 1980s recalled the arbitrary 
nature of the cuts:  
[T]he way it was done was nonsense, really, as it always is when you get these peremptory orders…. What 
happened was that HSE had to lose 25 per cent of its staff, whether it needed them or not… All inspectors’ 
recruitment had to be immediately suspended, and remain suspended for five years. What that does to an 
organisation is nobody’s business What do you do? You’ve got no choice.1302 
It is important to note that Thatcher governments reduced the budget covertly.  OHS had too 
much support from the public and industry to launch a direct attack on OHS.1303  Thus, the 
Thatcher government used ‘backdoor’ methods to steer the HSC/E.1304   The reduction of the 
HSC/E’s budget was often covered up.  During the HSC/E’s first cuts, the Secretary of State 
stated that the opposite was happening ‘more resources are available, and more visits are being 
made’.1305  Furthermore, the government maintained that,  
In real terms, at 1987–88 prices the last Labour Government spent £98.5 million on the Health and Safety 
Executive.   This year, the amount has been increased to £102 million in real terms. Next year, it is to go up 
to £104.5 million in real terms. Therefore, how does he justify his claim that we have cut provision?1306 
Also, it was stated to the House, ‘There has been a great deal of talk in the debate that the 
Government have been responsible for financial cuts...  Let us get it on the record once and for 
all that there have been no cuts whatever of that nature’.1307 The government failed to mention 
that the HSC/E’s remit had been extended significantly since the 1970s, thus, even though there 
was an equivalence in real term spending, the resources had to be stretched significantly further.  
Moreover, there was a belief amongst ministers that despite the cuts, the HSC/E ‘got off easy’ 
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compared to other bodies.  The ‘mercy’ shown to the HSC/E should be lauded rather than 
scrutinised.1308   
Second, the Thatcher government was regarded as the ‘most determinedly anti-union since the 
Second World War’.1309  The anti-unionism of the Thatcher government stemmed from its 
commitment to creating a functioning and unhindered economy.1310  Consequently, the 
government undertook an incremental legislative programme that sought to constrain the 
influence of trade unions on the functioning of the free market.1311  Such a programme shattered 
the post-war consensus and established a new agenda which supported the rights of the 
individual over the interests of the collective.1312  
The anti-union surround impacted OHS.  Within the first year of government, the Safety 
Representative and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 was undermined when it was most 
needed.1313  The Thatcher government annulled the entitlement to appoint safety representatives 
by redefining ‘a recognised trade union’ in the Employment Act 1980.1314  Thus, safety 
representatives could only exist where the employer chose to recognise a trade union.  Moreover, 
the wider effect of the government’s hostility played a significant role in constraining trade 
union influence, thereby tilting the tripartite structure towards the CBI.1315 
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Third, the Thatcher government is often regarded as the driving force behind New Public 
Management (NPM).1316  NPM was as a reaction to the perceived inadequacies and failings of 
the ‘bloated’ public services.1317   Appropriated from the private sector, NPM was the key 
organising principle for government to employ private sector models of financial control, 
performance monitoring and fiscal discipline.1318  Though there was some engagement with 
management techniques in the 1960s and 1970s, it did not go beyond the conduct of personnel 
and matters of pay.1319  A ‘full-blown form’ came under the Thatcher government to the extent 
that it became the dominant ideology of governing public services in the UK.   Its impact on 
OHS was experienced through the central question posed by government officials, how we can 
‘manage’ the HSC/E to make workplaces safer in the least costly manner?1320  The way in which 
the HSC/E was targeted and steered by the Thatcher government was largely informed by this 
surround. 
 
3.1 Targeting the HSC/E                                                                                                                                    
The targeting of the HSC/E was not an automatic process; rather it took some months for the 
government to acknowledge that the HSC/E were institutions of interest.   This spoke to the 
newness of the HSC/E; such institutions were incomparable to anything that had come before.   
From decades of observation and study, it is relatively simple to define the HSC/E.  However, 
for incoming Conservative ministers that encountered Labour’s projects, there was a need to 
categorise and catalogue such novelties.  Hence, the commissioning of the Pliatzky Review.1321    
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The Prime Minister enlisted the help of Sir Leo Plitazky to look at the whole range of non - 
Departmental bodies to eliminate any which had outlived their usefulness or which could not be 
justified in the context of the Government's objectives of reducing public expenditure and the 
size of the public sector.1322   Pliatzky’s role was not to secure reductions in Government 
expenditure but to gain a picture of the quango landscape.1323  The Department of Employment 
had to ‘hand over’ a list of bodies, which it was responsible for.  The HSC/E’s large budget 
made it a viable target.  What they found, alarmed them.  They encountered vast institutions, 
which exerted considerable influence on several departments and noted that it was a beneficiary 
of a large annual budget that grew exponentially every year.  Moreover, it was believed that the 
HSC/E had resulted in 'considerable extra costs for industry’.1324   
There was another matter that Pliatzky’s investigation brought to the fore; what was the nature of 
the HSC/E?  When the Government scrutinised its quangos, a variety of terms were used.  Bruce 
Fraser unpublished government report of 1945 used the term 'non-departmental 
organisations’1325.  The Treasury used ‘non-departmental organisation’ in 1968 in its Guide to 
Setting up Public Bodies1326, in a survey of such institutions undertaken in 1975 for the Civil 
Service Department, Gordon Bowen used the term ‘fringe bodies.’1327  In the late 1970s, Holland 
popularised the term ‘quangos’.1328  Very early, Pliatzky encountered definitional problems, he 
dismissed Holland’s term ‘quango’ on the basis that the connectedness of the HSC/E rendered it 
non – departmental and not non - governmental, he saw HSC/E’s expansion as the ‘concealed 
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growth of Government’, which occurred outside of the DE.1329  Therefore, Pliatzky referred to 
the HSC/E as a Non – Departmental Public Body (NDPB); ‘A body which has a role in the 
processes of national government, but is not a government department, or part of one, and which 
accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm's length from Ministers’.1330  Once the 
HSC/E was defined, Pliatzky, the Prime Minister, Sir Ian Bancroft, Sir Derek Rayner, David 
Wolfson and Mike Pattison all agreed that the HSC/E was one of the NDPBs, which ‘needed 
attention’.1331    
Related to the problem of definition was also the government’s lack of knowledge of the 
HSC/E’s operations.  Central Government knew very little about the HSC/E’s activities.  Such 
unfamiliarity served as a protective layer for the HSC/E.  Pliatzky was given just three weeks to 
investigate dozens of NDBPs; this was not a sufficient period to investigate the HSC/E.1332  
Also, it took weeks of probing and complaints from the Public Records Committee (PRC) to 
survey the records of activities kept by the HSC/E; the PRC was continuously met with 
frustration, to the extent that the PRC only managed to come away with a generic survey.1333  
Likewise, Pliatzky had little recourse to use the HSC/E’s annual reports, which were generic and 
presented the latter in the way it wanted to be presented.   To this, a Permanent Secretary 
remarked, ‘Sir Leo's conclusions in the case of the HSE were not as clear-cut as the advice which 
you received about the MSC’.1334  Unlike the MSC and other NDPBs, the HSC/E’s budget was 
spent solely on their operating costs.  Whereas other NDPBs funnelled their budget to other 
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organisations, creating a more distinct paper trail, which made it easier for external parties to 
investigate.  The HSC/E’s self – contained expenditure was far opaquer and difficult to 
scrutinise.1335  
Though Pliatzky was not able to get a full picture of the HSC/E’s activities, it was enough of a 
picture to alert officials that there was a problem.  A problem so significant that Pliatzky sent a 
confidential memo direct to the Prime Minister.  The memo stressed that the HSC/E was 
continuously growing; evidence of staff increases, bureaucratic excesses and burdens on 
businesses were underlined throughout his memo.1336   Disturbed by his memo, the Prime 
Minister demanded action on the HSC/E.1337  Action would come in the form of seeking to 
change the decision – making processes of the HSC/E.   
 
3.2 Steering the HSC/E                                                                                                            
Once targeted, the HSC/E was subject to steering that it had not experienced previously.1338  
Steering the HSC/E considerably evolved under the Thatcher government.  Perhaps being able to 
observe the development of sprawling networks on the opposition benches and the adoption of 
an administrative philosophy, NPM, the Thatcher government’s approach to steering was much 
more intensive than their predecessors. 1339  Steering significantly went beyond the minimal 
steering of the Labour government.1340   An example of this was that steering through setting 
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boundaries was intensified by the Thatcher government.  The minimalist steering of the Labour 
government did not go beyond setting the boundaries of operation.  The Thatcher government’s 
approach was much more intimate.  Hawkins’ interviews of HSC/E staff revealed that extent that 
the Thatcher government heavily scrutinised the HSE's plan of work:  
All of the policies and enforcement, the whole panoply of things which we do, looks at those periodically, 
and decides whether or not the balance is right…  whether there are particular omissions that they would 
like to see filled, or whether there are particular things which they think are being overdone...  I think the 
government does have rather rough and ready priorities.1341  
Specifically, the HSC sent a draft plan of their operations to concerned government departments.  
The department would return the plan with attached comments.1342   
 
3.2.1 The evolution of steering the HSC/E                                                                                                       
The Thatcher government’s steering of the HSC/E was typified by cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  
The first application of formal CBA in the UK was in the evaluation of road and transport 
projects in the UK in the 1950s.1343  It was largely used in an experimental sense.  Had the CBA 
shown excessive costs, the projects would still have proceeded.  However, under the Thatcher 
government, cost-benefit calculations took on a much more expanded and deterministic role in 
formal policymaking.1344   This meant that the Centre was obligated to weigh the potential 
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regulatory costs with potential benefits for all proposed regulations.1345  A series of interviews 
conducted by Keith Hawkins in the 1980s reveal the imposition of this requirement:  
The thing that causes attention now, which did not cause attention... perhaps when we started... is the fact 
that on the whole occupational health and safety legislation does have a cost, that its benefits are actually 
difficult to demonstrate, particularly if they are... prevention of ill - health in the long and distant future 
(emphasis added). 1346   
To unpack what lay behind this tool, we turn to Andrew Dunsire’s memorial address.  The 
teacher of esteemed scholar Christopher Hood and Principal in the Department of Transport was 
very interested in control; his most original work sought to understand how bureaucracies were 
kept under control.1347  After a decade of Thatcherism, he was very impressed with the manner 
that the Thatcher government exercised control over its many parts.1348  With the assistance of 
Rhodes and Hood, his address was centred on the ‘homeostasis’ approach of the Thatcher 
government.1349   The Thatcher government was intent on instilling homeostasis into the entities 
it had authority over.  Homeostasis, in its original biological context, denoted the maintenance or 
regulation of a stable condition.  In relation to the control of regulatory agencies, the government 
attempted to instil norms into the HSC/E to produce predictable and ‘stable’ outcomes.1350  Any 
excessive burdens on business or increase in spending would bring about instability.  Also, the 
instilling was designed to be covert; Dunsire brought the example of ’speed bumps’ on roads that 
produce speed restriction more cheaply, and perhaps more reliably, than the imposition of ‘speed 
cops’.1351  In this sense, the Thatcher government sought to embed ‘speed bumps’ into the daily 
operations of the HSC/E.   
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Similarly, Dunsire’s colleague, Rhodes wrote about ‘storytelling’.1352  The narrative was 
imposed upon regulatory agencies like the HSC/E that they should be mindful of their regulatory 
burden, their ‘role’ in industry should be ‘red tape reduction’ and not one that places ‘burdens on 
business’.1353  Kenneth Dyson explained that narratives compel regulators to stick to the script, 
scaring straight regulators that would otherwise produce excessive regulations.  Regulators that 
went against the narrative risked producing a fraught situation in which businesses would fold, 
markets or locations will collapse, and banks would slow down lending.1354  Also, another 
stream of narratives that came out of the Thatcher government revolved around the notion that 
the worst problems of industrial safety had been mitigated, thus, ‘further improvements needed 
to be justified in terms of a quantification of their costs and benefits’.1355  Such narratives 
remained consistent throughout the 1980s.  Dawson highlights that they were enshrined in two 
White Papers Lifting the Burden and Building Businesses...Not Barriers.1356  
 
3.3 The impact of the Thatcher Governments on the OHS Network                                                
By the end of the decade, the Thatcher government had fundamentally impacted the OHS 
Network.  The impact was reflected in a weakened Centre and a strengthened Periphery. 
 
3.3.1 The weakened Centre                                                                                                               
As governing institutions, the Centre of the OHS Network was weakened under the Thatcher 
government.  The surround of the Thatcher government had taken its toll on the Centre, its 
                                                     
1352 R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Theory and Practice of Governance; The Next Steps’ (Raw-Rhodes, October 2016) 
<www.raw-rhodes.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/TheoryPractice-Governancedocx.pdf> accessed 12 May 
2018; R.A.W. Rhodes and Anne Tiernan, ‘Executive Governance and its Puzzles’ in Andrew Massey and Karen 
Johnston (eds) The International Handbook of Public Administration and Governance (Edward Elger 2015) p91 
1353 Sandra Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988); 
R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Theory and Practice of Governance; The Next Steps’ (Raw-Rhodes, October 2016) <www.raw-
rhodes.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/TheoryPractice-Governancedocx.pdf> accessed 12 May 2018; R.A.W. 
Rhodes and Anne Tiernan, ‘Executive Governance and its Puzzles’ in Andrew Massey and Karen Johnston (eds) 
The International Handbook of Public Administration and Governance (Edward Elger 2015) 
1354 Kenneth Dyson, States, Debt, and Power: 'Saints' and 'Sinners' in European History and Integration (Oxford 
University Press 2014) p327 
1355 Sandra Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988) 
p203 
1356 Sandra Dawson and others, Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 1988) 
p22 - 23 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 246 
resources, ambition and reach had been curtailed.  The budget cuts curtailed the physical 
presence (inspection and advisory services) of the Centre.1357  In reaction to the cuts, the HSC 
warned the government that cuts would result in the reduction in their inspections and 
programmes and also lead to redundancies.1358  Such warnings were not always heeded.1359  
Accompanying the retraction of the physical presence of the HSE was the ambition that had been 
so crucial to the expansion of the Centre in the 1970s.  The surround had changed, affecting the 
confidence of HSC/E officials.   Hawkins wrote specifically about the HSE's vulnerability to the 
political climate that ‘became real in the early 1980s’1360.   His collection of interviews revealed 
a ‘change in stance’ caused by the ‘deregulation movement’.1361  Although this was not 
something officially articulated in writing, it was something to which the HSC/E were sensitive 
to; ‘The government of the day provides a feel as to what is appropriate... and this I'm sure, will 
filter down (emphasis added).1362     
The governing ambition of the Centre was moderated by the reality of reduced resources, 
accounting for the economic impact of its activities and the steering of its new masters.  This last 
point was particularly incapacitating.  No longer operating under the shadow of hierarchy, it 
operated under the shadows of hierarchy.  The Thatcher government exposed the HSC/E to the 
scrutiny of several influential central departments with little knowledge of what the HSC/E did; 
the National Audit Office (NAO) reviewed the HSC/E’s operation and administration, the Public 
Accounts Committee’s (PAC) questioned their financial management and the Employment 
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Committee enquired into their workings.1363   Moreover, the former Director- General of the 
HSE recollected that in the 1980s, seven Select Committees of Parliament were interested in the 
activities of the HSC/E:    
Now I was liable to be dragged before any of seven committees of Parliament, at a moment’s notice to 
explain anything they wanted to ask me, and I was, you know.  So your answerability becomes 
overwhelming, really overwhelming, that's one of my principal recollections, the amount of answerability. 
I mean one would sit, each, well at least once a month, until about ten at night, with a pile of questions, 
parliamentary questions in front of one.1364 
Furthermore, at the beginning of its existence, the HSC/E barely received 30 Parliamentary 
questions annually, however, by the late 1980s, there were nearly 800 per year.1365   We can 
posit that being answerable to so many factions affected the HSC/E’s autonomy and 
ambitiousness.  Both of which were further complicated by the fact that the Centre could not 
always argue its case with interested parties, it had to rely on the sponsoring department to 
defend its interests.  This posed several problems if the sponsoring department gave OHS a low 
financial priority.1366   
 
3.3.2 The strengthened Periphery                                                                                             
The Periphery was not subject to such pressures.  On the contrary, the Thatcher Government’s 
cuts to the Centre strengthened the Periphery.  The Periphery were inundated with opportunities 
to fill the vacuum left by the Centre.   Budget cuts meant that the Centre had to curtail its 
advisory role, training courses and charge for some of its services it previously carried out free 
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of charge.1367  Even the Centre’s advisory literature grew costly to many employers.1368  This 
allowed significant room for the Periphery to capitalise from the gap in the market.   
Also, the Centre’s regulatory output provided opportunities for the Periphery; the Notification of 
Installations Handling Hazardous Substances (NIHHS), Control of Industrial Major Accident 
Hazards (CIMAH), the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
(RIDDOR), the Electricity at Work Regulations and the Noise at Work Regulations were major 
pieces of regulation that required the expertise of the Periphery.1369 
More importantly, the strength of the Periphery was fuelled by the HSE staff joining the ranks of 
the Periphery.1370   The Periphery benefitted greatly from the expertise of former inspectors.  In 
fact, they actively targeted former inspectors for recruitment.1371  There is even some evidence 
that the government was aware of the Periphery filling the vacuum of the retreating Centre, and 
in a limited capacity, encouraged such activity.1372   
While the Centre’s staffing levels peaked at the end of the 1970s and fell each year after that, the 
1980s were years of tremendous growth for the Periphery.1373  The ‘boom’ period of the 
Periphery was also reflected in a series of mergers in the 1980s.  The most significant merger 
was between the IISO and the Institute of Municipal Safety Officers (IMSO) to form the Institute 
of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH); IOSH became the largest and most prestigious safety 
organisation in the country, with national and international membership. 
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The Periphery had shown significant ambition to play a greater role in OHS.  They saw 
themselves as the ‘young Turks of industrial safety, pioneering a new aggressive approach to a 
whole spectrum of industrial hazards, ranging from fire and flood, sabotage and theft to shop 
floor and office safety, product liability and industrial relations (emphasis added)’.1374  The IISO 
proclaimed decades earlier:  
The safety officer will be wanted more than ever, and his functions will be to supply specialised advice and 
knowledge…  The works manager will want advice, so also the mechanical engineer, the electrical 
engineer, the production engineer, the power engineer, the foundry manager, the foreman of each of the 
gangs, and so on.1375    
The publication of The Training of Safety officers and Management Introduction to Total Loss 
Control were among the first authoritative statements on the new direction of the safety 
profession.1376  Through the publication of these materials, safety bodies had in mind the 
production of the type of safety officer only too infrequently encountered in industry – ‘the fully 
competent, authoritative man’.1377  Safety bodies employed significant resources to bring about 
uniformity of practice and raise standards of professionalism.   
We cannot discount the fact that the private sector dominated the Periphery.1378  Unrestrained by 
a public mandate, the Periphery had the freedom to go as ‘close to the wire’ as was viable.1379  
The Former Director – General of the HSE also acknowledged that, ‘Large numbers of advisers 
and consultants… were, uncomfortably often, adept at maximising their financial advantage by 
exaggerating requirements.  It was the small industry sector that bore the brunt of this, and 
COSHH and the Electricity Regulations were the main cases in point (emphasis added)’.1380    
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Through such means, the Periphery pushed for OHS to cover more aspects of work, often with 
blurred results.1381   
 
3.4 The problematic nature of steering the OHS Network                                                        
The Thatcher government expended a significant amount of time and resources steering the 
HSC/E.  However, it appears that it had exhausted itself in doing so.  By the mid-1980s, there 
were no more grand deregulatory projects, the HSC/E’s budget had relatively stabilised, the 
OHS Network continued to expand and even the anti-unionism of the Thatcher government 
seemed to dim.1382   In this respect, David Gee noted, ‘If Mrs Thatcher's government is so keen 
on deregulation, how come we have had so many new and proposed health and safety laws since 
1980, for example, on lead, chemical control, testing and labelling, major hazards, asbestos and 
noise?’1383  Moreover, the HSC/E’s remit continued to expand and impose new responsibilities 
on businesses, supposedly burdening even more businesses.  Graham Wilson, author of one of 
the premier texts of politics in OHS in the 1980s, argued that Thatcher started as an ‘executive’ 
prime minister.1384  However, she soon departed from this approach.  She lacked the patience to 
follow through in an enduring manner.  She stepped away from routine cabinet decision-making 
and engaging with the permanent bureaucracy.1385   This exhaustion was not restricted to the 
Prime Minister; for many government departments, managing sprawling networks of public, 
private and voluntary actors was a demanding exercise that was difficult to sustain.1386   Besides, 
the core executive’s staffing numbers were far too low to control the activities of the HSC/E, by 
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the end of Thatcher government, HSC/E  were among the 5521 special purpose bodies, 
accounting for £37 – 46 billion of public spending.1387  There was simply too much traffic for the 
government to monitor, let alone control. 
The Thatcher government was the first to learn that steering agencies towards homeostasis was a 
frustrating and challenging affair.   This matter was crucial to Rhodes’ refutation of Saward’s 
Hollow Crown.  The former author noted that the core executive’s attempt to exercise control did 
not always produce the expected outcomes.1388  The erosion of the governing capacity of the 
OHS Network was a long and protracted affair.  The Centre had five layers of protection that 
enabled it to maintain some degree of autonomy for many years.  The paternal supervision of the 
sponsoring department, tripartite structure, business support, threats to public safety and 
specialised knowledge enabled the Network to remain quasi-autonomous for decades to 
come.1389    
An example of these protective layers in action was the Thatcher government’s arbitrary and 
controversial decision to move some operations of the HSC/E from London to Bootle.  In 
response to this decision, the protective layers of the HSC/E mobilised its resources.  What was 
intended to be a simple and swift transfer ended up as lengthy negotiations.  This speaks to the 
connectedness of OHS, each layer of opposition combined to compel the Thatcher Government 
to seek compromises.  The first layer was the Department of Employment, the first Secretary of 
State for Employment under the Thatcher Government was Jim Prior.  He saw no benefit in the 
mass dispersal of the HSE to Bootle and vehemently opposed the numbers proposed.  He sought 
to dilute the strength of the proposals by combating each of the proposals with detailed criticisms 
and more drastically, he continuously leaked the dispersal project to the media.1390  Prior was not 
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exceptional in this regard, Jenny Bacon, Former Director- General of the HSE, noted that until 
the DE was abolished in 1995, it expressed a ‘kind of paternity’ for the HSC/E.1391   
The second layer was the activism of organised labour and capital.  The HSC was aggrieved to 
see its younger sibling shipped off to Bootle.  Thus, it made a series of deputations to dissuade 
the government.1392  The CBI and the TUC managed to soften the Government’s proposals by 
arguing that they bore responsibility for the HSE and that they were intimately involved in the 
day-to-day work of the HSE and would find it difficult to keep this body – ‘a powerful quango’ - 
under control if it moved to Bootle.  Note that the term ‘powerful quango’ was underlined in the 
memorandum, stressing that the TUC and the CBI were the only organisations that could tame 
the beast. 
Additionally, the TUC and the CBI pre-empted the planned dispersal by commissioning a study 
on the dispersal project.  This study was designed to see how much staff could be dispersed 
without it having a detrimental effect on OHS.   Thus, if the Government contradicted the 
numbers that the study produced, without showing any care for its arguments ‘this will give the 
TUC an opportunity to make loud noises about irresponsible and inefficient Government 
decision making’.1393  Additionally, the Government feared that if they went ahead with a more 
radical proposal, it would bind the TUC and the CBI into the ‘same camp’.   Upsetting the TUC 
and CBI was genuinely ‘feared’, the Government was not interested in starting a ‘major row’.1394 
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The third layer was the concerns of public safety.  These concerns were triggered by the negative 
impact on the staffing levels of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), an arm of the HSE, 
that the transfer to Bottle would create.   A reduced inspectorate was fraught with dangers for 
public health and safety. The tragedies of Flixborough, Seveso and Bhopal, cast their shadows 
over the Thatcher premiership.   To this point, Roger Bibbings, RoSPA’s Senior Safety Adviser 
and Fellow of IOSH, stated:  
There had been gas explosions and nuclear accidents and all this sort of thing. And so he (John Rimington) 
came and sort of dangled this under Margaret Thatcher’s nose, saying we don’t want any of these things 
happening, therefore you need a strong body which has got all the hazard knowledge, which is the Health 
and Safety Executive, here to deal with these big hazard issues.1395 
The fourth layer was the support of business.  The government was mindful that the HSC/E 
enjoyed considerable support from business.1396   The dispersal of significant numbers of staff 
would not be acceptable to the supposed chief beneficiaries of deregulation.1397  Arguably, 
industry supported the Centre and its core regulations because of its onus on consensus and that 
it created a level playing field for competitors.1398   
The fifth layer was the expertise of the HSC/E.  As a former Director – General of the HSC/E 
explained, ‘Departmental officials could not deceive themselves that they knew how to handle 
these arcane affairs; and provided that HSE’s chiefs and policy divisions were able to roar in 
approved English, it was clear that the beast had better be left alone’.1399  Thus, any plans to 
dramatically alter the HSC/E relied on the HSC/E’s assessment.  Through this medium, the 
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HSC/E could moderate the government’s proposals.1400   As a result of these protective layers, 
the weakened Centre was able to remain functional, while being supported by a growing 
Periphery.  
 
4.0 The surround of the Major governments                                                                                      
In November 1990, the country awoke to a new and very different Prime Minister, John Major.  
However, there was nothing particularly new or different about the Major Government’s steering 
of the HSC/E.  The surround of Thatcher’s government lingered; neoliberalism and 
managerialism remained the mood music of the period.  Anti-unionism continued to be reflected 
in the promotion of individual employment relationships at the expense of the collective.1401  
Also, the Major government had much less to worry about than its predecessor; the trade union 
membership continued to fall to a level roughly equivalent to that of the 1950s.1402 
 
4.1 Targeting the HSC/E                                                                                                                                  
There was a quiet before the ‘political firestorms’, the disinterest of the final Thatcher 
government seemed to extend into the Major government.  There was little indication that the 
government would target the HSC/E.1403  On the contrary, the decline in resource allocation 
reversed in 1990, leading to a new peak of 4,545 staff in 1994.1404  Moreover, the HSC/E duties 
continued to expand.1405  Perhaps we can attribute this ‘armistice’ with the government being 
busied with the tragedies that shadowed the period, preoccupation with dealing with rebel MPs, 
                                                     
1400 Aaron B. Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of the Budgeting Process (Transaction Publishers 
2002)  
1401 Susan L. Kang, Human Rights and Labor Solidarity: Trade Unions in the Global Economy (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2012) 
1402 Matthias Beck and Charles Woolfson, ‘The Regulation of Health and Safety in Britain: From Old Labour to 
New Labour’ (2003) 31 IRJ 1 p35 
1403 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: The HSC, HSE and the 
Management of Occupational Risk' (PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 2016) 
1404 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, Safety Crimes (Willan Publishing 2007) p148 
1405 Christopher Sirrs, 'Health and Safety in the British Regulatory State, 1961-2001: the HSC, HSE and the 
Management of Occupational Risk' (Unpublished PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
2016) 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 255 
rectification of the Conservatives toxic image or simply the government ‘finding its feet’.  For 
whatever reason, the HSC/E was in relative safety until the second Major government. 
From the winter period of 1992, the HSC/E was on the radar of the government.  This appears to 
be due to the HSC/E closer links with Europe.1406  Europe was among the most divisive issues of 
the Major government.1407  It was a significant contributing factor to the downfall of Mrs 
Thatcher, enabling the contest of which Major was victorious; he was perceived as being the 
most euro-sceptic candidate.1408  At the time, the Director-General of the HSE witnessed that 
members of the Conservative Party who were ‘instinctively anti-European and minimalist’ 
steadily became more influential until ‘they seized the reins of power… under John Major’.1409    
He noted elsewhere, ‘The right wing of the Conservative party, which assumed increasing 
importance around 1990, was, to say the least, not in favour of European regulation, and that 
feeling came on top of an instinctive dislike of regulations of any kind’.1410  Thus, the perception 
that HSE was ‘in bed with Europe’ prompted the beginning of government probes.  To this point, 
Bacon viewed that this perception ‘politicised health and safety and antagonism to HSE’ because 
HSE was the vehicle for taking forward the Directives, ‘which Conservative ministers regarded 
as an absolute anathema’.1411   
Although the HSC/E had built up a relationship with the EU many years before the Major 
government, it was not met with a government ‘crackdown’ until the second Major government.  
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This was because the relationship between Europe and Britain on the issue of health and safety 
was a ‘micro consideration’ in the formative years.1412  Until the late 1980s, the introduction of 
EU OHS regulations into the UK was drawn-out and fragmented.1413  Also, the UK was 
seemingly at the helm of negotiations, the HSC/E exercised considerable influence on the EU to 
the extent that ‘several European directives during HSC/E’s inaugural period were closely based 
on established British legislation’.1414  A former Director-General added, ‘Now at the beginning, 
HSE ran the European show.  No doubt about that’.1415  However, this gradually changed with 
developments in the European Commission’s (EC) voting system which ‘side-lined British 
interests’, the passing of the Single European Act and a move towards Directives which 
stipulated general duties and minimum standards to harmonise OHS regulation across EU 
member states.1416   
All these developments culminated with the introduction of the ‘six-pack’ in 1992.  The Six-
Pack regulations were issued in response to a series of EU directives that covered a wide range 
of issues about the regulation of OHS.  Unfortunately for the HSE, the six-pack indelibly linked 
the HSC/E with the EU.  Rimington recollected the change of atmosphere when government 
officials became aware that the HSC/E issued the Six-Pack regulations:  
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When this glittering six-pack tumbled on to my desk, I knew the game was up; and it was not long before I 
was up before the Prime Minister, personally accused…. of “throwing” negotiations in Europe in order to 
smuggle in impossibly high standards of health and safety.1417   
The fact that the HSE’s six-pack guidance was printed on a blue booklet emblazoned with the 
EU constellation did not help matters.1418  OHS now fell into the matrix of the Conservative 
Party’s dislike of 'European' interference in 'British law’, the idea of the ‘nanny state’, the 
traditional Tory dislike of ‘burdens on business’ and susceptibility to the views of small 
companies.1419  The HSC/E were now marked institutions. 
 
4.2 Steering the HSC/E                                                                                                                   
The steering of the Major government was typified by ‘political firestorms’.  ‘Political 
firestorms’ were continuous government probes of the HSC/E’s activities that were supposedly 
placing burdens on businesses and the government’s purse.  These ‘firestorms’ were far more 
explicit and confrontational than the Thatcher government’s backdoor steering.  The emphasis of 
the Major government’s steering campaign was ‘search and destroy’.1420  It was envisioned that 
there would be a 40% reduction in ‘outmoded’ OHS regulation.1421  A Former Director- General 
of the HSE, remarked, ‘It was a rather different world from the one that I was dealing with in the 
1970s and a lot of it was about, how do we persuade ministers not to throw out the baby with the 
bathwater’.1422   
The firestorms were critical attempts to curtail the HSC/E’s autonomy, ‘cut out the fat’ and 
inculcate good practice.  The specificity of the probes went further than the Thatcher’s 
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government generalist deregulatory programme.  Under the premiership of John Major, the 
HSC/E went through seven unremitting reviews which could have ‘wiped it, or part of it at least, 
off the map’.1423  The Fundamental Expenditure Reviews (FERs) also formally known as the 
Fundamental Reviews of Running Costs were introduced by the Treasury in 1993 to continue 
previous attempts to grapple with underlying drivers of public spending and to identify upward 
pressures on departmental running costs.1424  More specifically, these reviews were a means for 
the HSC/E and its sponsoring department to reconsider their resource allocations.  The model for 
the review was the scrutiny model developed by Margaret Thatcher's Efficiency Unit under 
Derek Rayner.1425    
Interestingly, the appointment of the individuals charged with the FERs signalled a move away 
from the appointment of what N. Deakin and R. Parry refer to as ‘Treasury toffs’ towards 
individuals with ‘real world’ expertise and ‘modern personalities’.1426  For the ‘toffs’ that 
remained, they were subject to attempts to change their institutionalised behaviour through the 
encouragement to gain two years private-business experience and to engage with consultants on 
‘change management’ and senior management structure.1427   Also, the new appointees 
‘reinforced the pattern’ that knowledge of public spending was not necessary.1428  With this 
context in mind, it was not surprising to see that three of the seven FERs included in their terms 
of reference questioned the continued existence of the HSC/E.1429  Rimington reflects on the 
outlandish demands of the FER:                                                                                      
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The FER addressed only fundamental questions, the most fundamental being, ‘Why can’t the market do 
your job?’   For example, could the insurance market replace HSE?    Other questions were ‘Does HSE 
give value for money?’, ‘How are HSE’s expenditures calibrated to risks?’, ‘If you were forced to 
downsize HSE by 50%, how would you do it?’1430 
Moreover, seven HSC Sectoral Tasks Groups (STGs) had to be appointed.  Though the STGs 
reported to recognisable faces on the HSC Steering Group, every STG was chaired by a 'business 
person with broad management experience’ and a representative from a small firm.1431  
Moreover, the HSC Steering Group had to keep in regular contact with the Department of Trade 
and Industry’s (DTI) Deregulation Task Forces.1432   This was not a picture of autonomy that the 
HSC/E wanted to show the world.  Such a public display of subordination brought very vocal 
condemnation.1433   Though the government did not achieve its target, it ‘received the comforting 
sound of more deregulatory proposals landing on ministerial desks’.1434 
This was a new experience for the HSC/E; it was caught in what Peter Bain called the ‘twin 
tracks’ of deregulation.  The first of which was a specific focus on the activities of the HSC/E; 
the FERs focused on HSC/E’s output.  Information gathering brought the government closer to 
the HSC/E, the like of which Pliatzky was not able to achieve.   The other ‘track’ was of the 
generic programme of deregulatory reform that impacted the HSC/E.  Regarding this variety, the 
Major government was unrelenting.  It sought to weave into the fabric of institutions that non-
regulation is the norm, as Major himself articulated, ‘There should always be a presumption 
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against regulation unless it is strictly necessary’.1435  To achieve this, the Deregulation Unit of 
the DTI was repositioned to the 'strategic centrality’ of the Cabinet Office and the Deregulation 
and Contracting Out Act 1994 set out extensive delegated powers for ministerial repeal of 
regulations.  Such repeals required minimal parliamentary scrutiny.1436   The effect on the HSC/E 
was that they were subjected to the continuation of rigid and arbitrary CBA practices, erection of 
procedural barriers to regulatory activities, delays in the passing of regulations, prescribed 
periods of non-enforcement and the hiring of third parties to scrutinise its regulations.1437   
Never had a government penetrated so deep into the HSC/E’s legitimacy.  It was the ‘hottest’ 
period ever experienced; there were ‘bonfires of regulations’ all around them.1438   No longer 
confined to discreet probes, these were open ‘fire pits’ for all to see.  
 
4.3 The ever – decreasing Centre                                                                                              
Despite the firestorms, the Centre survived.  Albeit, in a considerably weakened form.  Its 
protective layers were not as strong as they were under the Thatcher government.  Thus, 
allowing the Major government to penetrate the Centre and further weaken it.  The tripartite 
activism did not amount to much of a defence, Almond and Mike Esbester noted that, ‘The 
benefits of tripartism became less relevant as the industrial relations context changed’.1439   
Similarly, ‘A senior source at the HSC noted that Trades Unions' participation in government 
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had been fashionable in 1972, but no longer was in 1992’.1440   Organised labour had lost much 
of its influence; the pendulum had swung in favour of business interests.  The research of Alan 
Dalton, a lifelong OHS campaigner and a TUC-nominated member of the HSC’s Advisory 
Committee on Dangerous Substances (ACDS) provides valuable information about the 
weakening of the tripartite structure.1441   Dalton was the first researcher to request information 
under the HSE’s freedom of information policy: he surveyed the composition, agendas and 
minutes of the HSC and its 21 advisory committees to shed light on the reality of tripartism.  
First, he concluded that the influence of the CBI far outweighed their labour counterparts.  He 
found that on issues as far ranging as stress, asthma, asbestos, homecare workers, rail safety, fire 
and working time, employers and CBI were able to move the conversation towards voluntarist 
solutions.1442  Dalton recollected, ‘I found the meetings very employer-dominated, supported by 
the HSE’.1443  Correspondingly, Dave Mathews of the National Health and Safety Officer for the 
Fire Brigades Union and a member of ACDS, stated, ‘The HSC/HSE officials lean towards the 
CBI’.1444  Despite Dalton’s expertise on dangerous substance, he could not penetrate the 
influence of employers and their organisations.  Second, trade unions often capitulated to the 
demands of employers and the government.  More worryingly, the labour representatives’ low 
attendance in HSC’s meetings signified a lack of interest.1445   
Correspondingly, the fear of negatively affecting HSC/E’s protection of the public appeared to 
be less of a factor with the Major government than it was with the Thatcher government.   
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Despite the shadow of tragedy, the Major government sought to annul much of the HSC/E’s 
operations; a senior source at the HSC observed that the various rail crashes ‘was the great 
disaster of HSE that was the point at which ministers lost confidence in HSC’.1446  Due to the 
Centre being ‘progressively eroded’, it lacked the capacity ‘to study and control’ major hazards.  
Significantly diminishing the Centre’s legitimacy as a protector of the public.1447 
Despite the loss of the above two protective layers, three remained.  The relationship formed 
from the paternal protection of the sponsoring department was enough to protect the HSE from 
the FERs.1448  In spite of the rhetoric, every so often, a minister ‘patted the health and safety 
dragon occasionally and recognised that it did do some good’.1449  However, it was to be the 
DE’s final deed, as a consequence of the firestorms, it was abolished in 1995, stripping the 
HSC/E of an ally that could have protected it from future governments.1450  The second layer of 
widespread support from industry protected the HSC/E.   The former HSE Director - General, 
believed that this was ‘a decisive factor in the siege years between 1992 and 1995’.1451   Bacon 
confirmed the sentiment, she saw that ‘all those big industry bodies stood up for HSE… and say, 
look actually, this has made a change, and it’s been a change for the good and you still ought to 
regard it as a plus point, and there still is a need to protect people at work’.1452  The third 
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‘priceless major asset which no-one else could match or replace’ was the Centre’s technical 
capability, and its well organised and consensual understanding of industrial hazards.1453    
Rimington observed that government officials could not deceive themselves that they knew how 
to handle these ‘arcane affairs…  it was clear that the beast had better be left alone’.1454 
These protective layers allowed the Centre to survive but not thrive, Rimington joined the ranks 
of former Director-Generals that feared for the future of the HSC/E upon their departure.  
Leaving his post in the mid-1990s, he acknowledged, ‘The political position of HSE is weak…  
The way Whitehall operates that could point to increased marginalisation and a slow death’.1455  
Similarly, Peter Bain paints a pyrrhic victory for the HSC/E:  
The job of chairing the HSC was made part-time by the government.  The agency’s 4,545- strong staff was 
reduced by 203 (102 inspectors) in 1994–95 and budget cuts of 2.6% were imposed that year, with a further 
5% reduction in 1995–96; by the year 2000, staff numbers would be at least 20% down on the 1993 figure.   
By March 1995, 85 of the most senior inspectors and advisers had left and the HSE, it was argued, faced 
‘the worst cash and morale crisis in its 20-year history”.  The agency struggled to train new staff meet 
inspection targets and to undertake necessary new work.1456 
 
4.4 The ever – growing Periphery                                                                                           
Mirroring the Thatcher government, the Major government paid scant attention to the expanding 
Periphery.  Most of the energies were spent restraining the Centre.  This allowed the Periphery to 
continue to grow unimpeded, filling the vacuum left by the restrained Centre.   Although the 
politicisation of OHS was growing, it was confined to the Centre.   
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The stream of experienced individuals leaving the Centre continued to reinforce the Periphery.  
Also, new entrants interested in working in OHS tended to fill the ranks of the Periphery, to 
many it seemed like a better option, Bacon explains why, ‘We couldn’t spend the money because 
we couldn’t get people with the right expertise because we couldn’t pay the salaries to match 
what was being paid in the industry, because overall pay was still controlled from the 
Treasury’.1457  
The six-pack regulations were a source of growth for the Periphery.  While the Centre was 
targeted by government for their involvement with the six pack, the Periphery revelled in the 
opportunities it brought.1458  The six-pack represented a ‘sea‐change’ in the approach to the 
management of OHS in the UK.1459  This change ‘amplified’ the need for employers to adopt a 
more proactive approach to managing safety based on the principles of risk assessment.1460  As a 
direct consequence of this, Richard Jones, the Head of Policy and Public Affairs at IOSH stated, 
‘In the 90s when the ‘6-pack’ came in, demand for IOSH membership increased significantly 
(numbers increased almost fivefold)’.1461  Anxious employers need not turn to the under-
resourced Centre.  Instead they turned to the Periphery, particularly regarding the legal 
requirement to conduct written safety assessments.1462  A former HSE Director-General observed 
that:  
So suddenly the number of members of IOSH burgeoned.   There were 4,000 in 1983 and there are now 
30,000 and what do they do, how do they get their money? They get their money by writing written safety 
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assessments.   The idea of an assessment was that the chap who created the risks should walk around and 
assess his risks, not employ someone else to provide him with a report which he just signs (emphasis 
added).1463  
Opportunities also expanded health and safety training to educate non-safety professionals to a 
basic level of understanding in OHS.1464  There were courses designed for every level of 
business and ironically also for NDPBs.1465  From 1993, IOSH alone, trained more than 60,000 
personnel every year.1466  The Periphery went from strength to strength while its central 
counterpart grew more constrained. 
 
4.5 A step further                                                                                                                            
Though the cuts, procedural barriers and the surround of enmity were particularly debilitating, 
they were expected features of Conservative governments.  However, it was the brazenness of 
the firestorms that had the most significant impact.  What came out of the interaction with the 
Major government was that OHS was not sacred and untouchable, rather it was vulnerable to be 
‘caught up in the deregulation red tape stuff’.1467   The Major government asked questions which 
were hitherto never vocalised in such a brazen manner.  Questions around the existence of the 
HSC/E and whether all ‘parts’ were necessary.  This allowed later politicians to question what 
if?   
 
5.0 The surround of the New Labour governments                                                                                                   
In May 1997, the country awoke to a landslide victory; New Labour captured 44% of the vote.   
Depicted as the third great progressive electoral landslide of the twentieth century, much was 
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expected of the new government.1468  There was cause for hope.1469   The HSC observed ‘a 
change in the political climate since the general election of 1997’ in which it experienced a 
significant encouragement to exercise more of a presence in industry.1470  Tombs and Whyte 
observed an initial rise in prosecutions in the period after the election.1471  Moreover, the 
government provided an extra £4.5 million for the financial year 1998/1999.1472  Also, the 
government suspended Section 5 and Schedule 1 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out 1994 
which required inspectors to write to companies two weeks in advance, before invoking 
improvement notices.1473   For a short time, it was believed that the attitude towards deregulation 
had changed and that the political environment was more favourable for OHS regulation.1474   
However, such notions would fade within a year; it appeared that it was ‘business as usual’, 
Stuart Hall contended that:  
Eighteen years of Thatcherite rule had radically altered the social, economic, and political terrain in British 
society… Thatcherism had evolved, not just an effective occupancy of power, but a broad hegemonic basis 
for its authority.  This ‘revolution’ had deep philosophical foundations as well as an effective popular 
strategy.  It was grounded in a radical remodelling of state and economy and the ‘colonizing’ of civil 
society by a new neo-liberal common sense.   Its effects were ‘epochal…  This was not likely to be 
reversed by a mere rotation of the electoral wheel of fortune.1475  
The arrival of New Labour ‘is perhaps the key period in which the Thatcherite claim to there 
being ‘no alternative’… was consolidated’.1476   New Labour mirrored the surround of the 
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Thatcher and Major governments, albeit with a ‘human face’.1477  When Labour entered office, it 
inherited a series of practices embedded within the British state.1478   
Apart from the initial enthusiasm documented in Hawkins’ interviews, the HSC/E staff did not 
express any discernible concern or apprehension about the Blair government’s deregulatory 
programme.  This may have been because eighteen years of Conservative government had 
pushed senior and more experienced staff to retire or migrate to the Periphery, thus, leaving a 
younger less experienced Centre.1479  The heyday of the 1970s was not experienced by the vast 
majority of staff.   Budget cuts, redundancies, recruitment freezes and doing more with less had 
long been the norm at these institutions.   Low morale in certain sectors was the result.1480  
Moreover, Almond’s interviews of HSC/E staff revealed that a good deal felt that there was little 
difference between the Labour and Conservative governments, in fact, some preferred the latter. 
5.1 Targeting the HSC/E                                                                                                                           
The Labour government did not express any significant interest in OHS before 2000.1481   Within 
the first two years of the Blair government, the HSC/E was affected by the generic deregulatory 
programme.1482  Though not specific, the HSC/E was an obvious target; it was the second largest 
of the 63 national regulators, which made a significant amount ‘regulatory contacts’ per year.1483   
Moreover, its relatively large budget and connection to the EU predetermined it to face some 
pressure from the government’s general deregulatory agenda.  However, from 2000, we start to 
see more specific and a significant amount of deregulatory pressure being placed on the HSC/E.  
Upon hearing that the government had focused its sights on the HSC/E, Bacon noted that ‘some 
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of us just sort of went down on the table’.1484   From the early 2000s, the HSE experienced a 
decrease in its resources and front line numbers that corresponded with a downturn in inspection 
and some regulatory activity.1485  An internal 2004 HSC paper, Becoming a Modern Regulator, 
speaks to the deregulatory pressure, ‘There has been deregulatory pressure from within 
government to reduce burdens on business, be clearer about the benefits of regulation, and more 
sympathetic to business needs’.1486   
Aside from the fact that the HSC/E ‘stood out’ as a resource heavy and burdensome institution, 
there are four salient reasons why the government felt obliged to target the HSC/E.  First, 
targeting the HSC/E was following in the tradition of previous governments, it was simply what 
the government did after a period of ‘settling in’.  Bacon observed during her time in 
government that there was a feeling amongst ministers that expressed itself as, ‘We didn’t 
manage to shoot it last time, let’s go out and hunt it again, where is this quango?’1487  Moreover, 
the weaker the HSC/E became, the easier it was to ‘hunt it’.  Second, the escalating numbers of 
workplace deaths became apparent.  What was once offset by unemployment, redundancies, 
under-reporting, de-industrialisation could not be explained away.   Third, a significant amount 
of Labour MPs wanted to reverse such poor statistics, one of which was John Prescott, Kevin 
Myers recollected:  
Well, the Health and Safety at Work Act was very dear to the heart of John Prescott. He was a young MP 
when it went through Parliament and he, I think he’s said he thinks that the Welfare State, The National 
Health Service and the Health and Safety at Work Act are three of the biggest legacies of the Labour Party, 
in terms of our society. So that’s how he viewed it. So when in 1997 they came into government having 
been out of power for 18 years, , he thought, well let’s actually review the situation 25 years on from the 
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Health and Safety at Work Act to see what we need, if there’s anything that we need to do to revitalise it, 
it’s a bit of a cliché, but that was the point of it.1488 
John Prescott’s interest in OH triggered something that the HSE had not experienced in many 
decades:   
The Deputy Prime Minister (John Prescott)… wanted a far stricter regime and he wanted more ministerial 
involvement, he didn’t want the commission doing things, he wanted to be in charge of everything 
outright’. So that was a different kind of challenge, it wasn’t one that said, let’s cut the resources, let’s 
undermine the regulation, it was the opposite. But in many ways it was just as dangerous and it was 
politicising and it was saying, we want ministers in charge, whereas the whole point about setting up the 
Health and Safety Commission and Executive was actually to get health and safety out from under politics 
and not get it politicised.  But under Labour I think it got more politicised but it had already happened. 
Though Prescott did not get ‘a far stricter regime’, his influence on the cabinet directed attention 
to the ineffectiveness of the HSC/E and more so ‘revitalised’ the discussion on how the 
government could reboot the OHS system and make it fit for the twenty-first century.1489  
Fourth, the legitimacy of OHS was beginning to be questioned in the public space.  Therein, 
catching the attention of government officials.1490  The understated and unassuming nature of 
OHS regulation was gradually substituted by a rabid politicisation of the activities of the OHS 
Network.1491  From the late 1990s, ‘regulatory myths’ about OHS flourished.  Disseminated by 
the leading tabloids, these myths were based on ‘tales of heavy-handed and disproportionate 
enforcement, the petty implementation of regulations, and the adoption of unnecessarily 
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bureaucratic approaches to issues of health and safety’.1492  Thus, by the time New Labour 
entered office, it faced significant ‘media hullabaloo’ that threatened the legitimacy of OHS.1493   
These four factors resulted in the Deputy Prime Minister’s launch of the Revitalisation of Health 
and Safety, which firmly placed the HSC/E within the crosshairs of government.  
 
5.2 The steering of the Labour government                                                                              
The steering of the HSC/E under the Labour government was typified by the imposition of 
targets.  Steering public actors through setting targets was an attempt to instil norms, improve 
efficacy and produce more successful outcomes. 1494   Rather than just operating, public services 
would be required to deliver ‘public value’ and value could be ascertained by whether targets 
were achieved.1495  In 1999, the HSC/E and the government launched the Revitalising Health 
and Safety strategy.1496   It contained the first ever explicit target approach for the OHS.1497  
Experiencing target – based steering, Myers of the HSE explains, ‘At the time the Blair 
government was keen on more explicit outcome focused approaches and we were then all driven 
to develop targets’.1498  Targets were adopted to reduce the number of working days lost to 
work-related injuries and ill-health, incidence rates of fatal and major injury accidents and 
incidence rates of cases of work-related ill-health.  All of which had to be achieved by 2010.  A 
year later, the government also initiated a decade-long occupational health strategy to reduce 
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occupational ill health and related absence.1499   The HSC/E was obliged to report on their 
progress each autumn, comparing the latest data with the base year (1999/2000).1500 
Patrick Diamond's article on the delivery agenda in public services sheds light on the centralising 
nature of steering through target setting.1501   First, he wrote that agencies that missed targets or 
that were charged with being unduly sluggish would result in intervention by the government at 
different levels of intensity, such as experienced by Myers, ‘The problem is if you don’t get the 
targets right you get strange behaviours’.1502   Second, target-based steering laid bare the paradox 
or ‘double talk’ of New Labour, responsibility for delivery was apparently devolved to the 
HSC/E to achieve the targets, but it sought ‘external validation’ from the executive, therein 
strengthening the grip of the core executive.1503  Third, setting targets also distanced the 
executive from failure.   Since the onus of performance was laid firmly on the shoulders of the 
HSC/E.  Despite budget cuts and expanded responsibilities, the HSC/E had to achieve its targets 
or suffer the negative consequences from public scrutiny.  Fourth, targets were an attempt to set 
the HSC/E as ‘industry leaders’.  The targets set by the HSC/E were an attempt to lead by 
example.  It was hoped that industry would follow suit and set targets for itself.1504  
 
5.3 The ‘official’ retraction of the Centre                                                                                     
From the Thatcher government until New Labour, the Centre had experienced retraction due to 
the constant cuts in resources, recruitment freezes and the antagonistic surround.   However, we 
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start to see a marked change in the character of the retraction.1505  The HSC/E under the Labour 
government actively sought to retreat from the workplace; it formulated ways to retract from 
front line services.  This is in line with the Hazard Magazine’s reporting that the HSC/E 
‘dropped off dramatically’ from the early 2000s.1506  Indeed, in a decade of New Labour 
government, 1999/2000 – 2008/2009, HSE inspections fell by two – thirds.  There was a 69% 
decline in the numbers of inspections made by HSE’s Field Operations Directorate (FOD); a 
63% decline in investigations of safety incidents at work; a 29% decrease in all types of 
enforcement notices issued: a fall in HSE prosecutions of 48%; by the end of the decade, a mere 
8% of major reported injuries were investigated.1507 
Such levels of retreat from the workplace were significant; Hazard’s Retreating from Front 
section reported the intention of the HSC/E to ‘retreat’ from the workplace, it argued that the 
HSC/E ‘stole a lead on other regulators by being the poster boy’ for the government’s new 
approach.1508   The retreat stemmed from the fact that the HSC/E could not continue the pretence 
that they were able to function with such obstacles.  The Centre believed that its efforts to 
improve working conditions in certain areas plateaued in the 1990s.1509   Industry had moved on 
from the Robens Report: deindustrialisation, growth of the service industry, industry 
fragmentation and contracting challenged the HSC/E’s regulatory functions.1510  Also, their 
resources, expertise, influence and legitimacy had been so eroded that a new direction was 
needed.  Thus, from the 2000s, the HSC/E reviewed its inspection and enforcement strategy with 
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the aim to concentrate more resources on advice, ‘providing effective support free from the fear 
of enforcement’.1511   This was akin to what Gordon Brown, the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, referred to as the ‘new model of regulation’ where the formulation of regulation or 
maintaining a well-staffed front line service should no longer be seen as the norm or a goal to 
work towards.   Instead, such things should only be actioned after education and encouragement 
have failed, ‘No inspection without justification, no form filling without justification, and no 
information requirements without justification.   Not just a light touch but a limited touch.   The 
new model of regulation can be applied to… health and safety (emphasis added)’.1512    
Observing the HSC/E move in this direction, it becomes clear what the ‘revitalisation’ of OHS 
entailed.  Carol Boyd observed that Revitalising set the course to intervene as little as possible; 
the ‘revitalising exercise’ was based on tactics of ‘persuasion, cajoling and buck-passing’.1513   In 
this vein, the HSC/E’s retraction was reliant upon the ‘self – interest model’; it was intended that 
businesses would be able to identify the ‘business case’ and make the necessary improvements to 
their workplaces and that insurance companies would exert pressure on ‘poor performers’.1514  
This would allow the HSC/E to reduce its footprint and essentially become ‘risk managers’; 
moving from removing the risks from hazards to one of managing the risks.1515 
It would appear that the HSC/E’s retraction was to such an extent that it did not want to release 
too much information.  The information of the decrease of ‘regulatory contacts’1516 was kept out 
of the public domain, so the Hazards Magazine spent months pursuing the HSE for its figures on 
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the decrease of ‘regulatory contacts’; the figures revealed a dramatic fall in official safety 
inspections, ‘[R]evealing how far HSE has moved from its role as the UK’s official health and 
safety enforcer.   Firms are now less likely to be inspected, less likely to be prosecuted, less 
likely to be convicted and less likely to receive an HSE notice requiring safety 
improvements’.1517   It should also be noted that the policy of retreat was not restricted to the 
reduction of ‘regulatory contact’, it also extended to the formulation of regulations.  The HSC’s 
strategy involved a ‘downplaying of further regulatory solutions’.1518  As far as the HSC/E was 
concerned ‘existing health and safety legislation offers adequate legal protection for all workers, 
regardless of employment status’1519, the ‘best route’ was through clear advice.1520  The 
‘storytelling’ of the Thatcher government had finally found its place in the HSC/E.1521   
In order for the HSC/E to retract from the workplace, the HSC/E wanted to develop closer 
partnerships with employers by providing support and education with ‘the principle of proactive 
management’ of OHS.1522   To this point, Whyte and Tombs observed that the HSC/E exerted its 
energies developing partnerships with employers rather than focusing on enforcement. 1523  The 
government and HSC/E began to use the term ‘partnership’ much more frequently following the 
1997 general election.1524   Although ‘partnership’ was said to have its roots in the Robens 
Report’s notion that special interests needed to be accommodated into the policymaking process, 
the ‘language of partnership further relegated the role of the state. Under the partnership 
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mentality, statutory intervention was thought to be ineffective without the wider support of 
partner organisations’.1525   
The close bond between the HSC/E and employers that had gained momentum since Thatcher’s 
attack on unions was formalised and made explicit with the notion of partnership.1526  Instead of 
addressing the imbalance of the tripartite framework, Beck and Woolfson note that the 
government sought to intensify the existing business-government dialogue on regulation.1527  
This development coupled with the retraction from the workplace was leading to what the former 
Director-General referred to as the ‘slow death’ of HSE.1528  
 
5.4 The ‘official’ growth of the Periphery                                                                                                            
The Periphery continued to grow unabated.  It grew in the traditional trajectory of filling the 
vacuum of the Centre, but it also experienced significant growth in the contracts it received from 
the HSE.  Coming out of the matrix between the HSE’s partnership with the private sector and 
the former’s retraction from the workplace was the aggressive contracting out of formerly HSE 
functions.  The Hazard Magazine made several FOI requests to the HSE for information on the 
extent of its contracting out (see Fig 1).  What they found was that the HSE had ‘massively’ 
increased its ‘external spend’.1529   HSE’s expenditure on external OHS services increased 
significantly from £19.9m in 2000/01 to £26.2m in 2004/05, totalling 9.6 percent of its total 
budget in 2004/05.1530   
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Fig 1. The Contracting out of the HSE1531 
 
However, from the 2000s, some actors of the Periphery had been caught in the snares of 
regulatory myths.  Therein, prompting the government to view the OHS consultants as a cause 
for concern.   The Brown government was the first government to focus on the Periphery.  The 
previous governments did not censure the Periphery.  Perhaps this was because the Periphery 
was seen as the epitome of a market – based solution to the betterment of working conditions.  
Employers opted to use the services of consultants; no regulation stipulated their appointment.  
Moreover, there was also a significant amount of naivety of the ‘burdens on business’ narrative.  
It did not account for the ‘hangers on’, instead it was postulated that once the regulator was 
restrained, then the burdens would miraculously dissipate. 
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From the mid-2000s, government officials began to focus their energies on ‘overzealous health 
and safety consultants’ which emerged during discussions about the merger of the HSC and 
HSE, ‘Employers can be over-cautious in their interpretation of its provisions, increasing the 
compliance burden on themselves.  Over-zealous health and safety “consultants” contribute to 
this problem and we call for a system of accreditation of consultants and advisers’.1532  The main 
issues centred on the ‘abuse’ of written risk assessments that occurred with the introduction of 
the Six-Pack.  The HSE’s former Director-General recalled that some consultants made a 
‘bureaucracy of what was originally intended to be a flexible and discretionary system, and I 
think that's done HSE a lot of harm (emphasis added)’.1533  Though no major action was taken to 
address the ‘abuses’ of the Periphery, OHS consultants now had the attention of government. 
 
6.0 The surround of the Coalition government                                                                                    
On May 2010, the Labour government had clearly lost the election, but the Conservative 
opposition had failed to win.  Thus, David Cameron's Conservative Party agreed to a power-
sharing coalition government with Nick Clegg's Liberal Democrats.  Under the Coalition 
government, much of the surround remained the same except for a creeping populism.1534  
Following the ‘cycle’ set by the Blair government, the Conservative leader opened the door 
wider to a rhetorical populism through his appeals to the ordinary man.1535  
The populist rhetoric of the Conservative Party affected the surround of OHS in two ways.  First, 
the denigration of OHS was no longer confined to the tabloids; concerns were legitimated by No. 
10.  No previous government openly disparaged OHS regulation.  Lord McKenzie, New 
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Labour’s shadow Health and Safety Minister, protested: ‘The rhetoric of this government has 
shown an antipathy to health and safety; the rhetoric at the highest levels. I’m sure the previous 
government would never have done that, simply it is not in their DNA to do it (emphasis 
added).’1536  Though antipathy towards OHS was not new, never had it been expressed in such a 
visceral and populist way, the Prime Minister pronounced openly that the government was 
‘waging war against the excessive health and safety culture that has become an albatross around 
the neck of British businesses… This coalition has a clear new year's resolution: to kill off the 
health and safety culture for good’.1537  Arguably, such pronouncements added additional 
gravitas to the media’s proliferation of regulatory myths.1538   
Second, the populist rhetoric revolved around the notion of ‘common sense’.  Almond notes that 
common sense was ‘central to the Coalition Government’s thinking on health and safety 
regulation’.1539   If Big Society was the conversation between the government and the people, 
then common sense was the language in which they spoke to each other.  There was no place for 
translators or interpreters in this conversation.  Almond goes on to argue that the Coalition 
government explicitly used the notion of common sense as a deterring and critical restriction on 
OHS regulation; the government actively engaged with popular representations of the ordinary 
man’s common sense, and ‘the interaction stages of the meaning-generation process to form and 
consolidate one particular world-view’.1540  
Both of which contributed to an increasingly ‘thick’ surround for those working within OHS.  
The Deputy Chief of the HSE spoke of this surround:  
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I said I’ve worked in HSE for many years and when you meet people in the pub or dinner party and you 
talk about what you do for a living and I said most of my career when people find out what they do they 
say, gosh, that’s a really interesting and important job and there’s not enough of you… but in the last 
couple of years the experience has been, oh you’re one of them are you?... that is a real problem.1541   
Those that worked within OHS were constantly ‘sniped at by ministers, the press’.1542  A BERR 
report in the late 2000s noted that negative and erroneous statements around health and safety 
frustrated those that worked within OHS, their frustration was the backdrop in their responses in 
the call for evidence.1543  Similarly, the British Chamber of Commerce (BCC) believed that the 
media coverage ‘has helped to fuel negative perceptions and cynicism about health and safety 
and its value or lack of it.’1544    Throughout the 2000s, approximately 48,000 written articles 
were referring to health and safety published in the UK each year.1545  The bulk of which placed 
OHS in a negative light.  What made the surround worse for the HSE was the lack of an effective 
media centre.   The HSE was in no position to defend itself, Frank Davies, former Chair of the 
HSC noted that:  
The HSE used to have a huge media department – and a campaigns department.   It used to run national 
newspaper campaigns and used to engage’, and then the government ‘put a complete block on that…   if 
you compare that with, you know, even ten, fifteen years ago, their press releases were about working to 
raise awareness of asbestos and lead and the agricultural industry and so on.   So the flow of awareness-
raising activity in HSE has been deliberately suppressed, yes? (emphasis added).1546   
 
6.1 Targeting the HSE                                                                                                                         
The targeting of the HSE was unique.  Prior governments did not immediately target the HSE, it 
usually took some time in office, an investigation or an exogenous reason for the government to 
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target the HSE.  Yet, the Conservative government needed no provocation to target the HSE.  In 
fact, even before the Conservative Party came to power, it had expressed its disdain for the 
health and safety culture.   Two years before the Conservative came to power, Cameron stated 
that, ‘This whole health and safety, human rights act culture, has infected every part of our 
life’.1547  Arguably, the early targeting of the HSE was due to its weakness.  After three decades 
of government probes, the HSE was a much hollower institution.  The protective layers of the 
HSE/E had all but withered away.  We can also infer that the Cameron and his ministers drew 
their critique from the media’s regulatory myths.  Crucial to the acceptance of these myths was 
the fact that OHS regulations began to ‘invade’ areas that it had not traditionally occupied.  
Cameron’s target voter base was the ‘new entrants’ that were subject to OHS requirements.  
Similarly, Almond and Esbester suggest that the extension of regulatory activity to office work 
brought increased numbers of people in contact with the HSE ‘and contributed to later concerns 
about the legitimacy of health and safety’.1548  This became more profound with the growth of 
retail and service sectors.1549  Also, Davies of the HSC remarked: 
It was about the workplace, it was all to do with work.  It was not to do with outside.  Which is the problem 
we face now, it’s all outside.  We’re in the factories and controlling health and safety and in those days it 
was only in the factories.  Nobody talked about health and safety outside of the factories and almost like 
getting dirty. It was something you expect in a factory (emphasis added).1550   
Within the just a few weeks in government, the HSE was targeted with a review and a substantial 
budget cut. 
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6.2 Steering the HSE                                                                                                                           
The Coalition government utilised the steering tools of its predecessors except for one interesting 
development; the ‘public’ OHS review.  The ‘public’ OHS review sought to instil critical 
restrictions to OHS regulation and enforcement activity through appealing to the common sense 
of the ‘ordinary man’.1551  Arguably, contrary to previous government hostility towards OHS 
regulation, these reviews contributed to the creation of a ‘new orthodoxy’ of regulation ‘which 
sets firm parameters around what impossible and permissible in terms of future policy, and 
which excludes alternatives that do not conform to this model’.1552   These public reviews 
‘undertook interaction with a wider public constituency via two mechanisms: a consultation 
process which gathered responses from stakeholders, and an engagement with mediated popular 
opinion via the regulatory myths that were cited’.1553  In this vein, two OHS public reviews were 
distinguished; Lord Young’s Common Sense, Common Safety and Ragnar Löfstedt’s Reclaiming 
Health and Safety.   
 
6.2.1 Common sense, common safety                                                                                         
Lord David Young of Graffham, a Conservative peer, noted for overseeing two deregulatory 
White Papers in the mid-1980s, Lifting the Burden and Building Business Not Barriers, was 
asked by the new Prime Minister David Cameron to investigate ‘the rise of the compensation 
culture over the last decade coupled with the current low standing that health and safety 
legislation now enjoys’.1554   Sources indicate that Lord Young’s appointment was an effort to 
‘please the Thatcherite wing of the Conservative Party and elements of the tabloid press’.1555  
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The findings of his report were fairly predictable, thus before the publication, many from the 
OHS community tried to deter him from perpetuating regulatory myths.1556  Roger Bibbings, 
who had made his career in both the Centre and Periphery, met Lord Young on several occasions 
to dissuade him, he also met Alison Scott from the DWP, ‘the civil servant who wrote it’… to 
get her to say something a bit more reasonable’.1557  All such warnings were ignored, the Young 
report centred on freeing businesses from unnecessary bureaucratic burdens; regulatory agencies 
should consolidate and simplify regulations and that measures should be put in place in ensuring 
that the EU does not over-regulate.1558   Lord Young’s noted that he had received ‘a remarkable 
postbag’ in which ‘every single letter is in favour of the review’1559 and David Cameron 
welcomed the report ‘in full’ and vowed to retain Lord Young as an adviser to help implement 
the report across Whitehall.1560 
Though Common Sense, Common Safety did little to bring about direct and tangible change to 
OHS, it helped propagate the absurdity of OHS to white – collared new entrants.   The report 
represented the collectivisation of negative opinions about regulatory networks.  Almond 
referred to this as the ‘interaction stage’ in which the ‘objectification’ of subjective meanings 
were given concrete and external significance.   Lord Young’s report sparked nationwide 
discussion, debate, and agreement that aggregated individual subjective perceptions into a shared 
reality.  Accordingly, Lord Young knew that his task was ‘unusual’1561 and that health and safety 
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was a ‘mystique’ that he was consciously ‘stripping away’.1562   It was the first time that such 
scorn was placed between the covers of a TSO publication.  The ridicule of OHS was given 
‘official backing’ through his report, baseless and exaggerated stories could be legitimised just 
through association.     
In this vein, Lord Young’s report created an agenda for reform.  It helped cement the idea that 
the social regulation had a noble past but was corrupted by network actors seeking financial gain, 
the long arm of the EU and the presence of ‘busybodies and killjoys.’  The glorious past was one 
where ‘legislation… was directed at protecting those seen as most vulnerable, and which helped 
introduce safe practices for all workers’ tragically transformed into an ‘all-encompassing regime 
that stops people who change clocks from climbing ladders, requires Christmas trees to be kept 
behind barriers and prevents pantomime performers from throwing sweets to children in the 
audience’.1563   Similarly, the Prime Minister helped disseminate the ‘fall from Eden’ thesis:  
I think we'd all concede that something has gone seriously wrong with the spirit of health and safety in the 
past decade… It is clear that what began as a noble intention to protect people from harm has mutated into 
a stultifying blanket of bureaucracy, suspicion and fear that has saturated our country, covering the actions 
of millions of individuals as they go about their daily lives.1564  
Paul Taggart saw this idealisation of the past as one of the general features of populist discourse; 
it refers to a world built by people of common sense for principled and rational reasons.1565   
Thus, the underlying message was that it was not always like this, therein encouraging 
conversations about reform.1566    
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6.2.2 The Löfstedt Review 
The year after Common Sense, Common Safety was published, Chris Grayling, the Department 
for Work and Pensions’ (DWP) Minister for Employment, commissioned a review of health and 
safety legislation to be undertaken by Professor Ragnar Löfstedt, Director of the King's Centre 
for Risk Management at King's College.  It was noteworthy that when Grayling commissioned 
Reclaiming, he reportedly ‘wanted to absorb HSE into the Department of Work and Pensions as 
a prelude to axing it’, a DWP insider informed Hazards on condition of anonymity, ‘When he 
didn’t achieve that, he saw HSE was on the receiving end of a crippling funding cut’.1567  The 
commissioning of the Löfstedt Review was extraordinary; it was the widest-ranging review since 
the Robens Report.  The full title of the Löfstedt Review is Reclaiming Health and Safety for All.  
The notion of ‘reclaiming’ or ‘taking back’ has its roots in populist discourse.1568  It was the 
sense that something had been stolen from the people by the elite, in this case, bureaucrats and 
experts hijacked OHS. Thus the Löfstedt Review was the means for the government to transfer 
non – technical aspects of OHS back to the people.   
Phil James, Steve Tombs and David Whyte questioned the independence of the Löfstedt 
Review.1569   Their questioning has some grounding; before Professor Löfstedt had even 
completed his Review, the Employment Minister Chris Grayling stated, ‘We need common sense 
at the heart of the system, and these measures will help root out the needless burden of 
bureaucracy’.1570  He also stated elsewhere, ‘Professor Löfstedt’s review will play a vital part in 
putting common sense back at the heart of Britain’s health and safety system’.1571  Furthermore, 
when the Review was published Professor Löfstedt himself expressed concern about the extent to 
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which his report was being misused for political purposes.1572  However, the most telling 
evidence came from James, Tombs and Whyte’s analysis of Löfstedt’s references, they 
concluded that, ‘The inquiry drew on evidence from government sources more than other 
sources… Much of this evidence is in the form of reports and reviews from government and 
parliament itself’.1573  The weight of evidence wanted to simplify the layman’s task of achieving 
a safe workplace without the need of experts.   Thus, Löfstedt Review was essentially a publicity 
document for simplification and consolidation of regulations, personalisation of risk assessment 
and limitation of external enforcement. 
Taken as a whole, Löfstedt, Common Sense and the Department of Work and Pension’s Good 
Health and Safety, Good for Everyone were intended to make the OHS Network more placid.  
To this point, Michael Higgins observed that as a result of ‘popular enablement’, the 
Conservative government sought to alter national regulatory frameworks.   Throughout these 
reviews, the ‘rhetoric of empowerment’ for the ordinary man was utilised to ‘disguise the 
destruction of state support’.1574   Also, Higgins noted that the carrot of empowerment dangled in 
front of the ordinary man did not extend to the corporate sector ‘where government policy 
remains committed to eroding workplace rights’.1575  Thus, we should view the claims of 
empowerment along very narrow individualist economic lines rather than through the lens of 
social principles, ‘After all, removal of government everyday activities takes away from those 
financial, organisational and legal safeguards guaranteed by regulatory frameworks’.1576  The 
tangibility of this was reflected in the discarding and nullifying of regulations through the 
introduction of the Health & Safety (Miscellaneous Revocations) Regulations 2012 and the 
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Health and Safety (Miscellaneous Repeals, Revocations and Amendments) Regulations 2013.  
There has also been a significant slowing down of new regulation; there are currently 79 health 
and safety regulations on the statute book, compared to 90 in 2014–15 and 201 at the baseline 
year of 2011–12.1577  Additionally, there was also ‘breathing space’ allocated to businesses, for 
example, the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 
(RIDDOR) extended the three day injury reporting requirement to over seven days and the 
number of reportable incidents, injuries and illnesses were reduced and the requirement for self-
employed people to report injuries or illnesses was abandoned.   
 
6.3 The Centre – A willing victim?                                                                                                  
Though the weakening of the HSE had followed a consistent trajectory from the Thatcher period, 
it was clear under the Coalition government that its independence was significantly eroded.1578  
For the leadership in the HSE, it was a matter of ‘keeping your head down and getting on with 
the job’.1579  There was more to it than just victimisation.  It would appear that HSE shared an 
affinity with the government, often to the dismay of the Periphery.  No matter how ill – thought 
out or ideologically driven, the HSE would follow the direction of government and internalise 
the ‘burdens on business’ narrative.1580   Significant evidence that contradicted the government’s 
plans for OHS was collected by the HSE and select committees since the 2000s, yet much of this 
evidence was cast aside to pursue the direction of government.   
It is against this background that, Rory O’Neill l saw that ‘the cull of inspections’ was 
rationalised as a risk-based approach, but the HSE could not provide evidence, ‘It is simply a 
case of the HSE tamely following orders, in this case a stop-enforcing directive in the 
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government’s 2011 Good Health and Safety… The HSE tried to retrofit the evidence to the 
imposed policy’.1581   To this point, the Hazard stated, ‘Government instruction has percolated 
down into HSE’s… documents… Cable and Fallon needn’t have worried about HSE.  It has 
already gone way beyond the requirements of the incoming code’.1582  Moreover, the Magazine 
examined internal policy statements and 20 FOI requests to reveal that the HSE’s senior 
management was ‘tripping over itself to accommodate a deregulatory push from government and 
the employer lobby’.1583   Through the FOI requests, the HSE was forced to concede that they 
had agreed with the government to reduce proactive inspections.1584   
The HSE became a conduit for the Coalition government to spread its deregulatory agenda.  
Local Authority inspectors were instructed by the HSE to follow their National Local Authority 
Enforcement Code, which limited their occupational health and safety interventions to low-risk 
businesses.1585  Within the first two years of the Code, that local authorities reduced their 
unannounced proactive inspections to 16,400.  This was a drop of 86% since the baseline year of 
2009/10.1586  Similarly, the HSE was utilised by the government to ‘hold the line’ against 
proposals for European legislation.  The HSE used its ‘positive and influencing role’ on behalf of 
the UK government to frustrate the offshore and Seveso Directives (concerned with the 
prevention of major accidents).1587  Regarding the latter proposal, there were proposed changes 
in 2013 to the Seveso Directive which aimed at aligning the existing Directive with a new 
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classification of chemicals scheme.1588  The new scheme included a broader scope and some 
prescriptive requirements for inspections of hazardous sites.  However, the HSE campaigned 
against this, in doing so, preventing around £40 million of ‘unnecessary costs to British business 
and the regulators’. 1589  Similarly, the HSE achieved the withdrawal of planned EU Commission 
Directives on hairdressing and musculoskeletal disorders.1590   
From the late 2000s, the HSE was ‘pushed towards’ an increasingly commercialised position. A 
senior HSC source noted that, ‘The commercialisation agenda of HSE… has been forced on 
them by Ministers’.1591   The ‘commercialisation agenda’ thrust upon the HSE required elements 
of its operations were to be monetised or reorganised along commercial lines.1592   Although a 
‘payment for approval’ relationship has been a longstanding regulatory feature of the nuclear and 
offshore industries, the government sought to widen the HSE’s commercial operations.1593  
There were five aspects to the coerced commercial project of the HSE, first, the opening of the 
Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL), the HSE’s research and testing facilities, to the private 
sector.  The second angle was essentially products; specialist training courses and software.  
Third, offering support, advice and guidance to companies outside of the UK.  Fourth, auditing 
organisations with mature health and safety systems.1594   The fifth aspect and mostly contested 
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was the ‘newly marketized regulatory strategy’ of Fee for Intervention (FFI), whereby HSE 
charged firms when it intervened in response to breaches of the law.    
Despite industry’s overwhelming protest and the recommendation of Triennial Review that 
HSE’s public body status is the appropriate delivery model, the government still pushed ahead 
with the commercialisation of the HSE.1595   The rationale behind this was that it wanted the 
HSE to become more self-financing and to recover a larger proportion of its operating costs from 
its activities.  In doing so, extending the rationality of ‘commercialised service provision’ 
through passing the costs of regulating from the public to the private sector.1596    
 
6.4 The maligned Periphery                                                                                                                
The private sector of the Periphery continued to usurp functions of the HSE.  However, it 
continued to face the backlash of regulatory myths.   Beginning in the latter years of the Labour 
Government, the disparagement of the Periphery heightened under the Coalition government.  
The disparagement has since become the enduring ‘white noise’ in the OHS debate.  This was 
principally a unique feature of the post - Löfstedt period, the Periphery was ignored throughout 
the Thatcher, Major and much of New Labour governments, reform was squarely aimed at the 
Centre.  The Periphery were free to expand unabated and fill the vacuum left by the cuts to the 
Centre.  However, their unquestioned expansion would come to an abrupt end in the late 2000s.   
In the late 2000s, a poignant narrative began to develop in which networks of professionals and 
consultants had abused the power that was devolved to them; they had ‘rode the coattails’ of 
government institutions, to enrich themselves or to cover up their incompetence.  Whether there 
was evidence of such activity was inconsequential, it was advantageous for the government to 
capitalise on the media sensation around the ’elf and safety jobsworths’.   
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This provided enough momentum to launch two initiatives that sought to censure whole areas of 
the Periphery.  First, the Myth Busters Challenge Panel gave the public the opportunity to 
challenge the Periphery’s advice.  The Panel, headed by Chair of the HSE, considered cases 
where inaccurate or disproportionate advice was given by members of the Periphery.  The Panel 
would deliberate on whether the advice was correct and proportionate regarding the 
interpretation of the requirements of OHS legislation.  Once the Panel reached its verdict, the 
public was then ‘encouraged to return to the offending organisation and ask it to come clean on 
the real reason for its decision (emphasis added).’1597  What the Challenge Panel represented was 
troubling to some of the Periphery, it tainted the whole Periphery with the actions of a few 
individuals.  If a ‘guilty’ verdict was reached, it did not only cast aspersions on the ‘culprit’ but 
also the organisation that he or she was a member of.  Furthermore, the mere fact that the 
Challenge Panel had to be established validated that regulatory myths were not myths after all.  
The Panel perturbed organisations in the Periphery, which alleged that erroneous actions in the 
name of OHS were not necessarily traceable to the advice of OHS consultants, it could have 
equally had stemmed from how employers implemented their advice.1598  Also, the Challenge 
Panel empowered the public to question expert knowledge based on common sense.  All that was 
needed was a doubt; the public was not requested to bring counter-evidence to the Panel, therein 
creating a culture of doubt and scepticism that not only delegitimises the professionalism of 
consultants, but it also encourages managers to disregard or reinterpret the advice of consultants.   
The second initiative was recommended by Common Sense and Good Health and Safety.  It was 
the setting up of a register of all OHS consultants who offered their services to the public and 
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accessed 30 October 2016 
1598 SHP, ‘Practitioners not Wild about OSHCR’ (SHP, 31 January 2011) 
<http://www.shponline.co.uk/practitioners-not-wild-about-oshcr/?cid=searchresult> accessed 30 October 2016; 
SHP, ‘Changing Perceptions Begins at Home, IOSH 2012 Delegates Told’ (SHP, 6 March 2012)                                    
<www.shponline.co.uk/changing-perceptions-begins-at-home-iosh-2012-delegates-told/?cid=searchresult > 
accessed 30 October 2016 
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private sector.1599  The Occupational Safety and Health Consultants (OSHCR) was purported to 
make it easier for the businesses to access reliable and reputable advice.   Businesses were 
afforded the opportunity to search a database for ‘accredited’ consultants, free of charge.  
Consultants in the OSHCR who failed to maintain standards would be subject to disciplinary 
procedures, and if a decision to withdraw their membership status were made, the consultants 
would no longer be eligible to appear on the OSHCR.  The OSHCR was by no means a neutral 
pursuit, it stemmed from a particular perception of the Periphery, the government and the HSE 
freely admitted that the OSHCR was a means ‘to clamp down on the rogue health and safety 
advisers who cost industry so much money by giving them advice which bears little relation to 
the actual requirements of legislation’.1600  Thus, many consultants were perturbed by the stigma 
of setting up such a scheme.1601  Moreover, using the services of a consultant was pitched as a 
last resort, the HSE’s advice read: ‘Before you approach a consultant, have you considered 
managing your own health and safety? You probably manage many areas of your own 
business...  HSE provides tools to help you manage health and safety (emphasis added)’.1602 
Though the above initiatives have yet to impact the Periphery in any meaningful way, they 
indicate a developing fractious relationship between the Centre and some elements of the 
Periphery. 
 
7.0 Conclusion                                                                                                                                    
The OHS Network had the potential to develop into a well - rounded governance network, 
                                                     
1599 David Young, Common Sense, Common Safety (Cabinet Office 2010) 
accessed:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60905/402906_CommonSe
nse_acc.pdf on 29 October 2018 
1600 DWP, Good Health and Safety, Good for Everyone (DWP 2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66745/good-health-and-safety.pdf> 
accessed 27 June 2018 
1601 SHP, ‘Practitioners not Wild about OSHCR’ (SHP, January 31 2011) 
<accessed:www.shponline.co.uk/practitioners-not-wild-about-oshcr/?cid=searchresult> accessed 27 June 2018; 
Mark Burton, ‘I’m Working as a Consultant. Is there any Career Benefit to getting on to OSHCR?’ (Health and 
Safety at Work, 8 August 2011) <www.healthandsafetyatwork.com/recruitment-expert-oshcr> accessed 27 June 
2018 
1602 HSE, 'The Occupational Safety and Health Consultants Register (OSHCR)’ (HSE, n.d.) 
<www.hse.gov.uk/oshcr/> accessed 30 October 2016 
©University of Reading 2018                                                                                  Page 292 
largely independent from government.  The HSC/E were created to do the work that the 
government proved incapable of doing.  Under the Labour government (1974 – 1979), the 
HSC/E realised much of their potential because they were nurtured and given the space to fulfil 
their regulatory mandate.  However, successive government significantly curtailed the autonomy 
of the HSC/E.  From the Thatcher government, there was a continuous momentum to steer the 
HSC/E towards moderation.  The continuity of government was particularly remarkable; each 
government built on the interventions of the previous government to gradually erode the 
governance capacity of the HSC/E.  Through such means, steering evolved and became more 
intrusive with each government.   
We should envision the evolution of steering as a funnel; starting very broad and generic then 
becoming narrower and more specific.  Starting with the Labour government’s mode of steering 
which was generic, subtle and unassuming.  The Thatcher government evolved steering 
considerably; it began the process of instilling norms into the HSC/E, in order to create much 
more moderated and less invasive institutions.  This, in turn, was significantly matured and 
intensified through the Major governments’ political firestorms, which were specific reviews that 
attempted to further moderate the HSC/E.  The specificity and intensity of the Major 
government’s review went to the heart of the legitimacy of OHS, no longer sacred and 
untouchable, it was openly ‘caught up in the deregulation red tape stuff’.1603   Probing questions, 
which were hitherto never vocalised, considered the continued existence of the HSC/E and 
whether all ‘parts’ were necessary.  Such questions were answered by the Labour government, 
which abolished the HSC and formalised the contraction of the HSE.  Moreover, the Labour 
governments advanced the steering of the HSE through setting targets, focusing on performance 
management.  By the time the Coalition government entered office; the job was done, the HSE 
was a hollowed-out institution,  
                                                     
1603 Paul Almond, Interview with Jenny Bacon, Former Director- General of the HSE, University of Reading 
(Reading, 6/11/2014) 
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The HSE is suffering an identity crisis.   It is a regulator averse to regulating… when it comes to workplace 
health problems…   no capacity to assess, let alone remedy, them…  The HSE – both its leadership and its 
board – needs to assert its independence from government. At the moment its policy and practice is 
conflated uncritically with pronouncements from a government openly hostile to the HSE and to its 
regulatory function.1604 
The fate of the HSE was a culmination of events that began when Leo Pliatzky handed his report 
to the Prime Minister in the winter of 1979. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1604 Health and Safety at Work, ‘Rory O’Neill ‘Campaigner and Wannabe HSE Chief Executive, Talks to HSB’s 
editor, Howard Fidderman Biting the Hand that Starves it: Citizen Sane and the HSE’ (Health and Safety at Work, 
22 July 2013) <www.healthandsafetyatwork.com/hsb/citizen-sane-and-hse> accessed 29 October 2016 
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Chapter Eight – Conclusion 
1.0 The capture and release of OHS                                                                                                        
The capture and release of OHS produced a remarkable history.  Moreover, at each of these 
turns, it has told us much about government.  The capture of OHS informs us about an emerging 
state that sought to ‘minimize the social costs of industrialization by protecting the workforce 
from the undesirable side-effects of manufacturing production’.1605  The continued capture tells 
us about a state caught up in a ‘self-generating, administrative momentum’.1606 Correspondingly, 
the release of OHS informs us about a state that reached its limit.  Overloaded by its capture of 
the workplace and motivated by the activities of non – state actors, it sought to ‘release’ some of 
its responsibilities to non-departmental public bodies and non-state actors. 
 
2.0 The recapture                                                                                                                        
The recapture of OHS corresponded with the surround of the Thatcher government.  It continued 
with the Coalition government, showing no signs of weariness.  The aggressive recapture of the 
HSE stems from the government’s ‘desire for control and wish to shape the HSC/E’s work in a 
direct way’.1607  Every government since the Thatcher government has sought to scrutinise and 
interfere in the decision – making processes of the HSC/E.   The notion that the OHS Network 
was out of control prompted the government to target and steer them.  Autonomy could prove 
too costly for the government if the HSC/E were left to expand.   Agencies like the HSE had the 
propensity to consume significant resources that could be used for more politically expedient 
causes.  Also, the notion of a quasi-autonomous lawmaking body staffed with non-departmental 
personnel, employers, trade unionists and professionals regulating a segment of the UK’s 
                                                     
1605 P.W.J. Bartrip and P.T. Fenn, ‘The Evolution of Regulatory Style in the Nineteenth Century British Factory 
Inspectorate’ (1983) 10 JLS 2 p201 
1606 Oliver MacDonagh, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal’ (1958) 1 HJ 1 p52 
1607 Paul Almond and Mike Esbester, The Changing Legitimacy of Health and Safety at Work, 1960 - 2015 (IOSH 
2016) p92 
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economy was a daunting prospect for the government.   It would appear that the settlement 
reached at the ‘Whitehall War’ was a temporary measure. 
 
2.1 The consequences of recapture                                                                                                                        
The ongoing recapture of the OHS is reflected in three significant outcomes.  First, the 
unravelling of the HSE’s protective layers exposed it to the designs of government.  Formerly, 
its well-integrated protective layers allowed the HSC/E to resist government probes and preserve 
their autonomy.  However, these layers were gradually worn away, leaving behind much 
hollower institutions to the degree that the ending of the HSC occurred with little to no protest.   
The protective layer of both sides of industry did not amount to much of a defence, the benefits 
of tripartism became less pertinent as the context of industrial relations changed.1608  Also, the 
peril of possible disasters was enough to deter the Thatcher government from further probes, but 
from the 1990s, this lost significance as the HSE’s capacity to study and control accidents was 
progressively eroded.  The protection of the sponsoring department was lost with the loss of the 
DE; the DWP did not offer the ‘paternal protection’ the HSE received with the DE, according to 
Bacon, 
We lost our parent department, the Department of Employment disappeared, and so we had to form a 
whole lot of new relationships. And it took ages and was very resource intensive to build up a relationship 
with the Department of the Environment, which was itself of course then later subject to the machinery of 
government changes and became DEFRA and then became whatever it is now.  So all of that is quite 
upsetting to any kind of trying to build relationships and understandings and so on.  But when we first 
joined the Department of the Environment, nobody but nobody really knew what the Health and Safety 
Executive and Commission were and did, nor had much interest in it.1609 
The protection of expertise that the state could not surmount was reduced with the HSE’s 
haemorrhaging of expertise and research capabilities.  More poignantly, the populist appeals to 
                                                     
1608 Paul Almond and Mike Esbester, The Changing Legitimacy of Health and Safety at Work, 1960 - 2015 (IOSH 
2016) p87 
1609 Paul Almond, Interview with Jenny Bacon, Former Director- General of the HSE, University of Reading 
(Reading, 6/11/2014) 
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common sense have the propensity to challenge the remaining areas of expertise.  Lastly, the one 
remaining protection was the support of business.  To this point, an HSE source revealed, ‘The 
reason why HSE is still there today is purely because…  ministers have never managed to get 
British industry to say they don’t want it...  If they did, HSE would be dead in the water 
(emphasis added)’.1610  However, even this thin membrane of protection has been stretched with 
the business community’s displeasure with the FFI.1611 
Second, because of the eroded protective layers, the HSE has been defenceless to the downward 
pressure from the government.  The government could essentially mould the HSE into whatever 
it desired.   The ability to do this had significantly diminished the HSE’s regulatory mandate.  
Decreasing budgets have been accompanied by lowering staff levels, decreased regulatory 
contact and the allocation of core services to the private sector.1612  FFI was touted as a means 
for the HSE to recover the costs from the Coalition government’s 35% cut in its budget.  
However, it appears that the FFI scheme is loss-making.1613  The retraction of the ‘physical’ 
presence of the HSE has also been accompanied by an ‘intellectual deficit’.1614  Whyte and 
Tombs found that the minimal level of preventative inspections and relaxed rules of reporting 
has led to inadequate ‘levels of intelligence’.1615  Also, the HSE’s reliance on business being 
responsible fails to consider that businesses do not always register their existence with the HSE, 
leaving the HSE with an unrealistic picture of the problems it faces and the burden of expending 
resources to identify premises before their risk can be assessed.1616  In the face of such an 
                                                     
1610 Paul Almond and Mike Esbester, The Changing Legitimacy of Health and Safety at Work, 1960 - 2015 (IOSH 
2016) p197 
1611 IOSH, ‘Exit interview: Dame Judith Hackitt’ (IOSH, 27 April 2016) https://www.ioshmagazine.com/article/exit-
interview-dame-judith-hackitt accessed 28 June 2018 
1612 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, Triennial Review of the Health and Safety Executive. Submission to the 
Department for Work and Pensions (Institute of Employment Rights 2013) 
1613 Yoosof Farah, ‘HSE 'Lost £6m' on Safety Fines Scheme Last Year’ (Building, 18 January 2017) 
<https://www.building.co.uk/news/hse-lost-6m-on-safety-fines-scheme-last-year/5085793.article> accessed 3 
October 2018 
1614 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, Triennial Review of the Health and Safety Executive. Submission to the 
Department for Work and Pensions (Institute of Employment Rights 2013) 
1615 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, Triennial Review of the Health and Safety Executive. Submission to the 
Department for Work and Pensions (Institute of Employment Rights 2013) p5 
1616 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, Triennial Review of the Health and Safety Executive. Submission to the 
Department for Work and Pensions (Institute of Employment Rights 2013) 
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intelligence deficit, ‘it is difficult to see how a risk-based model or any coherent programme of 
targeted inspections/interventions could be sustained’.1617   Though difficult to confidently 
correlate, there is every indication that the government’s reshaping of the HSE has had a 
negative impact on work-related accidents.1618  In the first year of the Coalition government, the 
number of people killed at work in Britain last year rose by 16 percent, and the rate of fatal 
injury per 100,000 workers also increased – from 0.5 to 0.6.1619  Similarly, Hugh Robertson, 
TUC Head of Safety, postulates that the historic downward trend in work-related fatalities and 
ill-health has stagnated and, in some instances, reversed.1620    
Third, the State’s recapture of OHS prompted a fractious relationship between the Centre and the 
Periphery.  The quality of OHS policy, practice and research requires the delicate balance of 
both sides of the OHS Network.   Each shift in the Centre’s behaviour caused by government 
pressure created significant friction with the Periphery.  The weakened and commercialised 
Centre has transformed significantly from its Robens beginnings.  The HSE’s alignment with 
government engendered the former to speak in tandem with the latter to the extent that nothing 
came from the HSE that contradicted the official government line.  Even if this alignment meant 
disparaging the Periphery, reiterating regulatory myths and echoing reasons for governments 
cuts.1621  All of which were carried out with no substantial evidence.  Thus, the Hazards 
Magazine believed that the HSE was stuck in an ‘abusive relationship’, ‘It is time the HSE 
stopped playing the Whitehall game and saying ‘thank you’ to ministers after each successive 
                                                     
1617 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, Triennial Review of the Health and Safety Executive. Submission to the 
Department for Work and Pensions (Institute of Employment Rights 2013) p7 
1618 SHP, ‘Workplace Deaths Increase in Coalition Government’s First Year’ (SHP, 29 June 2011) 
<https://www.shponline.co.uk/workplace-deaths-increase-in-coalition-government-s-first-year/> accessed 3 October 
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1619 SHP, ‘Workplace Deaths Increase in Coalition Government’s First Year’ (SHP, 29 June 2011) 
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1620 Hazards Magazine, 'Buy Me: HSE Pimps Out its Services as Regulating takes a Back Seat' (Hazards Magazine, 
June 2016) <www.hazards.org/safetypimp/buyme.htm> accessed 3 October 2018 
1621 Hazards Magazine, ‘Low Life: How the Government has put a Low Price on your Life’ (Hazards Magazine, 
January 2013) <www.hazards.org/votetodie/lowlife.htm> accessed 29 October 2016 
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insult and cut.  It is time for the watchdog to bite the hand that starves it’.1622  This is unlikely to 
happen.  Since Leo Pliatzky identified the HSE, there has been a general trend towards ‘taming’ 
the HSE.  Building on the legacy of previous governments, the Coalition government has arrived 
at a place where it can exert considerable influence on the HSE.  The TUC’s Head of Safety 
observed that government ministers decide who sits on the HSE board; the bulk of joint 
committees have been moderated and there is considerably less consultation with the HSE.1623 
Attempting to appeal to the Periphery, the HSE reiterated that it had to make a series of 
unpopular choices, but its survival was the most important factor.1624  It was a strategic necessity 
to align itself with the government.  A former HSE Chief noted that ‘siding’ with the 
government, even if it disadvantaged the Periphery, was more necessary than ever before.  The 
need to safeguard the relationship between the two ‘central pillars’ of OHS, the HSE and the 
Government, trumped all other concerns.  If this was not secured:  
[T]he professional efforts of the rest of our national provision for industrial health and safety would 
gradually run down, as would our precious ability…  to get to the bottom of new developments, provide 
information and stimulus to national and international efforts influence international standards.’1625   
Decades of discord, the loss of the HSC, crippling budget cuts, negative press and the populist 
backlash left a shell of a Centre that was willing do anything to remain operational.    
It appears that the bulk of the friction will stem from the commercialisation of the HSE.  The 
HSE accelerated its commercialisation operations; it laid out plans to expand its audit and 
consultancy services nationally and internationally, primarily in areas that were traditionally 
associated with the Periphery.   In reaction, disgruntled members of the Periphery declared at the 
                                                     
1622 Health and Safety at Work, ‘Rory O’Neill: Campaigner and Wannabe HSE Chief Executive, Talks to HSB’s 
editor, Howard Fidderman Biting the Hand that Starves it: Citizen Sane and the HSE’ (Health and Safety at Work, 
22 July 2013) <www.healthandsafetyatwork.com/hsb/citizen-sane-and-hse> accessed 29 October 2016 
1623 Hazards Magazine, 'Buy Me: HSE Pimps Out its Services as Regulating takes a Back Seat' (Hazards Magazine, 
June 2016) <www.hazards.org/safetypimp/buyme.htm> accessed 3 October 2018 
1624 SHP, ‘IOSH 2014 Big Debate’ (SHP, 19 June 2014) <www.shponline.co.uk/iosh-2014-big-debate-you-are-a-
regulator-stick-to-regulating/?cid=searchresult> accessed 30 October 2016 
1625 John Rimington, 'Health and Safety - Past, Present and Future:  (The Alan St John Holt Memorial Lecture, 
October 9th 2008) accessed; http://www.rospa.com/rospaweb/docs/advice-services/occupational-safety/john-
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Big Debate, ‘You are a regulator.  Stick to regulating.  End of story’.1626  Such matters caused 
significant intrigue, prompting questions of neutrality and conflict of interests, Neal Stone of the 
BSC was perplexed: 
What you are seeing now is different.  How powerful is the commercial imperative?  Is HSE really going to 
be competing in the market to provide audit or consultancy?  Should it be doing that or should it be 
concentrating on the statutory priorities that were set 40 years ago, enforcement, science and technology 
and policy?1627    
The disparagement of the Periphery is unlikely to lead to a complete fracture in the Network; the 
Centre and the Periphery are too dependent on each other’s services.  However, we are likely to 
see a less connected Network as the Centre continues to align with the government and expand 
its commercial operations. 
 
3.0 History repeats itself                                                                                                                  
The government’s recapturing of OHS has resulted in an almost unrecognisable OHS Network 
from its HASAWA origins.  The recapture process has eroded much of the gains made under the 
1974 - 1979 Labour government.  It was as if the period of the 1970s was a hiatus from the status 
quo.   The traits of the pre – Robens era are reappearing; the distancing between the Centre and 
the Periphery, increasing government involvement in the HSE’s decision – making processes, a 
growing intellectual deficit and limited autonomy.  As a result, much of the same issues that 
prompted reform are likely to intensify.  The crucial question is, how many lives must be 
negatively impacted by the workplace before the government considers a ‘re-release’?  
 
 
                                                     
1626 SHP, ‘IOSH 2014 Big Debate’ (SHP, 19 June 2014) <www.shponline.co.uk/iosh-2014-big-debate-you-are-a-
regulator-stick-to-regulating/?cid=searchresult> accessed 30 October 2016 
1627 Louis Wustemann, ‘Interview: Neal Stone, Policy and Communications Director, British Safety Council’ 
(Health and Safety at Work, 2 October 2014) <www.healthandsafetyatwork.com/interview/neal-stone> accessed on 
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